Workshop on the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty

Preparing for 2010: Striking a Balance between Nuclear Disarmament & Nuclear Nonproliferation

L’Impérial Palace Hotel, Annecy, France

7 and 8 March 2008

Conference Report
Introduction
In keeping with its longstanding practice, the Monterey Institute’s James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS) hosted a two-day diplomatic workshop on the Treaty on the NonProliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) on 7 and 8 March 2008 in Annecy, France, entitled: “Preparing for 2010: Striking a Balance between Nuclear Disarmament and Nuclear Nonproliferation.” The workshop was made possible through the financial support of the Ploughshares Fund, Scherman Foundation, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, and contributions from the governments of Australia, France, Germany, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, the Republic of Korea, Slovenia, Sweden and the United Kingdom.

CNS is the only organization in the world dedicated exclusively to graduate education, executive training and research in the field of nonproliferation and disarmament. The unifying principle underlying the CNS approach is to combat the spread of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) by training the next generation of policy experts and nonproliferation specialists and by disseminating timely information and analysis in this field. One of the Center’s highest priorities is to actively promote a successful NPT Review Conference in 2010. The Center’s International Organizations and Nonproliferation Program (IONP) is primarily tasked to disseminate timely policy analysis and information on activity within the nonproliferation and disarmament regimes. Key to this task is the promotion of substantive dialogue between governmental and nongovernmental sectors on nuclear nonproliferation, disarmament and arms control through diplomatic workshops.

Executive Summary
With the specter of the 2005 Review Conference still looming in the minds of many, and a 2007 Preparatory Committee (PrepCom) session whose outcome was precariously perched on the edge of failure, the need for a successful 2008 PrepCom session in preparation for the 2010 Review Conference has grown in importance. The 2008 Annecy NPT workshop sought to build upon the experiences of the 2007 PrepCom, identify areas for progress, share recommendations and proposals on how to resolve key challenges facing the nonproliferation regime, and consider avenues for ensuring that the PrepCom will be able to pass on substantive recommendations to the 2010 Review Conference. The workshop was also designed to assist the PrepCom chairman-elect, Volodymyr Yelchenko of Ukraine, in his consultation with key ambassadors and senior representatives from NPT States Parties as well as senior staff from the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs (ODA), the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO). The workshop also benefited from the participation of representatives from several nongovernmental organizations and think tanks.

The workshop agenda was comprised of eight sessions addressing both procedural and substantive issues related to the 2010 Review Conference. In each session, a panel of speakers presented their perspectives on the specified topic, followed by a moderated discussion. The first session was devoted to taking stock since the 2007 PrepCom. Sessions two and three examined progress in nonproliferation and disarmament and ways to move these two agendas forward. Sessions four through six explored ways to tackle the various challenges facing the nonproliferation regime. The final two sessions were devoted to reviewing the views and proposals discussed over the course of the two days and provided the 2008 PrepCom chairman-elect an opportunity to brief participants on his consultations in preparation for the PrepCom thus far and to solicit their feedback.

Workshop panelists presented the following papers, some of which can be accessed through the CNS website at http://www.cns.miis.edu:

- *Taking Stock after 2007: Is the Glass Half Full or Half Empty? The 2007 PrepCom Chairman’s Summary Report- The Basis for a Successful Review*, by Ambassador Yukiya Amano (Japan and chairman of the 2007 PrepCom session)
- *Taking Stock After 2007: Is the Glass Half Full or Half Empty? A Non-Aligned Perspective*, by Ambassador Sameh Shoukry (Egypt)
Taking Stock after 2007: A Weapon State Perspective, by Ambassador John Duncan (United Kingdom)

A New Disarmament Era? What Initiatives are being Undertaken, and What Would be the Impact of Political Leadership on the Future of Disarmament? by Ambassador Knut Langeland (Norway)

Disarmament: Keeping on Track and Avoiding Derailment, by Dr. Patricia Lewis (UNIDIR)

What are the Prospects for Entry Into Force of the CTBT and for Negotiations on an FMCT? by Ambassador Jean-Francois Dobelle (France)

Reducing Non-strategic Nuclear Weapons: The 1991/92 Presidential Initiatives (PNI’s) and the INF as Templates for Regional Initiatives and Removing Forward Deployed Weapons in Europe and Russia, by Ambassador Kari Kahiluoto (Finland)

Reducing the Salience, Numbers and Operational Status of Strategic Nuclear Systems: Scope for Multinational Initiatives, by Ambassador Don MacKay (New Zealand)

Implementing Existing Nuclear Weapon Free Zones: Challenges and Solutions, by Ambassador I Gusti Agung Wesaka Puja (Indonesia)

Rethinking Security Interests for a Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone in the Middle East, by Dr. Rebecca Johnson

The Future of Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones: Maintaining their Relevance and Expanding their Scope, by Ambassador Sergio Duarte (United Nations High Representative for Disarmament Affairs)

Dual Uses and the Nuclear Fuel Cycle: Is Multilateralization the Answer? by Rüdiger Lüdeking (Germany)

