

PROHIBITING AND PREVENTING
NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS:

**Background Information
for Parliamentarians on
the Comprehensive
Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty
(CTBT)**

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1. Basic obligations

ARTICLE I

1. Each State Party undertakes not to carry out any nuclear weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion, and to prohibit and prevent any such nuclear explosion at any place under its jurisdiction or control.

2. Each State Party undertakes, furthermore, to refrain from causing, encouraging, or in any way participating in the carrying out of any nuclear weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion.

2. Why ratify the CTBT?



The aim of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) is to end all nuclear weapon test explosions and any other nuclear explosion in an effectively verifiable manner. Over 2000 tests were conducted during the period 1945 to 1996. Only a few have occurred after 1996 – the year the CTBT was adopted by the United Nations General Assembly and opened for signature. Each and every signature or ratification strengthens the political value of the Treaty. Even without having entered into force, the CTBT has helped to create a strong international norm against nuclear weapon testing.

A nuclear test provides the final and irreversible ‘downstream’ proof of the intentions of a State regarding its pursuit of nuclear energy for peaceful or for weapons purposes. The CTBT constitutes, thus, this last and clearly visible barrier between the peaceful legitimate use and the misuse of nuclear energy. This legal line needs to be drawn firmly and irrevocably.

The CTBT is also a key to easing the rancour between the nuclear haves and have-nots. It is a strong non-proliferation instrument, a catalyst for nuclear disarmament, and crucial in a world in which we see the resurgence of nuclear energy.

Preparations for entry into force of the Treaty are well under way by the CTBTO Preparatory Commission, with more than 84% of the International Monitoring System stations (seismic, hydroacoustic, infrasound, radionuclide) installed. States Signatories are equally entitled to all the benefits of the system. The wealth of data provided by the monitoring system has a variety of potential and important civil and scientific applications as well, notably the contribution to tsunami warning centres.

The nuclear weapon tests of 2006 and 2009, claimed by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, posed a challenge to the Treaty and the Preparatory Commission on several fronts. These events constituted the most serious trial to the norm against nuclear testing for many years. International condemnation of these events demonstrated the seriousness of the international community to uphold the global nuclear test ban. These events also imposed performance tests for our organization and its nascent verification regime. Although not all stations have been established or are transmitting data yet, the verification regime nevertheless functioned as a system, in a holistic and synergistic way. Regrettable and disquieting as those events were, the verification system's timely, integrated and coherent performance demonstrated a high level of reliability. The system has proven to be a valuable investment by the States Signatories to ensure that no nuclear test goes undetected.

The importance of universalization and the urgent entry into force of the CTBT has been widely recognized by the international community. This has been evidenced most recently through the overwhelming support for the CTBT at the United Nations General Assembly, in the Security Council and at the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT).

The time has come for the CTBT to enter into force. The opportunity is there and we must respond. We need to work together to make the world a safer place. For our own sake and for the generations to come.

Tibor Tóth
Executive Secretary
Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive
Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization
Vienna, June 2010

3. Scope of the CTBT

The object and purpose of the CTBT is to ban comprehensively nuclear weapon test explosions and any other nuclear explosion in any environment in an effectively verifiable manner. The CTBT aims at eliminating nuclear weapons by constraining the development and qualitative improvement of new or more advanced nuclear weapons. It plays a crucial role in the prevention of nuclear proliferation and in nuclear disarmament, thus contributing to a safer and more secure world.

When the Treaty enters into force it will establish a treaty-implementing body (the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO)), including an on-site inspection mechanism and confidence-building measures as well as an International Monitoring System (IMS) and International Data Centre (IDC). The IMS and IDC are already being created and are being provisionally operated during the preparatory phase by the Preparatory Commission for the CTBTO and its Provisional Technical Secretariat in Vienna. Seismic, hydroacoustic, infrasound and radio-nuclide data are collected through the stations of the IMS and transmitted to Member States via the IDC. The IDC also processes the raw data received from the stations to derive objective products and services which will support the Treaty verification responsibilities.

