SWEDEN

STATEMENT

by

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at the Conference Facilitating
the Entry into Force of the
Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty
"Article XIV"

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- CHECK AGAINST DELIVERY -
Mr Secretary-General,
Excellencies,
Delegates,
Ladies and Gentlemen,

I am delighted to join my distinguished Mexican colleague Foreign Minister Patricia Espinosa Cantellano as one of the Co-Presidents of this Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty as Mexico and Sweden jointly take on the role as Article XIV Coordinating States for the upcoming two year period.

I thank the UN Secretary General, Mr. Ban Ki-moon, for his statement and support in this endeavor and good wishes for the success of the Conference.

My thanks also goes to the previous Article XIV Coordinators, Foreign Ministers Alain Juppe of France and Taib Fassi Fihri of Morocco, who have done much towards the goal of the entry into force of the Treaty.

I would also like to express my appreciation to Ambassador Tibor Tóth, Executive Secretary of the Preparatory Commission, and his staff for their valuable work for the CTBT and in preparing for this Conference.

I look forward to working closely with all of you, building on the good work of the former Coordinators.

Taking on this task is a further sign of Sweden's resolute support for the CTBT and its entry into force, as well as wider interest to strengthen the international security architecture. Sweden has consistently supported the CTBT as an unique measure to completely put an end to nuclear testing. The Treaty will significantly constrain the development and qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons. And by doing so it offers an indispensable contribution to nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament. With the CTBT in force another step will be taken towards the goal of a future without nuclear weapons.
Tomorrow it will be exactly fifteen years since the Treaty was opened for signature. An overwhelming and growing majority of the international community already agree to the urgent need to finally put the CTBT in place. However, despite this broad commitment, the Treaty has yet to take legal effect as its entry-into-force mechanism requires adherence by relevant nuclear technology holders, the 44 states listed in Annex 2 of Treaty. This built-in safety-valve should alleviate any possible concerns among the states in question to commit because the of risk of others not taking on the same obligation. At the same time this amounts to a special responsibility on each and every one of those Annex 2 states. The need to act cannot be passed over to others. So far 35 of those states have assumed that responsibility and ratified, including three nuclear weapons states. That is commendable.

Nine Annex 2 countries have not yet chosen to do so. I am convinced that this will change as it becomes increasingly clear what the potential future options might be: a world where nuclear testing would again risk inflaming international relations, or a global community that has put such dangerous practices behind itself and banned them once and for all. To my mind the path we need to take is clear. With the CTBT in place can we build a more secure global environment for all.

To those that might be sympathetic to the idea of a complete test ban as such, but perhaps doubt the possibilities to detect any potential violators with a high certainty, there is good news. These fifteen years have been well spent in carefully building up an unprecedented global verification system for the CTBT. With the near completion of the International Monitoring System (IMS) undetected testing is virtually impossible. The system has proven itself on several occasions, including the announced North Korean tests in recent years. It has clearly been demonstrated that the CTBT will work once in place. Now, what remains is the political will to put it there.

The course of further CTBT ratifications is a slow but yet evolving process. As is known, two of the remaining Annex 2 countries have publicly announced their intention to actively pursue ratification. That leadership is very much to be welcomed. Any further ratifications, in particular by states armed with nuclear weapons, could untie the knot among the remaining states, possibly paving the way for a series of ratifications. This in turn could make the entry into force of the CTBT into a tangible scenario in a not too distant future.
As one of the Co-Presidents of the process aiming to facilitate the entry into force of the CTBT, I strongly wish to contribute to such a positive development. I join those urging all states that have not yet done so, to sign and ratify the Treaty without delay, thereby being part of the international consensus to completely end nuclear testing. Until then, the moratoria on nuclear testing must be upheld to underpin and strengthen the already de facto test ban, keeping in mind that voluntary moratoria cannot replace legal instruments.

Sweden and Mexico - as well as, no doubt, other supporters of this important Treaty - will keep on addressing the CTBT and its entry into force in order to help pave the way for further concrete steps towards this goal.

Thank you.