Assurances of Supply vs. Proliferation: A New Framework for Nuclear Energy, by Dr. Tariq Rauf (IAEA)

Minimizing Global HEU and Separated Plutonium Stocks: Methods and Prospects, by Hee-Seog Kwon (Republic of Korea)

Maintaining the Nonproliferation Fabric, by Dr. Christopher Ford (United States)

Dealing with Iran: Getting it Right, by Anatoly Antonov (Russia)

Plugging Proliferation Holes: Preventing Further Break-outs: Can the Backdoor be Shut Permanently? by Prof. John Simpson

Prospects for the 2008 NPT PrepCom: Substantive, Procedural and Other Issues, by Ambassador Volodymyr Yelchenko (Ukraine and chairman-elect of the 2008 PrepCom session)

In order to enable full and frank exploration of the issues and practical proposals, the 2008 workshop was conducted under “Chatham House Rules.” This report, prepared by Elena Hushbeck and Jean du Preez, provides an overview of the issues, themes and proposals discussed at the workshop, and is in no way reflective of all views. The authors of this report bear sole responsibility for its contents.

Common Themes and General Observations

In no means reflective of all views expressed during the workshop, the following common themes and observations were identified:

I. There is need for progress along two simultaneous tracks of strengthening the long-term vision and architecture for achieving a nuclear weapon free world while at the same time identifying and implementing immediate and practical steps. The way forward must be continuously revisited and revised in light of the progress or setbacks encountered. However, the overarching direction and structure must also be sturdy enough to withstand shocks and shifts in the global political climate.

II. Areas of convergence and common understanding need to be identified and strengthened in order to build the confidence and trust required to achieve the NPT’s objectives. This needs to occur at some of the most fundamental levels, including:
   - The goal of a world free of nuclear weapons;
   - The role and purpose of the review process;
The implementation of Decisions 1 and 2 and the resolution on the Middle-East adopted at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference, and the Final Document adopted at the 2000 Review Conference;

The nature of the partnership and joint responsibilities of nuclear weapon states (NWS) and non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS) to strengthen all three pillars of the NPT.

III. The symbiotic and mutually reinforcing relationship between nonproliferation and disarmament must be reawakened and reinforced. This must not only be expressed in national statements and political speeches but substantively demonstrated in the behavior and positions adopted by states. Ensuring that the recognized connection between the two principles results in positive progress rather than pro quo rhetoric is essential.

IV. The connection between procedure and substance notwithstanding, efforts of the 2008 PrepCom should be focused on substantive issues and interactive debate aimed at identifying and strengthening areas of convergence and agreement. Given the significant challenges facing the nonproliferation and disarmament regimes, all participants should seek to avoid diverting time, energy and resources toward minor procedural considerations.

V. Regional groupings no longer accurately reflect the current global political climate, but rather the Cold War environment in which they were created. Emphasizing the importance of these associations over issue-based alliances often has a polarizing effect. Progress in 2010 will require a move away from these groupings and strengthening common ground across regions.

VI. The 1995 Resolution on the Middle East was an essential condition of the 1995 indefinite extension and is a key issue for many NPT States. Finding ways to advance the implementation of the Resolution is of paramount importance. Failure to adequately address this issue was a factor behind the 2005 failure and could likewise become a serious obstacle for a successful Review Conference in 2010.

VII. Civil society plays a vital role in motivating governments to action. As the world encounters a number of pressing challenges, measures must be taken to raise the profile of disarmament and reenergize the forces within civil society that have contributed to success in the past. This will involve outreach that makes clear the relevance that disarmament carries for political, economic, and social development.

VIII. Given that the ghosts of the 2005 Review Conference still haunt the NPT, focus on success in 2010 is understandable and essential. However, the international community should not lose sight of the need to build the architecture for disarmament and nonproliferation efforts that extend well beyond 2010.

Proposals and Recommendations

The following sets of proposals and recommendations were identified during the two-day workshop. While some enjoyed wide support, opposing views were held on others.

1. Taking Stock after the 2007 PrepCom Session
   i. Opportunities for substantive discussions and interactive debates should be maximized.
   ii. The 2008 PrepCom should (1) remain focused on substance rather than procedure; (2) seek to identify and build common ground; and (3) lay the groundwork for the generation of concrete recommendations in 2009.
   iii. The role and purpose of the review process should be further clarified.
   iv. The 2007 Chairman’s summary can serve as a valuable source of information for the next PrepCom and for the Review Conference.
   v. A plan of action should be developed for achieving NPT universality.
   vi. A background paper on core NPT documents should be made available to the 2008 PrepCom.
   vii. The emphasis on regional groupings should be reduced.
   viii. Consideration should be given to an article-by-article review of the Treaty.
   ix. States should submit precise and carefully crafted working papers.
   x. Consideration should be given to the use of informal coordinators to assist in preparing the Chairman’s summary.
2. **Nuclear Disarmament: Getting the Politics Right**
   i. Strong leadership at the highest levels is required as well as committed outreach to key stakeholders, including the public.
   ii. NWS should demonstrate commitment to their undertakings given in 1995 and 2000.
   iii. Concrete practical steps should urgently be taken to sustain the vision of a nuclear weapons free world.
   iv. A clear and simple vision of a nuclear weapons free world may be more likely to inspire than the complicated details of individual treaties or agreements. Inspiration for energizing political momentum and international awareness can be taken from recent approaches to advance the issue of climate change. In this regard, consideration should be given to establishing a broad-based, high-level Intergovernmental Panel on Nuclear Disarmament.
   v. The entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) will create much needed political momentum in support of other disarmament and nonproliferation objectives.
   vi. A fourth General Assembly special session on disarmament will highlight both the political importance and the urgency of nuclear disarmament.

