Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
Vienna, 17 – 18 September 2007

New Zealand statement

Mr President

New Zealand’s interest and commitment to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) was forged many years before the Treaty’s adoption in 1996. The history of nuclear testing in our region, the Pacific, brought the cold reality of nuclear weapons far too close to our shores. This only strengthened our resolve to work for progress towards nuclear disarmament and the total elimination of nuclear weapons.

Mr President

In 1996 when the CTBT was adopted, we shared the international community’s excitement and optimism about this major advance for nuclear disarmament and global security. It would have been inconceivable then and inexcusable now that over a decade later, State Signatories would be meeting for a fifth time to consider why the CTBT has not entered into force and what might be done to accelerate the ratification process.

The international security environment continues to be challenged in unprecedented ways as was illustrated by the DPRK’s decision to test a nuclear device last year. The DPRK’s decision struck at the very heart of the CTBT and the moratorium on nuclear testing in the absence of entry into force of the Treaty. The test was an escalation of the legacy of DPRK’s previous unacceptable behaviour which, at previous EIF conferences, we noted with concern.

The DPRK’s actions served to highlight not only the urgent need of the entry into force of the CTBT, but also the fundamental role that the CTBTO’s monitoring regime plays in monitoring the moratorium on nuclear testing. Despite the IMS not yet being fully complete, the PTS was able to provide state signatories with very credible and timely analysis of the DPRK’s nuclear test.

The build up of the IMS and its early completion are key priorities for New Zealand. State signatories should make available sufficient resources for the PTS to exhaust its verification mandate. The PTS is doing its utmost in this regard but we can not afford to be complacent. Only upon entry into force will this Treaty and its global verification regime be fully operational.

Mr President
A fully operational CTBT makes a fundamental contribution towards nuclear disarmament. The entry into force of the CTBT is the first among the 13 practical steps agreed to by all NPT States Parties at the 2000 Review Conference of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. All State Parties to the NPT agreed to these steps in the Review Conference Final Document. The steps agreed in 2000 remain valid as does the expressed level of commitment to those steps. The entry into force of the Treaty constitutes one of the necessary measures to be taken to achieve nuclear disarmament – these undertakings remain relevant.

Mr President

We are encouraged by the substantial efforts of many countries working to encourage ratifications in their own regions and beyond as evidenced in the measure K document (Article XIV/2007).

We would note that since the last conference in 2005 that there has been 1 new signature and 15 new ratifications including Viet Nam, an Annex II state. Viet Nam’s ratification has now brought us one step closer to having the ban on nuclear explosions fully in force under international law. This ratification sets an important example to states, particularly Annex 2 states, whose ratifications are necessary for the entry into force of the CTBT.

We urge [Country], [Country], [Country], [Country], [Country], Annex 2 states that have signed but not ratified, to make the ultimate expression of support for the Treaty by ratifying it without delay.

A focal point, since 2003, for engaging those states that have yet to ratify the CTBT States has been the Special Article XIV Coordinator. We would like to thank Ambassador Jaap Ramaker and the Government of the Netherlands for their tireless efforts in engaging with those states. New Zealand continues to strongly support this role and the contribution from the Netherlands.

Mr President

New Zealand remains fully committed to encouraging universalisation of the CTBT. Our own region of the Pacific has been a particular focus for us. Despite the resource pressures faced by these small bureaucracies, progress continues to be made. We welcome an additional ratification from the Pacific, Palau, which has been made since the last Entry into Force Conference in 2005.

Mr President,

New Zealand would also like to express its appreciation to Australia, the previous Article XIV Coordinator and acknowledge the professionalism and vigour in which they carried out their role.
Mr President

We also welcome that, since the last Entry into Force conference, the Preparatory Commission has been able to make data available to early warning organisation for tsunami purposes on a formal basis. This decision gives these organisations greater certainty in terms of the data currently being received.

Concrete progress was long overdue since the devastating tsunami tragedy on 26th December 2004. While fully acknowledging that the PTS' primary role is in monitoring for nuclear tests, we believe that where there are humanitarian benefits from applications of the IMS technologies then all state signatories have a moral obligation to share these benefits.

Mr President

In closing, let me quote the New Zealand Minister for Disarmament and Arms Control, Hon Phil Goff, by saying that “the entire international community stands to benefit from full endorsement of an international regime that has as its fundamental obligation the prohibition of nuclear weapons testing”.

There is no question as to the CTBT's vital place in today's multilateral framework for nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation and its contribution to global stability. New Zealand will continue to promote the entry into force of the Treaty and we look forward to continued co-operation with other ratifiers to this end.