If the collected and analysed data indicate an ambiguous event, States may address concerns about possible non-compliance with the Treaty through a consultation and clarification process after it enters into force and may request an on-site inspection by the CTBTO.

4. History and significance of the CTBT

The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) was negotiated and drafted in the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva and opened for signature in New York in 1996. In the first 50 years following the first nuclear weapon test, there were multiple unsuccessful attempts to negotiate a comprehensive test ban. The conclusion of the CTBT essentially ended 50 years of testing, thus achieving one goal of the States Parties to the 1963 Limited Test-Ban Treaty and the 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT): the discontinuance of all nuclear weapon test explosions for all time.

The conclusion of the CTBT was one of the conditions upon which States Parties to the NPT agreed to the indefinite extension of the NPT in 1995. At its 2000 Review Conference, NPT States Parties concluded that signature, ratification and entry into force of the CTBT are “the first practical step for the systematic and progressive efforts to implement article VI of the NPT”, with its aim of nuclear disarmament. In that same year, the United Nations Secretary-General included the CTBT as one of the 25 core multilateral treaties representative of the key objectives of the United Nations, prompting many of the States to take action on the CTBT during the Millennium Assembly and thereafter.

Prospects for entry into force of the CTBT received a much needed boost in April 2009 when US President Barack Obama announced that his administration will “immediately and aggressively” seek the consent of the US Senate for US ratification. Other Annex 2 States such as China also indicated that they too are eager to achieve entry into force at

an early date. The Indonesian Foreign Minister's announcement in April 2010 that his country (another Annex 2 State) will ratify the CTBT soon provided significant additional momentum. The international support for the Treaty is further evidenced through the overwhelming support for the 2009 CTBT resolution at the First Committee of the United Nations General Assembly, the Security Council's call upon States to bring the CTBT into force as expressed in resolution 1887, and the unprecedented high level attendance at the 2009 Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the CTBT. The Final Document of the 2010 NPT Review Conference reaffirmed the vital importance of the entry into force of the CTBT as a core element of the international nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime.

5. Membership benefits

Politically, States Signatories contribute to regional and international peace and security, support the NPT and United Nations goals of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, and join a community of like-minded States.

The 337 CTBTO International Monitoring System facilities currently being built in accordance with the Treaty (170 seismic, 11 hydroacoustic, 60 infrasound and 80 radionuclide stations and 16 radionuclide laboratories) are located all over the world, including some in the most remote regions such as the Arctic and Antarctica. It is multilateralism at its best: 89 countries from North and South, East and West, are hosting or will host the facilities that no country could build and deploy alone. These countries and the exact location of the stations are established by Annex 1 to the Protocol to the

Treaty. As one of the most extensive global joint ventures, hundreds of station operators and National Data Centre staff support the system around the world around the clock. They represent a nearly invisible, but highly efficient and crucial extended arm of the monitoring system.

The raw data as well as processed data products are transmitted, upon request, to States Signatories by the IDC in Vienna. The Preparatory Commission can assist States Signatories in the establishment of National Data Centres by providing the satellite link to the IDC and assistance with its installation, software, services of the Help Desk, and specialized training for station operators and managers. States Signatories can make use of the range of technologies applied in collecting, transmitting, processing and analysing verification related data. They may also benefit from the utilization of verification regime data in a variety of civil areas, including scientific research, disaster preparedness, meteorological and climate forecasting, and tsunami warning. The training courses and workshops are free of charge and are very important to building the capacity of States Signatories to make the best use of the verification related technologies, including for civil and scientific applications.

As the installation of the IMS progresses, new research and improved communications technology strengthen and refine the detection capacities of the system.

Currently, 114 States Signatories have established National Data Centres to receive and process the data and data products collected by the IMS and transmitted by the IDC in Vienna. More than 1145 users worldwide are receiving data through their State's Secure Signatory Account.