3. **Systematic and Progressive Disarmament**
   i. The current momentum in support of the CTBT should be both maintained and increased. In this regard:
      a. Existing no-test moratoria should be strengthened through a pledge by all nuclear weapon possessor states not to be the first to resume testing;
      b. The CTBT verification system should continue to be further developed and fully funded;
      c. Changes in U.S. presidential and congressional leadership should be fully explored in support of CTBT ratification;
      d. The ratification of Indonesia (an Annex II State) is feasible and should be achieved as soon as possible. Momentum among non-Annex II States is equally important, such as achieving full ratification in Latin America by the end of 2008.
   ii. Negotiations on an FMCT should commence without further delay. In the meantime, existing moratoriums should be strengthened by joint moratoria declarations by the NWS and other nuclear capable states.
   iii. The United States and Russia should continue reducing their arsenals so that they are measured in hundreds, not thousands, through a verified and legally binding treaty. China and other NWS as well as the nuclear capable states should also be engage in deep arms reductions.
   iv. A multilateral Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF) should be explored, perhaps by identifying different ranges for different regions.
   v. NWS and NNWS should cooperate to develop technology needed to verify disarmament.
   vi. Reliance on nuclear weapons should be reduced and the operational status of weapon systems should be lowered.
   vii. U.S. non-strategic weapons should be removed from Europe and similar Russian systems should be relocated to the center of the country.
   viii. A structured mechanism for tracking progress on the numbers of weapons, deployed, dismantled or destroyed should be created.

4. **A Zonal Approach to Nuclear Nonproliferation and Disarmament**
   i. The treaties of Pelindaba and Central Asia should enter into force as soon as possible.
   ii. Existing zones could be strengthened by *inter alia*:
      a. Securing NWS ratification of treaty protocols;
      b. Achieving universal membership within the zones;
      c. Increasing cooperation and coordination among existing zones;
      d. Removing NWS reservations on security assurances given to zonal parties;
      e. Evolving existing zones into WMD free zones;
      f. Coupling NWFZ with regional approaches to nuclear energy.
   iii. Recommendations specific to a Middle East NWFZ included:
a. Adopt a “Helsinki-based” approach;¹
b. Reaffirm the importance of the Resolution on the Middle East adopted at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference;
c. Use side discussions and informal facilitators to identify areas of convergence and generate mutually acceptable text;
d. Strive to achieve ratification of the CTBT by states in the region prior to 2010;
e. Promote a regional no-first-use of WMD declaration;
f. Promote the idea of a nuclear fuel cycle free zone.

5. Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy and the Nuclear Fuel Cycle
   i. Promote acceptability of multilateral nuclear approaches (MNAs) though progress on nuclear disarmament.
   ii. Support an IAEA approach to MNAs.
   iii. Evaluate MNA proposals against identified benchmarks.
   iv. MNA participation should be voluntary with the energy, economic, security and benefits easily identified.
   v. Establish a nondiscriminatory system for nuclear fuel supply in close collaboration with the IAEA instrument
   vi. Explore modalities for transport and disposal of nuclear waste within a MNA framework.
   vii. Increase safeguards, security and physical protection of excess fissile materials.
   viii. Expand and accelerate HEU conversion to LEU.
   ix. Establish baseline inventories of HEU and Pu.
   x. Highlight HEU minimization as a nuclear terrorism prevention measure.
   xi. Take measures to address the underlying concerns driving NNWS aversion to accepting the Additional Protocol.
   xii. NWS should accept and fund more safeguards on their facilities.

6. Plugging Proliferation Holes
   i. The approach to Iran should be grounded in diplomacy and recognition of Tehran’s role in the Middle East.
   ii. Engage Iran in the fight against terrorism and drug trafficking.
   iii. Further develop the 2006 P5+1 proposals presented to Iran.
   iv. Take steps to build trust and confidence in Iran’s nuclear program.
   v. Fortify legal barriers to breakout and withdrawal from the NPT through domestic legislation and additional international commitments.
   vi. At the Review Conference discuss Article X during cluster 3 and in Main Committee 3.
   vii. Develop capabilities for swift and appropriate response to withdrawal.
   viii. Explore mechanisms to hold withdrawing states accountable for noncompliance. In this regard consider a mechanism to prevent withdrawing states from continuing to use material and technology gained while party to the Treaty.
   ix. Focus on addressing the security concerns behind noncompliance and withdrawal while emphasizing the consequences of withdrawal and noncompliance.
   x. Strengthen safeguards and make greater use of real-time surveillance capabilities.
   xi. Promote multilateral approaches to enrichment and reprocessing.

