STATE of ISRAEL

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Statement by
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at the
Third Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the
Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty

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Mr. President

Let me join previous speakers in congratulating you, on behalf of the delegation of Israel, on your election as President of the Conference on facilitating the Entry into Force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. I am confident that under your leadership this conference will be brought to a successful conclusion. I can assure you of our full support and cooperation.

Allow me also to express our thanks to the government of Austria for hosting the Conference and our deep appreciation to Ambassador Hoffmann, the Executive Secretary of the Preparatory Commission of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization and his staff for their excellent work.

Mr. President,

At the outset let me express my Government's firm support for the CTBT. Our expectations are that this Conference will succeed in advancing the objective of entry into force according to Article XIV of the Treaty.

Israel's decision to sign the CTBT reflects my Government's long standing policy on arms control and non-proliferation and support for international non-proliferation efforts with due consideration to the specific characteristics of the Middle East and our national security needs.

Israel believes the CTBT has a central role to play in coping with non-proliferation in line with relevant General Assembly resolutions (First Committee resolution 57/100) that stressed the role of an effectively verifiable CTBT in the field of disarmament and non-proliferation. On the backdrop of non compliance with non-proliferation regimes especially in regions as the Middle East, the importance of the CTBT as a tool to close such gaps is paramount.

Mr. President

Since the establishment of the Preparatory Commission for the CTBT Organization Israel has invested great efforts and actively participated in the development of the CTBT verification regime.

One of the two IMS auxiliary seismic stations in Israel, Eilat, is already operational. The second station, Meiron, has been constructed and is undergoing a testing period. It is expected to be operational by the end of this year.

Global communication infrastructure elements have been installed at the Israeli NDC for communication with the IDC, as required by the Treaty.

Israel took part in all OSI courses, tabletop exercises, workshops and field experiments by providing both trainees and lecturers/expert participants.

Furthermore, Israel has provided numerous contributions to the Initial Draft Rolling Text (IDRT) of OSI Operational Manual (OM) and is actively participating in the elaboration phase of the OM.

In addition, we are working with the Preparatory Comission to conclude a Facility Agreement.
Israel also supports efforts aimed at advancing regional seismological cooperation to strengthen the CTBT verification regime. To this end – and prior to Entry Into Force (EIF) - we will continue to look for measures to enhance collaborative efforts to broaden confidence in the CTBT in our region.

Israel has been supporting all the above efforts even when it is experiencing tight financial constraints.

Mr. President,

In considering the ratification of the CTBT, Israel’s decision making process will be influenced by three main factors:

The level of readiness of the verification regime as attained by the PrepCom, its effectiveness and immunity to abuse, with particular emphasis on the OSI Operational Manual.

Israel’s sovereign equality status as reflected in actions taken by the PrepCom including those related to the geographical region of the Middle East and South Asia (MESA) and in the Executive Council of the future CTBTO.

The developments in our region, including the adherence to and compliance with the CTBT by states in the Middle East.

Mr. President,

Yet recognizing that entry into force of the Treaty is still pending we call upon all participants to double the efforts in order to complete the CTBT verification regime to allow a smooth EIF when the time comes. In the meantime we believe that the advancement of the cause of the CTBT calls for the following commitments and activities to be diligently pursued:

- Sustain the commitment not to carry out any nuclear test explosion in line with the Treaty basic obligations.

- Provide sufficient funds to the CTBTO in order to complete as soon as possible the essential elements of the CTBT verification regime, namely, the International Monitoring System (IMS), the International Data Center (IDC) and the full capability to carry out On-Site Inspections (OSI). In our view, that is a prerequisite for entry into force, as required by the first paragraph of Article IV of the Treaty.

- Operate, maintain and test the IMS stations and the IDC as appropriate to gain experience in order to provide detection capabilities prior to EIF as well as a smoothly-operating monitoring system by EIF. In addition, expand the seismic cooperation among all member states.

- Build the OSI element of the CTBT verification regime: complete the preparation of the OSI Operational Manual, purchase and test the OSI equipment and prepare the training infrastructure. Test and validate the whole OSI system by field exercises. In
this regard, we would like to emphasize the importance of the OSI Operational Manual and call upon all states to demonstrate greater flexibility while working together on the elaboration of the Manual in order to allow the timely conclusion of this crucial element of the OSI element of the CTBT verification regime.

Mr. President:

At this point in time, we recognize the significant achievements made since the former conference on Facilitating the Entry Into Force of the CTBT in 2001 by the Preparatory Commission and the CTBTO under the leadership of its Executive Secretary Ambassador Wolfgang Hoffman, in building the verification regime capabilities; we deeply appreciate the great efforts made by the PTS and all participants to enhance this process.

Mr President,

I would like to express the hope that consensus could be reached on the draft final declaration. We urge not to include language in the draft final declaration that would run counter to the consensual aim of this conference. We commend Ambassador Grunberg for his relentless efforts to conclude a consensus draft, prior to the conference and we hope his efforts will prove to be successful.

Let me conclude, Mr. President, by expressing our hope that this Conference will be furthering the objectives of the CTBT and facilitating its entry into force.

Thank you. Mr. President.