6. National implementation measures

6.1. How?

Article III of the CTBT requires each State Party to take, in accordance with its constitutional processes, any necessary measures to implement its obligations under the Treaty. Even in States having a legal system where treaties automatically form part of national law, the government may need to adopt at least some measures, legislative and/or administrative, to implement the Treaty. It is for each State Party to decide what measures, in accordance with its constitutional processes, would be necessary or appropriate and how to carry them out.

In some cases, the State may determine that existing national legislation already fulfils the requirements set out in the Treaty. In most cases, existing legislation may need to be amended or supplemented, or one or more new laws may need to be passed, and subsidiary regulations or administrative measures may need to be adopted. Whatever approaches the State decides to follow, the common goal is to give internal legal effect to all of the State's obligations under the Treaty and, in particular, to enable it to legally enforce those obligations in respect of activities by all persons under its jurisdiction, including by means of sanctions for violations.

6.2. What measures?

Section 8 below provides a checklist of the main elements of national legislation to be considered.

6.3. Where?

The legislation shall apply to the whole territory of the State and must be extended to any other place under its jurisdiction or control in accordance with international law. Furthermore, Article III requires that the legislation be extended extraterritorially to natural persons possessing the State's nationality, to prohibit such persons from undertaking anywhere any activity prohibited by the Treaty.

6.4. When?

The necessary national implementation measures need to be in force at the time the CTBT enters into force. As a general rule, the measures should therefore be taken either at the time of ratification or immediately afterwards. In many States, the legislature has often stipulated that the legislation will enter into force when the CTBT does. In other cases, the State has decided to adopt the national normative constraints against nuclear testing with immediate effect, in advance of the Treaty's entry into force, as an environmental, counterterrorism or other policy based measure.

Since 2004, the adoption and enforcement of effective laws and the establishment of a range of domestic controls aimed at preventing nuclear weapon proliferation among non-State actors, in particular for terrorist purposes, have become the obligation of all States under United Nations Security Council resolution 1540. The creation of the criminal offence of carrying out a nuclear explosion, with penalties appropriate to the gravity of the crime, together with measures aimed at

preventing the acquisition of enabling materials or devices, acts to deter persons from undertaking such activities in the State's jurisdiction and prevent the State's territory from being a haven for those who might be interested in pursuing such activities. Such legislation serves to meet the requirements of resolution 1540, a binding legal obligation for all States under the Charter of the United Nations.

For these reasons, a number of States have already made it a criminal offence to carry out a nuclear explosion or to cause, encourage, attempt, assist with or in any way participate in one. Some States, at the time of ratifying the CTBT, amended their penal code with immediate effect. Others had already adopted such legislation as nuclear-weapon-free-zone States. Examples of such types of legislation are available from the CTBTO Secretariat upon request.

Finally, owing to the extensive activities that are required to be taken by the CTBTO Preparatory Commission and States Signatories to establish and provisionally operate the IMS and IDC during the preparatory phase, the State may find that it needs to take measures to enable effective cooperation with the Commission now.

7. The National Authority

Article III of the CTBT requires each State Party to designate or set up a National Authority to “serve as the national focal point for liaison with the Organization and with other States Parties”.

The core function of the National Authority is to facilitate the interaction between States and with the CTBTO on all matters regarding the implementation of the Treaty after its entry into force. Before entry into force of the Treaty, most States Signatories have already set up at least an interim National Authority because of the need to cooperate with the Commission in establishing the verification regime. For States hosting monitoring facilities, the National Authority usually is the governmental entity which negotiates and promotes the conclusion of the necessary Facility Agreement in order to advance work on the IMS, which must be fully operational at entry into force. In other States, the National Authority is cooperating with the Commission in establishing a National Data Centre and building the national capacity to receive and analyse IMS data.

