Eastern Europe and the CTBT

In terms of membership, Eastern Europe with 22 members is the smallest of the six geographical regions established for the purposes of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). Yet it is by no means the least visible. The region is united in its robust and continuing support for the comprehensive ban on nuclear test explosions.

The most visible sign of this support is the readiness with which Eastern European States have adhered to the CTBT. Indeed, their track record in this respect is exemplary. All 22 have signed the Treaty and are accordingly members of the Preparatory Commission, while 19 have ratified it. Most importantly, each one of the seven Annex 2 States from the region, whose ratification is required for the CTBT to enter into force has already ratified the Treaty. As the sole nuclear weapon State in the region, the Russian Federation signed the CTBT on 24 September 1996 and ratified it on 30 June 2000.

Over the years, three Permanent Representatives of Eastern European States to the Preparatory Commission have been elected as Chairpersons of the Commission: Ambassador Daniela Rozgonova, Slovak Republic, from May to December 1997; Ambassador Pavel Vacek, Czech Republic, from January to June 2000; and Ambassador Liviu Aurelian Bota, Romania, from July to December 2002. In addition, Eastern Europe regularly nominates Vice-Chairpersons of the Commission and has designated several members of the Advisory Group, which advises the Commission on financial, budgetary and associated administrative issues as well as a representative of the Commission on the Management Board of the Provident Fund of the organization.

Since 1997, Eastern European States have hosted 13 technical meetings and training activities of the Commission. The activities focused on fostering international cooperation with respect to the CTBT, on On-Site Inspection (OSI) issues, on training for the staff of National Data Centres, and on possible civil and scientific benefits of the Treaty’s verification technologies. Notably, the first OSI field experiment was conducted in Slovakia in 2001.

The commitment of the Eastern European geographical region to the CTBT and the Preparatory Commission was given recognition in 2004, when Ambassador Tibor Tóth, the Permanent Representative of Hungary in Geneva and longstanding chairman of Working Group A, was elected the second Executive Secretary of the Commission, with effect from 1 August 2005.

Eastern European facility agreements

States hosting monitoring facilities under the CTBT conclude international agreements or arrangements known as facility agreements with the Preparatory Commission. Facility agreements regulate matters such as the establishment, upgrading, testing, certification, and the operation and maintenance of monitoring facilities as well as the privileges and immunities of the organization and its staff.

The CTBT envisions that 36 international monitoring facilities will be located in five Eastern European States, namely Armenia, the Czech Republic, Romania, the Russian Federation and Ukraine. Thirty-two of these facilities are hosted by the Russian Federation, including Eastern Europe’s only radionuclide laboratory, RL13 in Moscow.

Following several rounds of negotiations held in Vienna and Moscow, the Government of the Russian Federation and the Preparatory Commission concluded a bilateral facility agreement in Vienna on 22 March 2005. The agreement is being applied provisionally until the Government of the Russian Federation has completed the necessary domestic formalities for its entry into force. The agreement is especially significant since it regulates the Commission’s activities in respect to almost ten per cent of the overall monitoring network. Facility agreements have also been concluded with the Czech Republic (2002), Romania (2003) and Ukraine (1999).
The 2005 National Data Centre (NDC) Evaluation Workshop, held from 17 to 21 October in Rome, Italy, focused on obtaining evaluation feedback from NDCs on the System-wide Performance Test (SPT1). Organized by the PTS and hosted by the Instituto Nazionale di Geofisica e Vulcanologia in Rome, the workshop attracted over 80 participants from 26 Member States. More than 30 participants gave presentations and provided reports on their evaluation of the SPT1.

The participants acknowledged that the SPT1 has been very successful both in providing baseline information on the current status of the verification system and in illuminating various areas that require further development. Given the importance of the SPT1, the degree to which NDCs have become engaged and the good cooperation now in place between NDCs and the Provisional Technical Secretariat (PTS) for evaluation activities, it was recommended that Working Group B should consider future integrated tests to assist the development of selected components of the verification system. Furthermore, the participants expressed their appreciation of the Operations Centre, which was established for the conduct of SPT1, as a significant improvement in PTS coordination and recommended that the Operations Centre should be further developed.