Report on Workshop Sessions

Session I: Taking Stock After 2007: Is the Glass Half Full or Half Empty?
Panelists and participants shared their views regarding the 2007 PrepCom and overall health of the NPT regimes. The panelist presented papers on the outcome of the 2007 PrepCom and differing assessments on the status of the NPT from both a NWS and NNWS perspective.

¹ The Helsinki process was an approach undertaken by the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe that included negotiations on a comprehensive range of issues involving key stakeholders at every level of society. This approach was able to bridge the bitter differences in Europe at the height of the Cold War. The negotiations culminated in adopted of the Helsinki Accords and set the stage for negotiation of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE).
Based on the discussions at and the outcome of the 2007 PrepCom session, five areas for progress in 2008 were identified:

- Nuclear disarmament and security issues;
- Non-proliferation and regional issues including a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East;
- Article X issues;
- The need for full compliance with the Treaty; and
- Balanced discussion of all three pillars of the NPT.

Reasons for optimism regarding the 2007 PrepCom included: the adoption of the agenda; the greater access afforded NGOs and the media; many working papers and proposals submitted in a constructive atmosphere; and the efficient, focused and detailed discussions on key issues. Additionally, the Chairman’s summary contained valuable and comprehensive information to bear in mind during the 2008 Session.

Whether the glass is half-empty or half-full is, as one panelist noted, a matter of perception. Any appraisal of the current status of the regime should acknowledge successes as well as serious challenges, which include *inter alia*: lack of progress on disarmament; modernization of arsenals; continued reliance on deterrence; failure to address negative security assurances; no progress towards establishing a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone (NWFZ) in the Middle East; and the proliferation of weapons in states not party to the NPT. Four steps needed to move forward were proposed:

- Agreement on a plan of action for achieving universality;
- Reinforcing full compliance of all State Parties with all the provisions of the Treaty;
- Facilitating access of developing countries to peaceful uses of nuclear energy;
- Operationalizing the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East.

The discussion emphasized that states need to draw strength from their common interests, including as one panelist stressed, the shared vision and the collective economic, environmental, and security benefits of a nuclear weapons free world. The concept of nonproliferation and disarmament as two sides of the same coin was also strongly reinforced. However, participants differed regarding progress on disarmament. One side made the case that significant achievements have occurred in nuclear disarmament but have not been successfully conveyed to other governments or civil society. An opposing view maintained that the issue is more a matter of NWS lack of transparency than marketing. It was furthermore emphasized that progress has been too slow, especially when viewed alongside NWS efforts to modernize and improve nuclear weapons and their continued, if not increasing, salience in security doctrines.

The exchange of views revealed the need to reach a common understanding regarding the role and purpose of the review process as well as the status of the 1995 and 2000 Review Conference outcomes. One approach advocated a legalistic perspective while another cautioned that a conflation of law and policy could impede agreement if governments feel they will be locked in. Regarding the status of the strengthened review process, one participant argued that the protracted debate on the 2007 agenda diluted the core of the review process. He, along with several others, stressed the need for all states, particularly the NWS, to demonstrate commitment to the strengthened review process and all undertakings of 1995 and 2000.

Participants appeared united in the view that the 2008 PrepCom session should (1) remain focused on substance rather than procedure; (2) seek to identify and build common ground; and (3) lay the groundwork for the generation of concrete recommendations in 2009. However, divergent views were expressed on the status of the Chairman’s summary and how to carry the work of the 2008 PrepCom forward. Some favored a modest approach, others a more ambitious one, to identifying areas of convergence and agreement. One group advocated achieving consensus on a summary. Others argued that a factual summary does not require consensus and could still move all ideas and proposals forward to 2009. They cautioned that a negotiated summary might increase the prospects for derailment or failure. It became clear that in either approach, singling out any State Party in the summary is unlikely to succeed.
Recommendations for 2008 emerging from the session included:

- Maximize the time available for substantive and interactive debate.
- Exercise caution in determining the parameters for “success.”
- Assist delegations by providing a Chairman’s background paper consisting of core NPT documents as a reference for the delegations.
- Break away from the regional groupings in favor of issue-based groupings.
- Carrying out an article-by-article review of the Treaty might help avoid duplication.
- Forego long winded working papers in favor of more precise and carefully crafted ones.
- Appoint informal coordinators to assist in preparing the Chairman’s summary.

