Statement by Ms Aileen Carroll, M.P.,
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to the Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force
of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty
Vienna, September 4th, 2003

Allocution de Madame Aileen Carroll, Député,
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à la Conférence pour faciliter l’entrée en vigueur du
Traité d’Interdiction complète des Essais nucléaires
Vienne, le 4 septembre 2003
Mr. President,

In 1996, after 30 years of talk and two years of tough negotiations, the international community concluded a major treaty banning nuclear testing. During the final stages of negotiations at the Conference on Disarmament, a stringent entry-into-force provision was introduced and had the support of many states. It gave 44 named states each a de facto veto over entry-into-force. Canada was among those countries which questioned the wisdom of the provision, and therefore proposed an amendment that was ultimately adopted within the Treaty as Article XIV (2).

While many states feared the possibility that the CTBT’s entry-into-force provision could mean that the hard-won Treaty would remain in limbo for the immediate future, few imagined in 1996 that entry into force would be so long in coming. Indeed, during the signing ceremony in 1996, many expected the Treaty to enter into force well before the new millennium. Regrettably, it is seven years since the CTBT was concluded and many of us are attending our third Entry Into Force Conference.

As disturbing as the current situation is, it in no way diminishes the power and importance of the CTBT. The bottom line of this Treaty, and what makes Canada a die-hard supporter, is its provision for the prohibition of any nuclear weapon test explosion and for the multilateral verification of this prohibition. 168 states are now members of the Preparatory Commission, having signed the Treaty; this is up from 161 two years ago. Progress on ratifications has been more dramatic: 104 states, a clear majority of the global polity, have taken the fundamental step of ratifying the CTBT, up from 85 in 2001. But the stubborn fact remains that according to the provisions of Article XIV, twelve specific ratifications stand between us and the CTBT’s entry-into-force.

Mr. President,

Algeria’s recent decision to ratify brings us a step closer to entry-into-force. Just as importantly, in Canada’s view, this decision constitutes a ringing endorsement of the Treaty, and belies the claims of those who would question the ongoing relevance of the near universal test-ban norm. It brings Algeria - an Annex 2 state and the country which contributed more than any other to the success of the 2000 NPT Review Conference - into the family of CTBT ratifiers. This is consistent with Algeria’s longstanding leadership in non-proliferation and disarmament fora and an example for others who have stated they will ratify. We urge them to do so without delay.

We welcome Algeria among us as a full partner and participant in this Conference. We also welcome with equal zeal the recent ratification by Cyprus and signature by Palau. Each signature and every ratification reinforces the norm against nuclear testing and strengthens the value of the Treaty. The Minister of Foreign Affairs of Canada, the Honourable Bill Graham, wrote recently to counterparts in the twelve Annex 2 countries urging them to ratify. He also wrote to seventy-four other countries, whose ratifications Canada is also urging.
There is today a universal norm, a standard of international behaviour, which prohibits nuclear-test explosions. The CTBT is the codification of this norm, and provides the vehicle for its verification. It is increasingly unthinkable that we could ever return to the era of nuclear testing. Indeed, the conduct of a nuclear test explosion today, over six years after India and Pakistan flouted the international norm, would represent an act of defiance of the global will, and an affront to the principles enshrined in the Treaty.

In our desire to enhance peace and stability in a new international security environment, the search for new tools and means to use them collectively cannot be a substitute for the reinforcement of existing mechanisms to build peace. The CTBT is a vital pillar of the NPT and its effective implementation reinforces the nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime. Its principles apply today to every state, whether ratifier, signatory or non-signatory. Any violation of the prohibition against nuclear test explosions would be met with worldwide opprobrium.

The environmental benefits of the comprehensive test-ban cannot be understated. And we are learning that the verification system has unintended but nevertheless welcome and useful civil applications. We are grateful to the Chair for initiating and the Provisional Technical Secretariat for organising the seminar on those scientific and civil applications. Canada is also proud to be contributing to the network with 15 seismic, radionuclide, hydroacoustic and infrasound stations. A radionuclide monitoring facility in Yellowknife was recently certified, bringing the total to 5; more certifications are expected.

The primary purpose of the CTBT, however, is to contribute to international peace and security. It is Canada’s firm belief that all states in all regions of the world will benefit from the increased security provided by a CTBT that has entered into force. By constraining both the development of nuclear weapons and their qualitative improvement, the Treaty combats both horizontal and vertical proliferation. And it is the first of the thirteen practical steps towards the elimination of nuclear weapons identified at the 2000 NPT Review Conference - the first step on the royal road to nuclear disarmament.

Nuclear weapons, unimaginably lethal, criminally indiscriminate and uniquely dangerous, must never be used. We adopted the CTBT in order to ensure that these weapons may never be demonstrated. Over time, the Treaty, along with other security mechanisms, will contribute to the erosion of the political value and sustainability of nuclear weapons, contributing inexorably to their elimination.

Mr. President,

This year’s conference has broken with past practice and includes an opportunity to discuss practical measures for encouraging entry-into-force. Canada welcomes this innovation, and looks forward to the deliberations. We should seek ways of facilitating ratifications in those countries where the process has been delayed for technical rather than political reasons.

Finally, we must not forget that we are meeting now for the third Conference to facilitate Entry into Force of the CTBT. It is generally assumed by participants that there will be a fourth such Conference two years hence. The NPT Review Conference will also be held in
2005. Should these facts give us pause? Only if we refuse to use our collective talents or to draw on the limitless expertise of the scientific community, academics and civil society; all of whom contributed to the CTBT's conclusion seven years ago. The CTBT is our Treaty; it does not belong to those states that refuse to sign or ratify. In fact, various aspects of the Treaty are today being applied provisionally. But we have not lost sight of the goal of entry-into-force, particularly given the need to give the verification system a sound legal footing.

We must encourage the remaining twelve Annex 2 states to consider not just the twin objectives of the Treaty, but to consider also our determination to complete the International Monitoring System, the International Data Centre and the Global Communications Infrastructure. This expanding network is already more extensive, and sensitive, than anything any one country can mount on its own. Coupled with the on-site inspection provisions, this verification regime should be a model for international arms control and disarmament agreements. The Annex 2 states should also consider our determination to apply the norm that 168 states have endorsed with their signatures. Perhaps by 2005, the international community will agree to consider measures that could allow the CTBT to enter into force. In the meantime, we must not relent in urging the Annex 2 states to ratify the Treaty - for their own security, as well as for the future of all humanity.