In the event of an on-site inspection after entry into force of the Treaty, the role of the National Authority would be particularly important, considering the negotiations and administrative arrangements required to facilitate inspection activities under the Treaty. Such tasks would include communication between the inspected State Party and the Technical Secretariat, consultations on the mandate of the inspection, and privileges and immunities, as well as visas, diplomatic clearance for the inspection aircraft or exemption issues.

The establishment or designation of the National Authority is mainly an administrative matter. It would usually be established as a result of general executive powers of the government. While it is therefore not necessary to include it in an implementing act or statute, it may be necessary to establish its mandate and powers by statute, in particular

when its powers would affect the rights of third parties or it has been assigned some level of enforcement authority.

Currently, more than 130 States Signatories have designated their respective National Authorities.

8. Checklist for legislators

The sections below identify elements that are suggested to be taken into account by States when incorporating the Treaty into national law. The CTBTO Secretariat has developed and freely distributes a guide to CTBT legislation which contains model legislation and commentary. The Secretariat is also available for consultations or assistance.

8.1. Measures explicitly required

- Prohibit and prevent nuclear weapon test explosions and any other nuclear explosion;
- Extend the legislation extraterritorially to natural persons possessing the State's nationality regardless of where the persons commit the act;
- Cooperate with, and afford legal assistance to, other States Parties;
- Designate or set up a National Authority.

8.2. Other elements normally necessary

- Definitions;
- Law that is binding also on the government;
- Recognition of the legal capacity of the CTBTO;
- Privileges and immunities of the CTBTO, delegates of its Member States, staff and experts;
- Confidentiality of data;
- For States hosting a facility in the CTBTO International Monitoring System, national arrangements to enable site selection, construction, operation, maintenance and data transmission;
- Procedures to report chemical explosions above the threshold established by the Treaty;
- Inspection powers and procedures;
- Authority to issue regulations;
- Allocation of budgetary and personnel resources to participate in the CTBTO and its activities.

8.3. Measures which may be necessary during the preparatory phase

To establish and provisionally operate the IMS and IDC during the preparatory phase, some States Signatories have adopted measures to:

- Establish or designate the National Authority and National Data Centre;
- Recognize the legal capacity of the Preparatory Commission;

- Confer privileges and immunities upon the Preparatory Commission, delegates, the Executive Secretary, staff and experts;
- Authorize the negotiation and conclusion of Facility Agreements or Arrangements with the Preparatory Commission;
- Authorize and enable the conduct of activities pursuant to the Resolution establishing the Preparatory Commission, including cooperation between the National Authority and the Preparatory Commission;
- Allocate budgetary and personnel resources to participate in the Commission and its activities.

9. Ratifying States (153 as of May 2010)

Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria*, Andorra, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina*, Armenia, Australia*, Austria*, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh*, Barbados, Belarus, Belgium*, Belize, Benin, Bolivia (Plurinational State of), Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil*, Bulgaria*, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada*, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chile*, Colombia*, Cook Islands, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Democratic Republic of the Congo*, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Eritrea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland*, France*, Gabon, Georgia, Germany*, Greece, Grenada, Guyana, Haiti, Holy See, Honduras, Hungary*, Iceland, Ireland, Italy*, Jamaica, Japan*, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kiribati, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg,

Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Marshall Islands, Mauritania, Mexico*, Micronesia (Federated States of), Monaco, Mongolia, Montenegro, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Nauru, Netherlands*, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway*, Oman, Palau, Panama, Paraguay, Peru*, Philippines, Poland*, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea*, Republic of Moldova, Romania*, Russian Federation*, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, San Marino, Senegal, Serbia, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovakia*, Slovenia, South Africa*, Spain*, Sudan, Suriname, Sweden*, Switzerland*, Tajikistan, The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey*, Turkmenistan, Uganda, Ukraine*, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland*, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Vanuatu, Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of), Viet Nam* and Zambia.