Session II: Nuclear Disarmament: Getting the Politics Right

Presentations by two panelists elaborated on a theme repeatedly evoked throughout the workshop: the need to strengthen and reinforce the ultimate vision of a nuclear weapons free world in tandem with efforts to identify and elaborate practical and immediate steps. The first panelist noted that among the positive elements of the 2007 PrepCom was the willingness of all parties, particularly NWS, to engage, and that the interaction between the Western Group/European Union and the NAM was less polarized than during preparations for the 2005 Review Conference. Recent developments, perhaps best exemplified by the ubiquitously referenced Wall Street Journal op-eds by Schultz, Nunn, Kissinger, and Perry, may signal a change in NWS approach that is based on new strategic considerations and the recognition of the desirability of a nuclear weapons free world. Though far from constituting a full revival of multilateral arms control diplomacy, a broader trend in advancing the disarmament agenda appears to be taking shape. One panelist put forth the 5 principles and 10 recommendations that emerged from the February 2008 Oslo Disarmament Conference as one contribution of this broader movement.

The second panelists likened the step-by-step approach to achieve a long-term disarmament vision to building a railroad. It was stressed that the process will require revisiting and re-evaluation at each station along the way, but the overall structure must be capable of sustaining progress from one generation to the next and be made “weather proof” to surviving changes in the global climate or leadership changes. This will involve outreach to civil society and passing enthusiasm for the disarmament vision on to the next generation. Major obstacles to success identified by the panelist include not getting every one united behind the vision in time, further proliferation, bad faith actions, fear of both failure and success, and wavering political leadership.

The following is a combined list of proposals and recommendations made by two panelists as well as those put forward during the subsequent moderated discussion.

- Leadership at the highest levels is required as well as committed outreach to key stakeholders, including the public.
- Concrete steps should be taken to sustain the vision of a nuclear weapons free world.
- Since progress must be a joint enterprise among NWS and NNWS, this will require balanced emphasis on nondiscriminatory approaches, increased transparency and confidence building measures by both NWS and NNWS.
- The overarching architecture of the vision should be robust enough to endure shifts in global security climate and changes in political leadership.
- The United States and Russia should continue reducing their arsenals so that they are measured in hundreds, not thousands, through a verified and legally binding treaty. The next step would be to engage other NWS and nuclear capable states and to make even deeper reductions.
- A multilateral INF Treaty should be explored, perhaps by identifying different ranges for different regions.
- NWS and NNWS should cooperate to develop technology needed to verify disarmament through projects such as the UK-Norway disarmament laboratory.
- Reliance on nuclear weapons should be reduced and the operational status of weapon systems should be lowered.
• Entry into force of the CTBT is urgent. Pending this, funding for the CTBT verification systems should continue and existing moratoria should be strengthened perhaps through a pledge not to be the first to resume testing.
• FMCT negotiations should commence without further delay. In the meantime, existing moratoriums should be strengthened and the creation of a voluntary fissile material control initiative to enhance security and transparency should be explored.
• Re-evaluating or reframing the 13 practical steps agreed to at the 2000 Review Conference should be considered.
• Measures should be undertaken to ensure that nuclear weapons do not fall into unauthorized hands.
• A nondiscriminatory system for nuclear fuel supply should be created in close collaboration with the IAEA. This will require an open dialogue about the needs of both producer and consumer.
• A fourth General Assembly special session on disarmament should be held.
• A broad-based, high-level Intergovernmental Panel on Nuclear Disarmament should be created analogous to the one created to address climate change.

Some participants noted that initiatives appearing on the increasing number of lists identifying ways to advance the disarmament agenda are very similar and many have been around for quite some time. Yet, the key ingredient necessary to bridge the gap between listed ideas and concrete action remains elusive. Some identified this missing element in terms of political will. Another view suggested that is it more helpful to think in terms of political momentum rather than political will. The discussion pointed to regional security issues, reduced engagement by civil society, and economic considerations as some of the major factors contributing to subdued momentum.

Session III: Systematic and Progressive Disarmament: Que vadis?
The third panel was devoted to evaluating progress on some of the key initiatives in disarmament that have been repeatedly highlighted among the lists of practical and achievable measures to advance disarmament and nonproliferation and the ways in which the status of these issues would impact on 2010 review cycle. The first panelist discussed progress on two core commitments from 1995 and 2000: the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT). The second panelist offered views on the relevance of the Presidential Nuclear Initiatives (PNI) and the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF) for addressing the issue of non-strategic nuclear weapons and delivery systems. A third panelist explored issues related to de-alerting and transparency.

The view was broadly held that the CTBT is one issue where there has been progress that could contribute positively to success in 2010. The recent ratifications of Barbados, Malaysia and Colombia have generated momentum and brought the number of Annex II State ratifications needed to bring the Treaty into force within single digits. Progress also continues in establishing the International Monitoring System (IMS) which demonstrated its usefulness during the North Korean nuclear test in 2006. Some expressed the hope that the 2008 US presidential elections would enable US ratification, a key step that would dramatically modify the global dynamics and potentially trigger a cascade of CTBT ratifications. However, one participant reminded the group that regardless of who is elected, the United States remains years away from having 2/3 majority support in the Senate. The discussion identified methods for continuing the CTBT’s momentum, including:
• A joint declaration by the five NPT NWS, India and Pakistan not to be the first to resume nuclear testing;
• Achieving the ratification of Indonesia, an Annex II State whose ratification is feasible and would generate significant momentum;
• Building momentum among non-Annex II States as well, through approaches such as achieving full ratification in Latin America by the end of 2008; and
• Addressing regional tensions through coordinated ratifications.

