Following World War II, Japan made disarmament and non-proliferation one of the major items on its foreign policy agenda. The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) in particular has a special significance for Japan and the Japanese people, and it is the fervent wish of the Japanese to see its entry into force. This sentiment derives from reactions to the tragedies in Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945, as well as an incident involving the exposure of a Japanese fishing boat and its crew to radioactive fallout from a U.S. hydrogen bomb test at Bikini Atoll in 1954.

CTBT and Japan

Japan’s support of the CTBT also stems from its consideration for ensuring national security. Northeast Asia is one of the most unstable regions in the world. Japan itself is surrounded by countries with nuclear weapons, namely, China, Russia and the USA; and, last year, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea publicly announced its possession of nuclear weapons. It should be stressed that any form of nuclear testing conducted by a country would severely damage efforts to deter nuclear testing in general, thereby undermining security.

The CTBT is also important for international security. The Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is the central pillar of the nuclear non-proliferation regime and one of the important cornerstones underpinning global security. For it to function successfully, confidence needs to be maintained and strengthened in its three pillars: nuclear disarmament, nuclear non-proliferation, and the peaceful use of nuclear energy. Given the symbolic significance of the CTBT for nuclear disarmament in general, the wider the support for it is, the greater the confidence in the NPT, thereby leading to a strengthening of international security.

Japan has consistently made it a priority to support the conclusion and entry into force of the CTBT because of its importance to Japan and the world as a whole. When Japan joined the United Nations (UN) in 1956, the Foreign Minister, Mamoru Shigemitsu, called for the early conclusion of the CTBT in his first speech made to the General Assembly.

CTBT negotiations

When negotiations for the Treaty did not start due to a lack of support from major countries, the late Dr Shigeji Suyehiro, Director-General of the Japan Meteorological Agency, played a key role in the work of the Group of Scientific Experts, which was formed in 1976 to prepare the ground for CTBT negotiations. As a country located in an earthquake-prone zone, Japan’s knowledge and experience were useful in defining the technology required to detect underground nuclear testing.

When finally in 1993 countries agreed to start negotiations, Yoshitomo Tanaka, Ambassador of Japan to the Conference on Disarmament, chaired the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban and played an important part in working to reach an agreement on its mandate.

I, personally, participated in negotiations from 1994 to 1997 while fulfilling my assignment at the Delegation of Japan to the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva. Japan opposed the authorisation of low yield tests and nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes and this was reflected in the final version of the Treaty.

Dr. Suyehiro also played an important role in the development of the IMS network.

What I regret most to this day are the specific conditions set forth in the Treaty’s ‘entry into force’ clause. Japan proposed a simple majority of ratifications and was opposed to Article XIV as it stands today. At the final stage of negotiations, the late Foreign Minister, Yukihiko Ikeda, came to Geneva in an attempt to persuade countries to relax the conditions required for entry into force of the Treaty, but the present formula was ultimately preserved.

Japan’s contribution to the CTBT

Japan’s contribution to the CTBT since it was adopted by the UN General
Assembly in 1996 can be divided into three areas: the Preparatory Commission’s activities, the promotion of the entry into force of the Treaty, and civil and scientific application. Ever since the Preparatory Commission was established in November 1996, Japan has contributed about 20% of its total annual budget, and we are now the de facto largest contributor to the Commission.

As part of our efforts to support the build-up of the verification regime, Japan has been offering training courses on seismological observation to experts from developing countries since 1995. In 2003, Japan hosted the Ninth On-Site Inspection Workshop in Hiroshima.

We have chaired, and actively participated in, Article XIV Conferences and have co-organized CTBT Ministerial meetings in order to promote the early entry into force of the Treaty. In addition, we have used every opportunity in our bilateral consultations with countries concerned to encourage ratification.

Japan is an active supporter of the use of CTBT verification technologies, including the provision of IMS seismic data for use in tsunami early warning systems. Although civil and scientific applications are not one of the Treaty’s prime objectives, it would be excellent if CTBT technologies could be used to save lives, thanks to the flexibility of Member States.

On a separate issue, it is surprising to note that there are only four Japanese staff members working for the Provisional Technical Secretariat (PTS), 2.29% of the total staff. This extremely low percentage is unfortunate in view of Japan’s considerable financial, technical, and political contributions to the CTBT. However, the good news is that many highly qualified Japanese are currently applying for posts in the PTS and I feel sure they will join the Organization in the near future and make a valuable contribution to the CTBTO Preparatory Commission.

Important of the CTBT and its entry into force

Looking ahead, there seems little prospect of the CTBT coming into force in the near future, bearing in mind the strict conditions set forth in the Treaty. In fact, ten of the 44 countries required to ratify before the Treaty can come into force have still not done so. Nevertheless, as of 17 July 2006, 176 countries have signed and 134 have ratified. This fact carries a politically and morally significant weight. Furthermore, 60% of IMS stations are now transmitting data to the IDC allowing us to detect nuclear tests with a considerably high degree of certainty. All of these factors considered, conducting nuclear tests has now become politically and morally very difficult despite the fact that the CTBT has as yet not come into force.

It is regrettable that India and Pakistan conducted eleven nuclear tests in 1998, but since then no further tests have been carried out. The five nuclear powers as well as India and Pakistan have all declared a moratorium on nuclear testing. This is a clear indication of progress brought about by the CTBT, especially when one considers that more than 2,000 tests were conducted before the adoption of the Treaty.

In conclusion, what we, as supporters of the CTBT, can and should do for the moment is to encourage signature and ratification by as many countries as possible and work for the early completion of the CTBT verification regime.

Biographical note

Mr. Yukiya Amano is Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary and Resident Representative of Japan to the International Organizations in Vienna. He is currently the chairperson of the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency.

Mr. Amano joined the diplomatic service in 1972 and has held increasingly senior positions, including Director of the Science Division, Director of the Nuclear Energy Division, and Director-General of the Disarmament, Non-proliferation and Science Department. He has also held academic posts at the Japan Institute of International Affairs, the Weatherhead Center for International Affairs at Harvard University, the Monterey Institute of International Studies, and Sophia University.

Mr. Amano participated in negotiations such as the NPT Review and Extension, the CTBT, the BTWC verification protocol, and the amendment of CCW. He represented Japan as a Governmental Expert on the UN Panel on Missiles in 2001 and in the UN Expert Group on Disarmament and Non-proliferation Education in the same year.