Statement by the Executive Secretary
of the Preparatory Commission for the
Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization
Mr. Wolfgang Hoffmann

20 November 2002
Mr. President, distinguished delegates,

1. I am pleased to be here today to report on the activities of the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization. The Treaty, the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, is one of the cornerstones of the international non-proliferation and disarmament regime. Its total ban of any nuclear test explosions in any environment will help end the development of ever more sophisticated nuclear weapons, as well as arresting the proliferation of these weapons.

2. Until today the Treaty has been signed by a total of 166 States and ratified by 97. Thirty-one of these ratifications are by Annex 2 States – 44 States listed in the Treaty whose ratification is required for entry into force. The level and pace of signatures and ratifications indicates the firm support of the international community for the Treaty. The conference on facilitating entry into force of the CTBT, which was held in New York in 2001, lead to a significant increase in signatures and ratifications.

3. The Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization was established six years ago to carry out the necessary preparations for the effective implementation of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, and to prepare for the first session of the Conference of the States Parties to the Treaty. The main activity of the Commission and its Provisional Technical Secretariat during the last years was the establishment of the verification regime to monitor Treaty compliance.

4. The global verification regime needs to be operational at the Treaty’s entry into force. It will be capable of detecting nuclear explosions underground, in water and in the atmosphere. The verification regime comprises four elements:
   - The International Monitoring System (IMS), with the International Data Centre (IDC), will be able to detect evidence of possible nuclear explosions;
   - A consultation and clarification process can clarify and resolve matters concerning possible non-compliance with the Treaty;
   - States Parties will also have the right to request an on-site inspection to determine whether a nuclear weapon test or any other nuclear explosion has been carried out in violation of the Treaty, and to gather facts which might assist in identifying any possible violator; and lastly
   - Confidence-building measures will contribute to resolve compliance concerns arising from possible misinterpretation of verification data and to assist in the calibration of IMS stations.

5. The International Monitoring System (IMS) consists of 321 monitoring stations and 16 radionuclide laboratories that monitor the Earth for evidence of a nuclear explosion. The IMS uses seismic, hydroacoustic and infrasound monitoring technologies to detect possible nuclear explosions. Radionuclide monitoring technologies collect and analyse air samples for evidence of the physical products created by nuclear explosions. Progress in establishing these facilities has been good considering the engineering challenges that face the establishment of this first
worldwide monitoring network. Currently 43% of the monitoring system are operational.

6. Good progress in establishing the IMS was in great part made possible by those States hosting IMS facilities. I would like to use this opportunity to thank States for their help and flexibility and express my hope that the good cooperation will continue for the remainder of the build up process.

7. A Global Communications Infrastructure (GCI) carries the seismic, hydroacoustic, infrasound and radionuclide data from IMS facilities to the International Data Centre. This global satellite communications network is also used to distribute data and reports relevant to Treaty verification to the States Signatories.

8. The International Data Centre supports the verification responsibilities of States Signatories by providing the products and services needed for effective Treaty monitoring. The Centre receives raw data from monitoring stations around the world, which it processes, analyses and transmits to States for final analysis. Improved software is enhancing precision in locating the events which produce seismic, hydroacoustic, infrasound and radionuclide data, and the verification system as a whole is being continuously developed and refined.

9. On-Site Inspections as provided for in the Treaty are a final verification measure, and the development of a draft OSI Operational Manual is a key task for the Preparatory Commission. The Commission is also acquiring inspection equipment and building up a pool of potential inspectors. A realistic field experiment was conducted in Kazakhstan in October 2002. The results of this experiment will facilitate preparation for real on-site inspections.

10. While the primary purpose of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) verification regime is to verify compliance with the Treaty effectively, the CTBT verification technologies, IMS data and IDC products have the potential to offer a range of useful civil and scientific applications for sustainable development and betterment of human welfare. In this regard, the Commission organized, with the strong support of the Government of the United Kingdom, a Senior Experts’ Discussion on Civil and Scientific Applications of CTBT Verification Technologies in London from 9 to 10 May 2002. Fifteen experts representing 13 Member States took part and the discussion reviewed and further explored potential civil and scientific applications of Treaty verification technologies and assets.