The participants of the workshop benefited from the exchange of experience between NDCs and the PTS, the well-prepared presentations and the open working atmosphere. According to a survey, over 80 percent of the participants rated the workshop between excellent and good.

“Today, in my ninety-seventh year, … I am still as deeply confirmed in my belief that nuclear weapons are fundamentally immoral, and that we must do everything in our power to stop their proliferation. It is not only the enormous scale of their powers of destruction (to the point of destroying the whole of civilization), but, even if limited, their action is indiscriminate, affecting civilians as well as military, innocents and aggressors alike, killing people alive now and generations as yet unborn.

All this makes nuclear weapons unacceptable instruments for maintaining peace in the world. But this has been exactly our policy during, and since the end of, the Cold War. Nuclear weapons have been kept as a deterrent, to prevent war by the threat of retaliation. And we have to ask ourselves: Are we going to base our world on a culture of peace or on a culture of violence?

If we rest the security of the world on a balance of terror, not only is it extremely dangerous, but in the long run it will erode the ethical basis of civilization.”

Professor Sir Joseph Rotblat, the only nuclear physicist to resign from the Manhattan Project, wrote this letter to the editor of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists shortly before his death on 31 August 2005. He received the Nobel Peace Prize in 1995 together with Pugwash “for their efforts to diminish the part played by nuclear arms in international politics and, in the longer run, to eliminate such arms.”
Article XIV of the CTBT specifies the conditions for the Treaty’s entry into force which will take place 180 days after the 44 States with nuclear capabilities listed in its Annex 2 have ratified it. As the Chairman of the CTBT negotiations in Geneva, I recall that it was a Canadian idea to include a mechanism under Article XIV, whereby on request of the Ratifier States regular conferences are convened by the United Nations Secretary-General to promote the entry into force of the Treaty.

This mechanism has become instrumental in moving the issue of entry into force forward. So far, Article XIV Conferences have taken place in 1999, 2001, 2003 and 2005. The 2003 Conference under the Chairmanship of Finland has adopted for the first time twelve specific measures, appended to its Final Declaration. One of them was the decision to appoint me as the Special Representative with the mandate “to assist the co-ordinating State in the performance of its function in promoting the early entry into force of the Treaty.”

In its Final Declaration, the 2005 Conference reconfirmed the measures adopted at the 2003 Conference, including my function to assist the current co-ordinating State, Australia, in promoting the entry into force of the Treaty.

My mandate does not make a distinction between the Annex 2 States and other countries which have not yet signed or ratified. At the beginning of my work I focused for practical reasons on Annex 2 States, namely China, Vietnam and Pakistan. I was encouraged by my visits to China and Vietnam, with particularly China being very supportive of my work. I am looking forward to an early visit to Indonesia.

Besides my facilitating role in the entry into force process, I would like to work now also on increasing the overall number of signatures and ratifications in order to strengthen the norm against nuclear weapon test explosions. Smaller countries ought to be aware that by signing and ratifying the CTBT, they too can contribute to this important objective and thus make the world a safer place.

It is a little over seven years ago that the world last witnessed nuclear weapon test explosions. The more countries sign and ratify the CTBT, the stronger the norm gets. It goes without saying that the series of unilateral moratoria that are observed now cannot take the place of the CTBT, which, once entered into force, would ban nuclear weapon test explosions once and for all.

Biographical note

Following the 2003 Article XIV Conference, Ambassador Jaap Ramaker was appointed Special Representative of the Ratifying States to promote the entry into force of the CTBT.


Between 1994 and 1997, he was Permanent Representative of his country to the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva. In this capacity, he chaired the CTBT negotiations and led them to a successful conclusion. He then served as Permanent Representative to the United Nations in New York (1997-1998) and to the United Nations and other international organizations in Vienna and as Ambassador of The Netherlands to Austria (1999-2004).