The prospects for negotiating an FMCT were seen as less promising. While all participants agreed on the need to begin negotiations, views varied on the likelihood of this occurring at the Conference on Disarmament (CD) in the near future. Predictions ranged from the possibility that a program of work
based on the draft presidential decision L.1 could be adopted within the 2008 session to more dire assessments that if no agreement is reached this year, the CD will lose its relevance and utility and not encounter a similar opportunity for quite some time, if at all.

Despite significant weaknesses in codification, definitions, verification, irreversibility and scope, PNI and INF were discussed as highly valuable building blocks for the future. Both emphasized the importance of addressing non-strategic nuclear weapons and missiles within NPT and bilateral contexts. US-Russian leadership in this area, such as the First Committee proposal to make the INF a multilateral treaty, could contribute to a positive environment in 2010. It was pointed out that lack of progress on multilateralization should not enable weakened commitments or breakout by Russia or the United States. Another proposal put forward on this issue would involve US removal of tactical weapons from Europe and Russian relocation to the center of the country.

Although there appeared to be general agreement that progress in de-alerting and transparency would improve the climate in 2010, sharp difference between NWS and NNWS remain. NWS assertions that NNWS demands regarding operational status are misinformed, in combination with refusal to supply accurate information, is a source of NNWS mistrust and frustration. This may derive, as the third panelist suggested, from a fundamentally different outlook regarding whether information about existing nuclear weapons are the sole purview of NWS or whether the NPT bargain makes ensuring the safety and security of the world’s nuclear weapons a responsibility to be shared by NWS and NNWS alike. Recent efforts by some NWS to provide information regarding disarmament achievements were welcomed, but contrasted with demonstrated refusal to establish a structured mechanism for updating data rather than a piecemeal provision of information dependant upon the sporadic inclination or whim of some NWS. The need to establish clear units of measure for tracking progress on the numbers of weapons deployed, dismantled or destroyed was also noted. The importance of transparency on the part of NNWS was underlined but did not receive the same level of attention during the discussion.

There were also differing points of view regarding the merits of de-alerting or reducing operational readiness. The more prominent group saw such actions as a practical way to reduce nuclear danger, reduce accidents and increase confidence among states. An alternative analysis suggested that prolonging the amount of time needed to complete a process actually shortens the effective decision-making time available for setting that process in motion and increases the chances for misperceptions when adversaries witness the first steps.

The following additional recommendations for going forward emerged from the discussion:

- Keep pressure and momentum within the CD.
- Move FMCT discussions forward through other forums or independent action by NWS. Such suggestions drew strong opposition from some participants.
- Maintain and strengthen existing commitments to moratoriums on fissile material production through joint declarations and bringing China and the 3 non-NPT States on board.
- Regarding an FMCT, explore a ban on future production coupled with a set of transparency and confidence building mechanisms.
- Establishment of a group of scientific experts within the CD to examine the technical matters related to an FMCT similar to that established for the CTBT.
- Establish a voluntary Fissile Material Control Initiative in which any country that owns fissile material would agree to: (1) make regular declarations regarding their fissile material stocks by category; (2) apply the highest standards of physical protection and accountancy to those stocks; (3) declare regularly amounts of material they regard as excess to their weapons needs; (4) place such excess material under IAEA safeguards as soon as practicable; and (5) convert excess material as soon as possible to forms that cannot be used for nuclear weapons (e.g., by blending down HEU to low-enriched reactor fuel).

Session IV: Nuclear Nonproliferation and Disarmament: A Zonal Approach
During this session, two panelist addressed challenges and opportunities surrounding nuclear–weapon-free zones (NWFZ) in general, while a third addressed issues related specifically to the establishment of a Middle East Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone (MENWFZ). The particular importance of
advancing the establishment of a zone in the Middle East as a key ingredient to a successful 2010 Review Conference was re-emphasized.

The valuable contribution of NWFZs to global peace and security was acknowledged as was the point that NWFZs involve the three pillars of the NPT and therefore encounter the same spectrum of challenges. The discussion reaffirmed the importance of continued efforts to achieve entry into force, universal membership, and NWS ratification of NWFZ protocols. The negative security assurance (NSA) arrangements under NWFZs were welcomed, but a universal and legally binding instrument remains a priority among many NPT States. Removing the reservations placed on NSAs offered by NWS under NWFZs was identified as one way to strengthen existing zones.

In addition to the above, the following recommendations were put forward:

- Work to gain the ratifications needed to bring the Treaties of Pelindaba and Semipalatinsk into force.
- Increase cooperation and coordination among the zones to increase public awareness and consolidate the political leverage for advancing disarmament and nonproliferation.
- Evolve the zones into WMD-free zones, including delivery vehicles.
- Promote regional approaches to take full advantage of peaceful nuclear energy while in compliance with international obligations. This approach must not seem to deepen divisions between the “haves” and “have-nots.”