10. Signatory States which have not yet ratified (29 as of May 2010)

Angola, Brunei Darussalam, Chad, China*, Comoros, Congo, Egypt*, Equatorial Guinea, Gambia, Ghana, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Indonesia*, Iran (Islamic Republic of)*, Iraq, Israel*, Myanmar, Nepal, Papua New Guinea, Sao Tome and Principe, Solomon Islands, Sri Lanka, Swaziland, Thailand, Timor-Leste, United States of America*, Yemen and Zimbabwe.

* States, listed in Annex 2, which must ratify the CTBT before it can enter into force.

11. Non-signatory States (13 as of May 2010)

Bhutan, Cuba, Democratic People's Republic of Korea*, Dominica, India*, Mauritius, Niue, Pakistan*, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Syrian Arab Republic, Tonga and Tuvalu.

12. Entry into force

The CTBT will enter into force 180 days after it has been ratified by the 44 States listed in Annex 2. These 44 States formally participated in the negotiations of the Treaty and possessed nuclear power reactors or research reactors at the time. Nine of those States have not yet ratified the Treaty.

13. Resolutions by the Inter-Parliamentary Union

13.1. Resolutions 1995–2009

The Inter-Parliamentary Union has adopted a series of resolutions in which either explicit reference is made to the CTBT or the stated aims are consistent with those of the CTBT:

- The Importance of Adhering to the Obligations Specified in the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (91st Inter-Parliamentary Conference/Paris, 1994)

* States, listed in Annex 2, which must ratify the CTBT before it can enter into force.

- To Comprehensively Ban Nuclear Weapons Testing and Halt All Present Nuclear Weapons Tests (94th Inter-Parliamentary Conference/Bucharest, 1995)
- Parliamentary Action to Encourage all Countries to Sign and Ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Prohibiting All Nuclear Testing, to Encourage Universal and Non-discriminatory Nuclear Non-Proliferation Measures and to Work Towards the Eventual Elimination of All Nuclear Weapons (101st Inter-Parliamentary Conference/Brussels, 1999)
- Importance of the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear, Chemical and Biological Weapons of Mass Destruction and of Missiles, Including the Prevention of their Use by Terrorists (108th Inter-Parliamentary Conference/Santiago (Chile), 2003)
- The Role of Parliaments in Assisting Multilateral Organisations in Ensuring Peace and Security and in Building an International Coalition for Peace (109th IPU Assembly/Geneva, 2003)
- The Announcement by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea of its Nuclear Weapons Test and the Strengthening of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime (115th IPU Assembly/Geneva, 2006)
- Advancing Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament, and Securing the Entry into Force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty: the Role of Parliaments (120th IPU Assembly/Addis Ababa, 2009).

13.2. Text of the 2009 Resolution

Advancing Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament, and Securing the Entry into Force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty: the Role of Parliaments

Resolution adopted by consensus by the 120th IPU Assembly (Addis Ababa, 10 April 2009)*

The 120th Assembly of the Inter-Parliamentary Union,

Determined to advance nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation with a view to strengthening international peace and security in accordance with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, and *underscoring* that substantial progress in the field of nuclear disarmament requires active support and dedicated contributions by all States,

Deeply concerned that the existence in the world of some 26,000 nuclear weapons, whose use can have devastating human, environmental and economic consequences, constitutes a threat to international peace and security,

Reaffirming the obligations of nuclear-weapon States under Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) towards nuclear disarmament and their unequivocal undertakings under the 1995 and 2000 NPT Review Conferences in this regard,

Recalling past IPU resolutions designed to advance the progress of non-proliferation and disarmament and to encourage ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), in particular the one adopted by the 101st Inter-Parliamentary Conference (Brussels, April 1999),

Reaffirming the crucial importance of the NPT as the cornerstone of the nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament regime, which sets out legal obligations in these fields at the same time as it guarantees the right to develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes,

Recalling international conventions and resolutions adopted by the UN Security Council and the IPU on the right to access nuclear technology for peaceful purposes,

Concerned that non-compliance with all provisions of the NPT by some States has undermined the three pillars of the NPT and eroded the benefits derived by all States,

