

# Outreach activities

*The Provisional Technical Secretariat (PTS) conducts a variety of activities focusing on enhancing the Treaty understanding of decision-makers and the general public. It generates political support, encourages international cooperation and builds national technical capacities through training.*

## International cooperation

The Provisional Technical Secretariat (PTS) continues its international cooperation and outreach activities aimed at enhancing the understanding of the Treaty and the work of the Preparatory Commission, promoting technical cooperation among Member States and providing legal and technical assistance for national capacity building.

The most recent international cooperation workshop took place from 31 May to 2 June 2006 in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. Some 30 participants from nine South-East Asian States, including representatives from ministries of foreign affairs, policy makers and scientific experts as well as a UNESCO representative, attended the workshop which was opened by H.E. Dr Jamaluddin Jarjis, Malaysian Minister of Science, Technology and Innovation, and addressed by Tibor Tóth, Executive Secretary of the Preparatory Commission.

The workshop aimed at enhancing the understanding of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), facilitating the earliest possible completion of the establishment of the International Monitoring System (IMS) and promoting ratification of the Treaty. During the three-day workshop, representatives of participating States gave their perspectives on the CTBT and on national implementation measures.

They discussed the prospects of increased regional and sub-regional cooperation with the aim of developing effective networks in the region, particularly focusing on IMS station installation and National Data Centre operation. Special attention was also given to the potential civil and scientific applications of the CTBT verification technologies such as natural disaster management.

Mr Tóth, who also met with H.E. Datuk Seri Syed Hamid Albar, Foreign Minister of Malaysia, on the sidelines of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) Coordinating Bureau Ministerial Meeting, stressed the significance of the ratification by Malaysia when talking to the press: “The ratification of Malaysia will be an extremely important symbolic act in the regional context because Malaysia is the coordinator of NAM in the wider sense, as well as an important example to those countries which have yet to ratify the CTBT.” ■



PARTICIPANTS AT THE WORKSHOP IN KUALA LUMPUR, MALAYSIA, 31 MAY - 2 JUNE 2006

## External Relations

The role of the External Relations Section in promoting the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) is being attained by pursuing a two-pronged approach: There are bilateral contacts with individual States through their capitals and Permanent Missions on one hand and outreach activities on the margins of multilateral forums and meetings of intergovernmental organizations on the other. All efforts are reflected in a five-pillar strategy:

- Providing support to the Executive Secretary, the Special Representative in the Article XIV Conference



## The CTBT noble gas ...

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process, the chairperson of the Preparatory Commission as well as bureaus of geographical and political groups, with a view to advancing the cause of the Treaty in those Annex 2 States that have yet to ratify the Treaty;

- Promoting the universality of the Treaty, as an effective instrument for international peace and security, providing assistance to States to move forward with the signature/ratification process as well as supporting States which, after ratification, need assistance in implementing the Treaty;
- Cooperating and creating synergies with international organizations by establishing cooperation frameworks with relevant international organizations. Furthermore, forging linkages with other international and sub/regional instruments, in order to ensure more visibility of the Treaty in the concerned organizations and their relevant programmes;
- Featuring the potential benefits of the verification technologies as a distinctive asset of the CTBT verification regime in external relations activities and;
- Supporting and assisting Member States to promote the Treaty in a specific country or group of countries. ■

## Training

In order to assist Member States to fulfil their verification responsibilities under the Comprehensive Nuclear-

Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) and to enable them to benefit fully from participating in the work of the Treaty regime the CTBTO Preparatory Commission has emphasized the importance of training and capacity building since its establishment.

In order to complement traditional training methods, the Provisional Technical Secretariat (PTS) has developed an e-learning project, which will provide electronic, interactive access to training courses and technical workshops to authorised users as well as continuous access to training modules.

The e-learning project will include training for national officials involved in the development and operation of verification system elements of the CTBT, International Monitoring System (IMS) technologies and station installation processes; for station managers and operators on the function and operation of station equipment and the interaction with the International Data Centre (IDC) on the function of the IDC and the analysis of IMS data; for national data centre staff on the utilization of and access to IMS data and IDC products and services; and for on-site inspection (OSI) experts and potential future OSI inspectors.

The e-learning project, which will be implemented in two phases over a period of approximately 15 months, will be financed by a Joint Action of the European Union in the magnitude of 1,133 million Euros. A pilot phase is currently in progress and is being financed by the Netherlands and the Czech Republic in the amounts of €180,000 and €15,263.55, respectively. ■

into the Arctic. The main sources of this are nuclear power plants in Europe.

As the quartet of xenon isotopes is also produced and disseminated by civilian applications it is very important for CTBT verification purposes to be able to provide data that enables States to interpret the signatures as indicative of either a nuclear explosion or of some other event. It is therefore necessary to understand very well the dynamics of civilian sources like reactors and the two major radioxenon plants (Chalk River in Canada and Fleurus in Belgium). As the composition of the quartet varies in the emissions from different sources, forming ratios between the four relevant isotopes can provide insight into the origin of a given sample. Research is zealously pursued to improve the understanding of these relations.

### Xenon and the waveform technologies

The waveform networks (seismic, hydroacoustics and infrasound) are able to geo-locate suspicious events, but they cannot provide evidence of the 'smoking gun' of a nuclear event. With the radionuclide technologies it is quite the opposite. They are informative on the character of the event but cannot pinpoint the location with a corresponding exactness. The answer to this is data fusion; first, a meteorological analysis to conclude from what areas of the globe radionuclides could possibly emanate and second, a comparison with waveform detections from the same area and time. It is possible, however, that in a well designed evasive scenario a nuclear event is solely detected by the noble gas system. The noble gas component is therefore of very special importance to the CTBT verification regime. ■