One panelist suggested that recent events and the current global and regional dynamics might generate the necessary reexamination of security calculations that would make progress on a MENWFZ possible. A Helsinki-based approach would entail three “baskets” of negotiations, taking into account a range of security, political, economic, social and cultural issues and participation by wide variety of key stakeholders from different sectors of society. This proposal prompted a discussion with divergent opinions among the participants regarding what form the overall approach to a MENWFZ should take. One group advocated a holistic and comprehensive approach which recognizes the complexity of mid-east relations while another urged against complicating or diluting the core issues which are already sufficiently complex and difficult to address. Additionally, others stressed the need for progress to occur within the context of the NPT and fulfillment of the 1995 bargain.

Recommendations specific to a MENWFZ included:

- Demonstrate serious will to make progress on the MENWFZ.
- Generate text that reiterates the importance of the 1995 Resolution.
- During the PrepCom and the 2010 Review Conference, make use of side discussions and informal facilitators to identify areas of convergence and work to generate mutually acceptable text for the Chairman’s consideration.
- Ratification of the CTBT by states in the region prior to 2010.
- Take the first steps by examining the modalities for initiating talks.
- A regional declaration on no-first-use of WMD by all countries in the region.
- Establish a nuclear-fuel-cycle-free zone as an intermediate step, one justification being that Israel will never relinquish its deterrent if its neighbors posses a latent capability. However, this drew quick response from several participants asserting that this would be an attack on Article IV and unacceptable to states in the region.

Session V: Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy and the Nuclear Fuel Cycle - Protecting the “Achilles Heel”

The fifth session explored the challenges posed by the dual-use nature of nuclear technology, particularly within the context of the forecasted nuclear renaissance. The panel presentations addressed the challenges and prospects for multilateral nuclear fuel-cycle arrangements (MNA’s), the connection between strengthened safeguards and nuclear disarmament, and global efforts to address highly enriched uranium (HEU) and separated plutonium (Pu) stocks.
The growing energy demand and interest in nuclear technology carries significant proliferation risks, creating more states with latent nuclear weapons capability and more sensitive materials and technology to account for and secure. Participants discussed MNAs as one valuable contribution to containing these challenges. However, MNAs are unlikely in the current climate of NNWS skepticism about NWS disarmament and the perception that the agreements erode their “inalienable rights” to civil nuclear development. It was suggested that NWS progress and leadership in disarmament could go a long way to improving the prospects for MNA solutions, as would carefully considering the impact that various MNA proposals have on NNWS perceptions about the status of the NPT bargain. One panelist offered four benchmarks for assessing the viability of MNA proposals: proliferation resistance; assurances of nuclear fuel supply; legitimacy in the context of the NPT and Article IV; and market compatibility. These benchmarks form the basis of the German Multilateral Enrichment Sanctuary Project (MESP) for a commercially run enrichment plant in IAEA administered territory.

The following suggestions were made for the 2010 RevCon:

- Endorse solutions to be found in the IAEA.
- Stress the voluntary restraint character of the solution and its consistency with the NPT.
- Put relevant solutions alongside other measures in the proper context of strengthening compliance and underline this as a common cause benefiting the security interests of all parties to the NPT.
- Strengthen the acceptability of the solution and the basic bargain underpinning the NPT by providing new momentum for disarmament.

The discussion highlighted the need to make the political, economic, energy and security benefits of MNA participation easily recognizable to states. It was noted that the two categories of MNA—guarantees of fuel cycle services and placing sensitive facilities under multilateral control—are complementary rather than competing approaches. In pursuing either approach, it was stressed that participation should be voluntary and enable states to take part in ownership of economically viable solutions. Ensuring that the proposal does not deepen or reinforce the divide between the “haves” and “have-nots” or perceptions about the erosion of Article IV was considered essential.

While it may be, as one participant suggested, that there is no warranted case for cutting of supply to a country in compliance with its obligations, many participants pointed out that political motivations can color determinations of compliance. One participant asked whether an automatic mechanism for referral to Security Council would be a possible solution. The response noted that NNWS would view this as yet another example of Security Council legislating and pointing out that ultimately the Council can do little if a country decides not to comply. Acceptance of MNA solutions and energy dependence on outside entities will require full confidence that political considerations will not interfere with fuel supply arrangements. Gaining this confidence increases in difficulty if a neighboring government appears determined to have a fully independent capability. Participants suggested that legally binding assurances might be the only way to address these issues. The need to explore modalities for transport and waste disposal was also identified. While there is no international consensus on how to deal with these critical issues, multilateral disposal was identified as one possible solution.

Some individuals pointed out that proliferation concerns associated with the nuclear renaissance could be addressed in other ways. One participant reminded others of the need to make distinctions between the materials and technology that do have proliferation potential and those that do not, pointing out that bilateral agreements can provide economically viable energy solutions with no proliferation risk. Another participant suggested that addressing underlying energy concerns with alternative energy solutions could prevent some states from seeking nuclear energy in the first place.