Considering the importance of all States ensuring strict compliance with their nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament obligations,

Recognizing the progress made under the NPT and the resulting safeguards agreements, and *urging* the nuclear-weapon States to fully implement the commitments they undertook during the NPT Review Conferences in 1995 and 2000,

Concerned that, in spite of tireless efforts made by the international community for forty years to ban nuclear explosions in all environments, and thirteen years after it was opened for signature, the CTBT has yet to enter into force,

Convinced that the verified cessation of nuclear-weapon-test explosions or any other nuclear explosions constitutes an effective disarmament and non-proliferation measure and is a meaningful preliminary step towards nuclear disarmament, but *stressing* that the only way to remove the threat of nuclear weapons is the total elimination of such inhumane weapons,

Stressing that a universal and effectively verifiable CTBT constitutes a fundamental instrument in the field of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation,

Underscoring the crucial role of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in promoting nuclear cooperation, the transfer of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes to developing countries, and nuclear non-proliferation, and the need for every State to adopt the non-proliferation safeguards standard of a comprehensive safeguards agreement combined with an additional protocol,

Disappointed that after over a decade, the Conference on Disarmament, the UN multilateral disarmament negotiation body, has yet to agree on a programme of work and resume its important mandate, owing to the divergent views on disarmament negotiation priorities,

Considering the important role played by bilateral disarmament treaties, such as the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, *welcoming* the cuts made by some nuclear-weapon States to their nuclear arsenals and *urging* deeper, faster and irreversible cuts to all types of nuclear weapons by all nuclear-armed States,

Convinced that the best way to guarantee world peace and stability is to take effective measures for international security, including disarmament and the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons,

Recognizing the benefits of confidence-building measures, such as the de-emphasizing of nuclear weapons in national security doctrines and the removal of nuclear weapons systems from high alert status, and *mindful* of the mutual confidence engendered by freely agreed regional nuclear-weapon-free zones, such as those in the South Pacific, Africa, South-East Asia and Latin America,

Underscoring the importance of establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, without exception,

Deeply concerned by the risk of accidental or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons and by the resulting toll in human life, environmental damage, political tensions, economic loss and market instability,

Pledging to bring about fuller parliamentary involvement in the disarmament process, particularly in respect

of nuclear weapons, in the form of greater pressure on governments and detailed scrutiny of military budgets and procurement programmes allocated for nuclear weapons development,

Mindful of the fact that national defence policies should not compromise the fundamental principle of undiminished security for all, and thus *recalling* that any unilateral deployment or build-up of strategic anti-ballistic missile assets affecting the deterrent capacity of nuclear-weapon States might hinder the process of nuclear disarmament,

1. *Calls on* all nuclear-armed States to make deeper, faster and irreversible cuts to all types of nuclear weapons;
2. *Urges* all States to redouble their efforts to prevent and combat the proliferation of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction in accordance with international law;
3. *Underscores* the vital role of the CTBT as part of a framework for achieving nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, and *expresses disappointment* that, thirteen years after it was opened for signature, the Treaty has yet to enter into force;
4. *Stresses* the vital importance and urgency of signature and ratification, without delay and without conditions, to achieve the earliest entry into force of the CTBT;
5. *Welcomes* the signatures/ratifications of the CTBT in 2008 by Barbados, Burundi, Colombia, Lebanon, Malawi, Malaysia, Mozambique and Timor-Leste;

