CONFERENCE ON FACILITATING THE ENTRY INTO FORCE OF THE COMPREHENSIVE NUCLEAR-TEST-BAN TREATY 3 – 5 SEPTEMBER 2003

NEW ZEALAND STATEMENT

Vienna, Thursday 4 September
Mr President

Seven years ago this month it was with excitement and optimism that the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty was adopted. It was the culmination of a long, tough negotiation and marked a major advance for nuclear disarmament and global security.

The long history of nuclear testing in our region, the Pacific, brought the cold reality of nuclear weapons too close to our shores. This fortified our own resolve to work where we could to see the end of nuclear weapons. By banning nuclear testing in any environment the CTBT impedes the development and qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons. It was for New Zealand, therefore, a prize worth fighting for.

Few would have envisaged in 1996 that the CTBT would have the extended pre-entry into force life that it has had. We take no delight that we meet today, for a third time under Article XIV, to consider what might be done to accelerate the ratification process.

We are not here today to regret missed opportunities. We do believe, however, that we need to take a serious and realistic look at the challenges this important treaty faces today – and to treat these challenges with utmost urgency.

Mr President

The world has changed since 1996. Global security has been challenged in unprecedented ways. This leads us only to conclude that the Treaty remains as crucial, if not more so, as it was on the day it was adopted. New Zealand’s commitment and support for it have also not wavered.

A fully operational CTBT would be the first line of defence against the resumption of nuclear testing, and, as such, a fundamental contribution towards nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation.

This is underscored by the fact that entry into force of the CTBT was identified as the first of 13 practical steps adopted at the 2000 Review Conference of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. The link is direct and clear. These two treaties mutually support the same object. The expressed level of commitment was also definitive. All States Parties to the NPT agreed to these steps in the Review Conference Final Document.

All States who have not signed and ratified the Treaty must do so now. While there are positive trends in universality of the Treaty, ratifications by Annex 2 countries - necessary for entry into force - remain discouraging. China, Colombia, Democratic Republic of Congo, Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, Israel, the USA and Viet Nam have signed but not ratified. Each of these countries must take for themselves the decision and action to follow through with the commitment they have already signalled in signing the treaty by moving to ratify. In this context, we welcome Algeria’s recent ratification, and call on other Annex 2 states to follow this example.
India and Pakistan remain a serious concern. We must find ways to engage with those countries that are actively pursuing nuclear weapons programmes and have already indicated a willingness to test. We urge India and Pakistan to abandon their nuclear ambitions and accede to the NPT and the CTBT without delay and without condition.

We are also particularly concerned at the potential implications of the announced decision by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to withdraw from the NPT and its declared intention to restart the Yongbyon nuclear reactor, without IAEA safeguards. We support dialogue towards an early, peaceful resolution of this situation, leading to the DPRK’s return to full compliance with its NPT obligations and its early ratification of the CTBT.

In the meantime maintaining the moratorium on testing is of highest importance. The fact that there have been no nuclear tests in the past 5 years is significant. The moratorium keeps alive hope of ongoing resistance to proliferation through development of new types of weapons. Any threat to this moratorium would be a threat to us all.

We are encouraged by the substantial efforts of many countries working to encourage ratifications in their own regions and beyond. These practical initiatives require work and ongoing engagement.

New Zealand remains fully committed in this regard. Our own region is a focus for us and we are confident that progress will continue to be achieved. Encouragingly the latest signatory, Palau, is from the Pacific region.

Only upon entry into force will this Treaty and its global verification regime be fully operational. But even during the set up stage the international monitoring system has real value in supporting global stability. The Provisional Technical Secretariat is doing excellent work in this regard. This unprecedented network of monitoring stations, laboratories and an International Data Centre in Vienna will, when completed, have the ability to detect nuclear explosions everywhere.

Apart from its core monitoring purpose the network has also already demonstrated the additional benefits that can be provided in terms of other scientific and technical applications.

Supporting the build up of the verification regime is one of the core objectives of the PTS’s work. Member states must make available to the Secretariat sufficient resources to allow the PTS to do its job in a timely manner. We have come too far and invested too much to afford to lose momentum.

For New Zealand it is important that we back our political support for the treaty by assisting where we can in the practical build-up of the International Monitoring System. We are particularly proud of the contributions made by the small but professional team of experts from our National Radiation Laboratory.
New Zealand is responsible for 6 monitoring stations and we have assisted in the establishment of others in the Pacific and elsewhere.

New Zealand's radionuclide laboratory was officially certified in June. The laboratory at our National Radiation Laboratory is only the second in the world to meet the stringent requirements for CTBT certification.

Mr President

New Zealand is here at this conference to voice our support for this Treaty and its work. We've also come to listen and, where appropriate, offer our thoughts. This work demands collective effort and creative responses and so we are particularly interested in practical measures others may be developing to support ratification.

There is no question as to the CTBT's vital place in today's multilateral framework for nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation and its contribution to global stability. It is incumbent on those who have ratified to continue to promote it, provide support where necessary to those who require it, and maintain pressure on those we wait on.