CONFERENCE ON FACILITATING THE ENTRY INTO FORCE
OF THE COMPREHENSIVE NUCLEAR-TEST-BAN TREATY

STATEMENT BY
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TO THE UNITED NATIONS

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CHECK AGAINST DELIVERY
Mr President

New Zealand's commitment to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty was forged many years before the Treaty's adoption in 1996. The history of nuclear testing in our region, the Pacific, brought the cold reality of nuclear weapons too close to our shores. We resolved to work where we could to see the end of nuclear weapon testing, and the end of nuclear weapons altogether. And so, nine years ago when the CTBT was adopted, we too shared the excitement and optimism of so many with this major advance for nuclear disarmament and global security.

A lot has changed since then – but not our commitment to the CTBT and to the total elimination of nuclear weapons.

Mr President

We did not imagine that we would be meeting for a fourth time to consider why the CTBT has not entered into force and what might be done to accelerate the ratification process. For New Zealand, the CTBT continues, however, to be worth fighting for. This requires a serious look at the challenges and states preventing entry into force – and treating those challenges with utmost urgency.

Global security continues to be under threat from all directions and in unprecedented ways. A fully operational CTBT would be the first line of defence against the resumption of nuclear testing, and, as such, a fundamental contribution towards nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation.

Entry into force of the CTBT was identified as the first of 13 practical steps adopted at the 2000 Review Conference of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. The link is direct and clear. These two treaties mutually support the same object. All States Parties to the NPT agreed to these steps in the Review Conference Final Document. New Zealand was profoundly disappointed that this year's NPT Review Conference could not agree on an outcome. And so, the steps agreed in 2000 remain valid, as does the expressed level of commitment to those steps.

We were also disappointed last week that the Final Summit Outcome document did not include any reference to disarmament and non-proliferation, let alone the CTBT. The outcome document in no way reflects the vital place that disarmament and non-proliferation holds in the peace and global security framework – a place which so many see so clearly, including the 70 or so countries who supported the Norwegian-led initiative.

Mr President

There continue to be positive trends towards the universality of the Treaty with 8 new signatures and 21 new ratifications since the last Conference. We are
pleased in particular to welcome recent ratifications from our close neighbours the Cook Islands and Vanuatu.

All States who have not signed and ratified the CTBT must do so now.

Ratifications by Annex 2 countries - necessary for entry into force - remain discouraging. Annex 2 countries China, Colombia, Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, Israel, the USA and Viet Nam, have signed but not ratified. We call upon these countries to follow through on the commitments they have already signalled in signing the treaty by moving to ratify.

Mr President

There are three Annex 2 countries that have not yet signed the Treaty.

The nuclear policies of India and Pakistan remain a serious concern. We must find ways to engage with those countries that are actively pursuing nuclear weapons programmes and have indicated a willingness to test. We urge India and Pakistan to abandon their nuclear ambitions and accede to the NPT and the CTBT without delay and without condition.

The nuclear programme of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea is also a serious concern. We were encouraged by recent developments in the Six Party Talks dialogue. We hope that the DPRK will return to full compliance with its NPT obligations and its early ratification of the CTBT.

In the meantime maintaining the moratorium on testing is for us of the highest importance. The fact that there have been no nuclear tests in the past 7 years may even prove its value. The moratorium keeps alive hope of ongoing resistance to proliferation through development of new types of weapons. Any threat to this moratorium would be a threat to us all.

We are encouraged by the substantial efforts of many countries working to encourage ratifications in their own regions and beyond. These practical initiatives require work and ongoing engagement and also creativity and fresh thinking. Respecting all aspects of the Treaty would also enhance political support for the CTBT.

New Zealand would like to thank the Government of the Netherlands for its generous offer since 2003 in providing a special representative to assist in promoting entry into force. Ambassador Ramaker offers an experienced voice in engaging key Annex Two countries and we continue to support this role.

New Zealand remains fully committed to encouraging universalisation of the CTBT. Our own region of the Pacific is a focus for us. Despite the resource constraints in Pacific Governments and conflicting priorities, progress continues to be made.
Only upon entry into force will this Treaty and its global verification regime be fully operational. But even during the set up stage the international monitoring system has real value in supporting global stability. The Provisional Technical Secretariat is doing excellent work in this regard. This unparalleled network of monitoring stations, laboratories and an international Data Centre in Vienna will, when completed, have the ability to detect nuclear explosions everywhere.

Following the devastating Asian tsunami disaster of December 26th 2004 we have also seen how this verification regime might also contribute to a tsunami warning system, and thereby save lives. While fully acknowledging that the Provisional Technical Secretariat's primary role is monitoring for nuclear tests, where the international community can benefit from applications of the same technologies, we would support these benefits being shared.

Supporting the build up of the verification regime is one of the core objectives of the PTS's work. Member states must make available to the Secretariat sufficient resources to allow the PTS to do its job in a timely manner. We have come too far and invested too much to lose momentum. 

Mr President

New Zealand is here at this conference to voice our support for this Treaty and its work. We've also come to listen and, where we can, offer our thoughts. Yes, we are frustrated with the obstacles the CTBT is encountering to entry into force. This work requires, however, collective and thoughtful effort, patience and unwavering commitment.

There is no question as to the CTBT's vital place in today's multilateral framework for nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation and its contribution to global stability. New Zealand will continue to promote it together with the numerous other ratifiers we know are equally committed to this treaty.