Conference on Facilitating the
Entry into Force of the
Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty
New York, 21-23 September 2005
Mr President,

Multilateralism in nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation is under severe stress.

The NPT Review Conference this year has failed to respond to serious security challenges. The World Summit last week proved unable to make clear commitments on nuclear non-proliferation and to make further progress on nuclear disarmament.

We must ensure that multilateralism remains a core principle.

We must ensure that the instruments we have negotiated can do what they were designed for.

Universal adherence and compliance with the Non-proliferation Treaty and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty are vital if we are to succeed.

Mr President,

We have been waiting nearly ten years for the necessary ratifications of the Test Ban Treaty.

Its entry into force would be a crucial step towards halting the proliferation of nuclear
weapons. It is alarming that we now seem further away from the treaty's entry into force than we have been in a very long time.

Countries that have not ratified this vital treaty should do so without delay. We urge the nuclear weapons states in particular to commit themselves to the CTBT in a legally binding way.

But pending the entry into force, we must do our utmost to further consolidate the existing test moratoria. These moratoria have set a norm against nuclear testing.

The longer the moratoria last, the higher the threshold for conducting nuclear tests. At the same time it is vital that all states respect the integrity of the norms set by the CTBT.

It is essential that states in regions of tension should all ratify the treaty at the same time.

While all practical steps to sustain the test moratoria are welcome, they cannot replace legally binding obligations under the CTBT. The treaty's entry into force will give much-needed momentum to multilateralism in disarmament and non-proliferation.
In order to ensure credible verification we must finalise the International Monitoring System. Norway has contributed substantial funds for this purpose and we will continue to do so.

Mr President,

Existing multilateral disarmament and non-proliferation instruments are vital elements of our response to the new threats to our security.

We are in a paradoxical situation: while the spectre of nuclear terrorism is looming larger than ever, our multilateral non-proliferation and disarmament instruments are being eroded.

With regard to Iran, Norway fully supports the efforts to find a diplomatic solution to the many questions surrounding the country's nuclear programme.

We call on Iran to co-operate fully with the IAEA in all its nuclear activities. We urge Iran to sign, ratify and implement, immediately and unconditionally, an Additional Protocol to its Safeguards Agreement.

The recent announcement after the six-party talks on the de-nuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula