NGO Statement on the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) for the Fifth Article XIV Conference on Facilitating Entry Into Force

To be delivered 18 September 2007

Mr. Chairperson, Distinguished Delegates, and Colleagues,

1 For more than half a century, countless nongovernmental organizations, scientific experts, political leaders, and ordinary citizens have pursued the goal of a more secure world free of the dangers of nuclear weapon test explosions. A decade ago, the 1996 Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) was negotiated and opened for signature. Today, over 176 states have signed. Installation of the Treaty’s extensive and sophisticated monitoring system and preparations for on-site inspections to verify compliance are advancing. Yet, after almost fifty years of hard work and advocacy, we have not crossed the finish line. More must be done to achieve the CTBT’s entry into force.

2 We, the representatives of nongovernmental organizations from across the globe, applaud the 10 states that have ratified the treaty since 2005. We call on all states that have not done so to sign and ratify the treaty we call upon all states to commit themselves to take the final step toward securing signatures and ratifications of the 10 remaining Annex II states that are necessary to bring the CTBT into force.

3a. The CTBT is important to all states—North and South, East and West, large and small, with nuclear weapons and without. The CTBT is essential to the prevention of nuclear arms races, the development of increasingly more destructive weapons, the prevention of more states acquiring nuclear arsenals, and the protection of human health and the global environment from the devastating effects of nuclear weapons production and testing.

3b. CTBT entry into force would also shore up support for the increasingly beleaguered nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) regime. The nuclear-weapon states’ commitment to the test ban’s entry into force was vital in securing the indefinite extension of the NPT in 1995. NPT states-parties unanimously endorsed signature and ratification of the CTBT as part of the 2000 NPT Review Conference. The continued failure by a few states to move forward with the CTBT undermines the confidence in the nonproliferation bargain and perpetuates the outdated 20th century belief that nuclear weapons are necessary and legitimate tools of foreign policy.

4. Achieving CTBT entry into force is no easy or ordinary task. Since the Article XIV Conference of 2005 in New York, new hurdles have emerged. North Korea conducted a nuclear weapon test explosion, more than a few states are failing to meet their financial obligations to support the CTBT Provisional Secretariat and the task of global test ban verification and monitoring, and some CTBT adherents have put forward proposals to engage in civil nuclear trade with states that have not yet signed the CTBT.

5a. As a result, CTBT entry into force is even more urgent and overdue. We respectfully call upon the CTBT member states to demonstrate more determined leadership and steadfast fidelity to the principles of the treaty so that entry into force can be achieved at the earliest possible date.
5b. Specifically, we strongly urge this conference to: a) reiterate that a state’s signature of the treaty constitutes an obligation not to conduct a nuclear test explosion, and that the CTBT establishes a norm of behavior that applies to states that have not yet signed the treaty; b) call upon all signatory states to provide necessary support to the construction and maintenance of the CTBTO monitoring and verification system, including on-site inspection; c) honor treaty and political commitments not to engage in nuclear trade with countries that have not yet joined the CTBT regime; and d) call upon de facto and de jure nuclear-armed states to cease and desist from research and development activities that may create pressure to test in the future.

5c. We urge the 10 remaining Annex II states that either have not signed or ratified the treaty to do so without further delay. We remind those hold-out states that their delay not only is holding the entire treaty hostage, but is also undermining their own security.

6a. Since the CTBT opened for signature, many states have advanced the cause of the treaty in ways that extend beyond their ratification. We gratefully acknowledge the support that has been offered to the test ban by individual governments, the EU, the NAM, and the OAS in policy statements and political pronouncements at this conference and in other international fora.

6b. We urge governments of CTBT signatories to maintain their public support, which helps reinforce the test ban norm, and to translate that support into action through meetings with representatives of hold-out states and in the implementation of each signatory state’s foreign and security policies. Rhetoric alone is not enough. Consistent, high-level pressure is necessary to move states to sign and/or ratify the treaty.

7a. In these conversations, it must be emphasized that a global test ban can help head-off and deescalate destabilizing nuclear arms competition. Short-sighted arguments that nuclear testing and improved nuclear weapons capabilities may be needed to enhance the credibility of a state’s nuclear retaliatory capabilities or its ability to execute preemptive strikes must be addressed directly and forcefully.

7b. Such arguments are at times voiced by diplomats from the Middle East, South Asia, and East Asia, where the entry into force of the treaty would be a signal contribution to nuclear-risk reduction. With no shortage of conflict and hostility in the Middle East, ratification by Israel, Egypt, and Iran would reduce nuclear weapons-related security concerns and bring these states further into the nuclear nonproliferation mainstream. Egyptian and Iranian steps to build and allow the operation of monitoring stations on their territories also would be helpful. The Pakistan-India nuclear arms race could be contained to the benefit of both countries if they signed and ratified the CTBT.

1 The world’s patience is wearing thin with signatory states that do not appear to be exerting a good-faith effort to ratify. The two remaining NPT weapon-states stand out in particular. The leadership in Beijing must fulfill its repeated and now somewhat empty promise to conclude the ratification process. It claimed at the last two Article XIV Conferences that it has submitted the treaty to the Standing Committee of People’s National Congress for approval and that “all necessary work is underway in a serious and orderly fashion.” There does not appear to be any domestic political obstacle in the way that should prevent China’s ratification within a few months. In the absence of such action, China owes a detailed explanation for its continued delay and a timetable for its ratification process. China could demonstrate it is a true leader and
not simply a follower by finally ratifying the CTBT.

2 Despite U.S. leadership for the treaty’s negotiation, the current U.S. presidential administration does not support CTBT entry into force. However, there are new and hopeful signs that a bipartisan process may be initiated as early as 2009 to reconsider ratification of the CTBT. We note that former Secretaries of State George Shultz and Henry Kissinger, along with former Secretary of Defense Bill Perry, former Senator Sam Nunn, and other prominent Democratic and Republican foreign policy experts have joined many NGOs in calling on the Senate “to achieve ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, taking advantage of recent technical advances, and working to secure ratification by other key states.” Some leading presidential candidates support this approach. Key senators can do this through hearings, by working with their colleagues, and through exchanges with technical experts and allied governments.

3 Other states also must do their part and ratify. There is no compelling reason why states such as Indonesia and Colombia, which consistently profess their support for the CTBT, should continue to dither.

4 We express our most serious concern over the October 2006 nuclear detonation in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK). This dangerous and irresponsible act has damaged the international non-testing norm. The restraint exhibited by the DPRK’s neighbors and their strategic partners is commendable and we strongly urge them to continue to build on progress with the DPRK toward establishing a nuclear-weapon free and more secure Korean peninsula. We call upon this conference to condemn the North Korean test as an affront and danger to international security and urge the states engaged in the six-party process to accelerate their efforts to implement their September 2005 Joint Statement for the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.

12a. The unwelcome North Korean nuclear test explosion, however, demonstrated once more the robust nature of the treaty’s verification and monitoring system. The International Monitoring System (IMS) and its experimental noble gas monitoring network successfully observed and provided data that helped identify the event as a nuclear detonation, despite a relatively small explosive yield of approximately half a kiloton TNT equivalent.

12b. We commend the valuable work of the CTBT PrepCom and the Provisional Technical Secretariat in developing the IMS, the International Data Center (IDC), and an On-Site Inspection capability but are deeply concerned about the failure of certain signatories to fully fund the CTBTO. As of September 4th, the largest contributor, the United States, is now more than $28.5 million behind in fulfilling its assessed contributions, while Brazil is almost $12 million in arrears, and Argentina is more than $6.5 million in arrears. The U.S. Congress, for its part, should ensure that the United States fully funds the international test ban verification system. All of the several signatory states that are behind in their assessed contributions must act now to become part of the solution rather than a part of the problem. Other states must not use this as an excuse to renge on their payments, but should press the United States and others to fulfill their obligations as a signatory to support the CTBTO.

13a. Continued budget shortfalls will hinder the remaining construction and provisional operation of international monitoring and verification facilities, which are crucial in maintaining the capability to confidently detect noncompliance. A robust verification system in turn alleviates concerns about risks involved in ratification because no other state can
conduct secret nuclear test explosions to gain an advantage.

13b. Ongoing activities at the test sites of China, Russia, and the United States also have the potential to ignite concerns about noncompliance with the CTBT. Current subcritical experiments, contained chemical explosions, and tunneling activities are unnecessary. We call on China, Russia, the United States, and others to permanently close their test sites or else negotiate transparency and confidence building visits to decrease concerns about activities not compliant with the CTBT.