6. *Calls upon* the parliaments of all States that have not yet signed and ratified the CTBT to exert pressure on their governments to do so;
7. *Especially urges* parliaments of all remaining States listed in Annex 2 of the CTBT, whose ratification is required to bring the treaty into force, to urge their governments to immediately sign and ratify the treaty;
8. *Calls on* all nuclear-armed States to continue to observe their moratoria on nuclear-weapon testing, on all States that have not already done so to proceed, on a voluntary basis, to dismantle their nuclear test sites, and on all States to maintain support for the CTBT Organization verification system until the CTBT enters into force;
9. *Urges* immediate commencement of negotiations on a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices;
10. *Invites* States to initiate negotiations with a view to concluding a treaty on the prohibition of short-range and intermediate-range land missiles that carry nuclear warheads;
11. *Recommends* that States with ballistic missile capacity that have not acceded to the Hague Code of Conduct do so quickly in order to render this instrument completely effective against ballistic missile proliferation;
12. *Calls on* all nuclear-armed States to adopt confidence-building measures, including the de-emphasizing of nuclear weapons in national security doctrines and

- the removal of all nuclear weapons from high alert status;
13. *Reaffirms* the importance of achieving universal accession to the NPT, and of States not party to the NPT acceding to it promptly and unconditionally as non-nuclear-weapon States, and of all States party to the NPT fulfilling their obligations under the Treaty;
 14. *Is hopeful* that the States concerned will be required to sign and comply with safeguards agreements and additional protocols, in particular those concluded in the framework of the IAEA, as a prerequisite for benefiting from international cooperation in the field of nuclear energy for civilian purposes;
 15. *Calls on* all States to support the initiatives aimed at globalizing the obligations set forth in the Treaty signed between the United States and the former Soviet Union on the elimination of their intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles (INF Treaty) and to promote cooperative approaches to the issue of missile defence, beginning with a joint assessment of possible threats;
 16. *Calls on* national parliaments to ensure State compliance with all their disarmament and non-proliferation obligations;
 17. *Urges* parliaments to provide strong and effective support to all resolutions and recommendations on peace, disarmament and security previously adopted at IPU Conferences and Assemblies;
 18. *Encourages* parliaments to monitor closely national implementation of all arms control, non-proliferation and disarmament treaties and UN resolutions,

- to engage their publics on nuclear issues and to report back to the IPU on progress made;
19. *Urges* IAEA Member States or parties to a safeguards agreement to lend strong and constant support to the IAEA so that it can honour its safeguards obligations and therefore to cooperate in good faith with the IAEA by providing it with all information requested;
 20. *Calls on* States whose ratification is needed for the entry into force of general safeguards agreements to take the necessary steps to that end as soon as possible;
 21. *Further calls on* the States party to a safeguards agreement which have not yet signed and/or ratified an additional protocol to do so as soon as possible;
 22. *Recommends* that the United Nations, especially the Office of Disarmament Affairs, and the Preparatory Commission for the CTBT Organization, strengthen cooperation with the IPU;
 23. *Invites* the IPU Secretary General to contact, on an annual basis, the parliaments of the States which have not signed and/or ratified the international treaties mentioned in the present resolution with a view to encouraging them to do so;
 24. *Urges* parliaments to instruct governments to express their support for the UN Secretary-General's Five Point Proposal contained in his address, "The United Nations and Security in a Nuclear-Weapon-Free World";
 25. *Encourages* parliaments to support the full ratification and implementation of existing nuclear-weapon-free

zones, and to explore the possibility of establishing additional nuclear-weapon-free zones freely agreed by States in specific regions;

26. *Calls for* the necessary steps to be taken to declare the Middle East a nuclear-weapon-free zone, without exception, in keeping with the resolution endorsed by the NPT Review Conference in 1995;
27. *Encourages* all parliaments to remain seized of the issue at the highest political level and, where possible, to promote compliance with the NPT through bilateral and joint outreach, seminars and other means.

* The following delegations expressed reservations on parts of the resolution:

- China – operative paragraphs 10, 11 and 15;
- India – preambular paragraphs 4, 5, 7, 10 and 12 and operative paragraphs 3, 4, 6, 7, 8 and 13;
- Iran (Islamic Republic of) – preambular paragraph 18 and operative paragraphs 6, 10, 21 and 26;
- Pakistan – preambular paragraphs 7 and 13 and operative paragraphs 13, 14, 16, 17, 18 and 23.