11. Seismic, hydroacoustic and infrasound data can be used in studies of the Earth’s structure and for research on earthquakes, volcanic eruption forecasting, tsunami warnings, underwater event location, and sea temperature and climate change monitoring. The data can assist in minimising the effect of volcanic eruptions on civil aviation and can be used for oceanic swell research and atmospheric and meteorological studies. Radionuclide technologies offer opportunities for detecting radionuclide dispersion, monitoring radiation levels and studying natural radioactivity, as well as supporting atmospheric studies, biological research and
environmental change tracking. Follow-up meetings and seminars are already taking place amongst policy-makers and scientists in support of the work of the Commission.

12. The Commission organizes training programmes and workshops in support of States Signatories in the enhancement of national technical capability for the implementation of the Treaty. Those include: training courses for IMS station operators in all four verification technologies, training courses for data analysis, storage and management, on-site inspection technologies, workshops for global communications infrastructure and workshops on international cooperation and national implementation of the Treaty. In addition, the Commission promotes international cooperation among States Signatories for them to participate in the fullest possible exchange relating to these verification technologies and the establishment and operation of national data centres. Since my last report to the General Assembly International Corporation workshops were hosted by Senegal and Kenya. Next week I will open an International Corporation workshop for the Caribbean region in Jamaica and for 2003 International Corporation workshops are scheduled in Azerbaijan, Fiji and Malaysia.

Mr. President,

13. In the same line, the CTBTO Preparatory Commission and the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (OPANAL), which share the same objective of enhancing international peace and security, have concluded a relationship agreement in Vienna on 18 September. This is the first agreement concluded between the Commission and a Regional Nuclear Weapon Free Zone Organization.

14. On 15 June 2000, the General Assembly adopted the Agreement to regulate the relationship between the United Nations and the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization, thereby accepting the Preparatory Commission as a new member of the United Nations family. The Commission remains an independent international organization, but has been given formal status by which we can contribute to the goals of the United Nations. CTBTO staff use the UN Laissez-Passer on duty travel. We have concluded a services agreement with UNDP, which provides us with operational support. Our Liaison Office, situated in the United Nations buildings across the street here in New York, contributes to the implementation of the relationship agreement with the UN and liaises with the United Nations Secretariat and other agencies of the UN system, the offices of regional, intergovernmental or relevant non-governmental organizations, as well as with the delegations in New York.

15. Under this Agreement, our links and interactions with the United Nations and its programmes, funds and specialized agencies are developing even further, and options for enhanced cooperation and support are under review. In order to fully contribute to the work of the United Nations family, the CTBTO Preparatory Commission has requested full membership in the United Nations System’s Chief Executives Board (CEB). The Preparatory Commission already participates in the work of the High
Level Committees of the CEB but this participation cannot replace full membership in the main coordinating body. In light of the disarmament-related issues in the Millennium Declaration we feel it particularly important that the CTBTO Preparatory Commission should be able to contribute fully to the work of the UN family.

16. We believe that it would be of great significance for the General Assembly to be kept abreast of the rapid development of our new and growing organization on a closer basis. In times of increasing concern about the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the reports of organizations specialized in this field should be of particular relevance to the deliberations of the General Assembly. However, we understand that the revitalisation of the work of the General Assembly is of utmost importance and that the clustering and bi-annualisation of the agenda item cooperation between the United Nations and regional and other organizations was an important part of the endeavours in this respect. We will therefore look for alternative ways to inform the General Assembly about the outcome of the next conference on facilitating entry into force of the CTBT to be held in 2003. Romania will introduce the draft resolution on co-operation between the United Nations and CTBTO PrepCom this year. In this context I would like to thank Ambassador Bota of Romania, the current Chairman of the CTBTO PrepCom, for his leadership.

17. In closing, I would like to emphasize that, six years after its opening for signature, the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty has the confirmed support of the international community, and is recognized as playing an important role in nuclear disarmament and in preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons. By signing and ratifying the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, States confirm their commitment to these shared goals.