14a. We also are deeply concerned that certain CTBT signatory states are pursuing nuclear trade arrangements with India, which has refused to join the NPT and the CTBT.

14b. We urge CTBT signatory governments that are also members of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) to establish CTBT signature as a condition of nuclear trade before they agree to exempt India from the NSG’s full-scope international safeguards condition of nuclear supply. If India is, as Prime Minister Manmohan Singh said in July 2005, prepared to take on the responsibilities expected of other advanced nuclear nations, it is reasonable to expect that India can sign the CTBT, as the five original nuclear-weapon states have already done. If India and the other states that are not members of the NPT are to enjoy the benefits of NPT membership, they should at least make meaningful, legally binding commitments to core nonproliferation and disarmament undertakings, including the CTBT.

14c. We also note that the proposed U.S.-India agreement for nuclear cooperation does not explicitly state that the United States would terminate civil nuclear trade with India in the event that New Delhi were to renew nuclear testing. Incredibly, the agreement also commits the United States to support the creation of a strategic fuel reserve for India and to help India gain access to fuel supplies from other suppliers such as the United Kingdom, France, or Russia, if nuclear fuel supplies are interrupted—even if the interruption is due to an Indian nuclear test or a violation of its safeguards agreements. It would be highly irresponsible for NSG member states to approve of changes to their guidelines for nuclear trade that do not stipulate that any exemption for India from the full-scope safeguards requirement would be revoked if India were to resume testing.

15. We are particularly disappointed that some states that have in the past strongly advocated for CTBT entry into force appear to have abandoned their CTBT principles and their duty to support UN Resolution 1172, which was the international community’s response to the 1998 Indian and Pakistani nuclear tests. Not only have the United States, France, Russia, and the United Kingdom failed to condition their support for renewed nuclear trade with India on New Delhi’s support for the test ban, but Australia has also apparently abandoned its CTBT efforts vis-à-vis India by considering the sale of uranium to India by considering the sale of uranium to India. Only two years ago, Australian Foreign Minister Alexander Downer chaired the fourth Article XIV Conference and said of states like India that are obstructing entry into force: “We have over the years heard many reasons as to why this is so. The time for excuses is past. It is time for them to act.” Indeed, the time is now for all states to act in support of the CTBT.

16a. We note with concern that CTBT signatories possessing nuclear weapons – France, China, Russia, the United States, and the United Kingdom – also continue to pursue nuclear
weapons research activities that are not consistent with the CTBT’s goal of “constraining the development and qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons.”

16b. In particular, the Bush administration’s pursuit of a new, so-called reliable replacement warhead (also known as RRW) could undermine the CTBT and provide other states with a cynical excuse to pursue new nuclear weapons capabilities and to keep their nuclear testing options open. The Bush administration claims that the new warhead and related modernization of the U.S. nuclear weapons production infrastructure can improve confidence in the reliability of the U.S. stockpile and reduce the likelihood the United States would resume nuclear testing.

16c. Such claims are unfounded and misleading. The production of new nuclear warheads is unnecessary to maintain existing nuclear weapons stockpiles under the CTBT and is contrary to the spirit of the CTBT and the commitments of states under Article VI of the NPT. We note that since the United States ceased nuclear testing 15 years ago this month, its ability to maintain its existing stockpile without testing has only improved. Recent U.S. government studies found that the plutonium primaries of most U.S. nuclear weapons will have minimum lifetimes of 85 years, about twice as long as previous estimates.

16d. We urge states gathered at this Article XIV Conference to formally call upon states possessing nuclear weapons to refrain from research and development efforts that could lead to new warheads and possibly the resumption of nuclear testing.

17a. The treaty’s broader political and security benefits are clear. But at its most basic level, the treaty exists to ban the explosive testing of nuclear weapons and to prevent the devastating effects of such tests on human health and the environment.

17b. Since 1945, eight countries have conducted 2,051 nuclear test explosions. Most of those tests were conducted at U.S. test sites in Nevada and the Marshall Islands, the Soviet Union’s test sites in Kazakhstan and Novaya Zemlya, France’s test sites on the Polynesian atolls of Fangataufa and Moruroa, China’s Lop Nor test site, and in Algeria and Australia. Most of the test sites are on the lands of indigenous peoples and far from the capitals of the testing governments. The 528 atmospheric tests delivered radioactive materials that produced approximately 430,000 additional cancer fatalities by the year 2000, according to a 1990 report by the International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War. The U.S. National Cancer Institute estimated in a 1997 report that the 90 dirtiest U.S. tests could cause 7,500-75,000 additional cases of thyroid cancer.

17c. While underground nuclear explosions pose a smaller radioactive hazard than atmospheric tests, there has been widespread venting from underground explosions. This was especially true at the Semipalatinsk test site in Kazakhstan. The United States has acknowledged that 433 of its 824 underground tests released radioactive material into the atmosphere. In addition, underground nuclear blasts produce large amounts of radioactive contamination in situ, which over time leak into the surrounding environment.

1 We have presented political and technical reasons in support of the comprehensive and verifiable ban on nuclear testing. But as we discuss the policy issues, diplomatic steps, and financial needs for the CTBT, we must not lose sight of the moral dimension of the CTBT—a
dimension equal to that of national and international security. Your citizens and future
generations depend on your wisdom and courage to protect them from the effects of the most
dangerous weapons ever to curse humanity. No government should stand in the way of this
indispensable step toward eliminating the threat of nuclear weapons and preventing nuclear war.

2 We express our gratitude for the opportunity to address the conference, to the secretariat
and other organizers, and to the hard work and dedication of the staff and leadership of the
CTBTO.

3 This presentation was prepared and supported by the NGOs that have been working for
the banning of nuclear tests for many years, in many countries, and in many ways. We look
forward to the day when all of our efforts bring about the entry into force of the CTBT.

Thank you.

1 Abolition 2000 (New Zealand)
2 Alliance for Nuclear Accountability (U.S.A.)
3 Acronym Institute for Disarmament Diplomacy (U.K.)
4 Action des Citoyens pour le Désarmement Nucléaire (France)
5 Arms Control Association (U.S.A.)
6 British American Security Information Council
7 Boundary Peace Initiative (Canada)
8 Canadian Federation of University Women (Canada)
9 Canadian Peace Alliance (Canada)
10 Canadian Voice of Women for Peace (Canada)
11 Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation (U.S.A.)
12 Center for Encounters and Active Non-Violence (Austria)
13 Círculo Latinoamericano de Estudios Internacionales (Mexico)
14 Citizens' Nuclear Information Center (Japan)
15 Coalition for Nuclear Disarmament and Peace (India)
16 Council for a Livable World (U.S.A.)
17 Friedens- und Begegnungsstätte Mutlangen e.V. (Germany)
18 Friedenswerkstatt Mutlangen e.V. (Germany)
19 Friends Committee on National Legislation (U.S.A.)
20 Amb. George Bunn, first general counsel for the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency who helped negotiate the NPT
21 Global Action to Prevent War (U.S.A.)
22 Global Anti-Nuclear Alliance
23 Global Security Institute (U.S.A.)
24 International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War
25 Lawyers' Committee on Nuclear Policy (U.S.A.)
26 Mayors for Peace
27 Nuclear Age Peace Foundation (U.S.A.)
28 Pax Christi Aotearoa (New Zealand)
29 Peace Depot (Japan)
30 Peace Foundation Disarmament & Security Centre (New Zealand)
31 Peace Movement Aotearoa (New Zealand)
32 Peace Movement Aotearoa, Wellington (New Zealand)
33 Peace Union of Finland (Finland)
34 Physicians for Social Responsibility (U.S.A.)
| 35 | Proposition One Committee (U.S.A.)  |
| 36 | Science for Peace (Canada)         |
| 37 | Simon's Centre for Disarmament and Nonproliferation Research (Canada) |
| 38 | Toronto Hiroshima Day Coalition (Canada) |
| 39 | Tri-Valley Citizens Against a Radioactive Environment (U.S.A.) |
| 40 | Women's Federation for World Peace International |
| 41 | Women's International League for Peace and Freedom |
| 42 | Women's International League for Peace and Freedom (U.S.A.) |
| 43 | Women's International League for Peace and Freedom, Aotearoa (New Zealand) |
| 44 | World Conference of Religions for Peace (Canada) |

*additional endorsements may be added prior to delivery of the statement*