The IAEA’s ability to go after undeclared material, access all parts of the fuel cycle and gain short-notice access to all buildings on a site makes the Additional Protocol a necessary tool for fully verifying compliance. However, only 80 countries have such agreements in force. This reluctance/refusal to accept the Additional Protocol may be, as one panelist suggested, a manifestation of “blowback.” While regional security considerations may motivate some states, NNWS frustration over a lack of progress on disarmament, the increasing role of the Security Council rather than other multilateral forums, politicization of the IAEA, and new fuel cycle initiatives that are
seen as infringing on Article IV, all contribute to decreased willingness among many NNWS to implement the Additional Protocol. A suggestion that NWS, the United States in particular, accept and fund safeguards on their facilities was put forward as one measure that would encourage NNWS to accept more in the way of safeguards.

The discussion acknowledged that importance of efforts to address HEU and Pu worldwide. Minimization and disposition efforts, particularly by Russia and the United States, have advanced disarmament, nonproliferation and the prevention nuclear terrorism. The continuing challenges identified by the panelist and in the discussion included the absence of baseline information, the expansion of civilian HEU use by 1 ton per year, and the varying level of security at facilities worldwide. A wide range of bilateral arrangements and multilateral arrangements exist for HEU consolidation, minimization, and conversion. It was suggested that the fissile material control initiative proposed in an earlier session is ultimately synonymous with efforts to minimize use of HEU. In contrast to HEU, Pu disposition is undertaken through national rather than collective approaches.

The recommendations identified for addressing HEU and Pu included:

- Continue with current minimization, consolidation, and disposition efforts.
- Further nuclear disarmament, including through FMCT negotiations.
- Increase security and safeguards for excess military material.
- Take measures to ensure that excess material cannot be returned to military uses.
- Expand and accelerate the conversion of research reactors.
- Establish baseline inventories of HEU and Pu for measuring progress.
- Set norms for HEU minimization through regular monitoring of the status of stocks, promoting HEU minimization, and immediate discussion on draft guidelines for the use of HEU.
- HEU minimization may gather additional support if presented as a measure to prevent nuclear terrorism.
- Explore ways to address transport and disposal of separated plutonium.

Session VI: Plugging Proliferation Holes
The sixth session focused on ways to address issues related to compliance and withdrawal. The first panelist focused on the need to reinforce the nonproliferation norm of the NPT and divided these efforts into three categories: reducing opportunity for countries to develop weapons; swift and effective compliance and enforcement; and denying any gains that might be expected from proliferation. The second panelist focused on the Iranian issue, highlighting the opportunity presented by the latest UNSC Resolution packaged with the P5+1 Ministerial Statement. The third panelist pointed out that future proliferation will occur within the NPT, thereby increasing the importance and urgency in resolving issues related to withdrawal and breakout.

Appropriately addressing the DPRK and Iranian cases was identified as essential to maintaining the strength of the NPT. Support was expressed for the approach taken towards the DPRK and the achievements of the six-party talks. However, the issue of North Korea’s membership status is a continuing challenge. Although a combination of rewards and punishments proved useful in the DPRK’s case, participants stressed that “carrot and stick “ responses should not be predetermined, but crafted to fit each withdrawal situation. Indeed, several participants pointed out that penalties and rewards may not be enough in many cases and advocated placing more emphasis on addressing the security threats (real or perceived) that underlie noncompliance and withdrawal decisions. One panelist suggested that security guarantees may be the only realistic way to quell the concerns of some withdrawing states. In any approach, the dangers of rewarding good behavior or creating the opportunity for states to extort material or strategic gains through withdrawal or noncompliance were acknowledged. In this regard, the discussion underlined the need to strengthen and clearly convey the intrinsic benefits of NPT membership while increasing the consequences of noncompliance and withdrawal.

The discussion regarding Iran centered on the need to restore trust between Iran and the international community. The latest IAEA report was welcomed as a very positive development, but not enough to fully restore the confidence of the international community. Participants noted that, with the exception of the weaponization studies alleged in documents presented by US intelligence, the IAEA report
considered all outstanding issues regarding Iranian nuclear program resolved. Investigations into the authenticity of the allegations continue, but IAEA capabilities are currently limited to following nuclear material. Additionally, without implementation of the Additional Protocol, the IAEA cannot fully assure the international community that Iran does not possess undeclared nuclear material. The discussion placed the greatest importance on the need for Iran to rebuild trust by reconciling for its past undeclared nuclear activities and complying with the Security Council resolutions. Importantly, some participants pointed out that Iran also lacks confidence. Noted sources of this mistrust included perceptions that Iran has been the target of political manipulations of the IAEA and Security Council and concerns that a temporary suspension of enrichment to comply with Security Council resolutions will evolve into a permanent restriction.

The exchange of views emphasized the need to move forward on the basis of diplomatic engagement rather than increasing pressure or threats of force that might provoke Iran to withdraw from the NPT. Such an approach would take into account Iran’s important role in the Middle East and could involve cooperation in combating terrorism and drug trafficking. Additionally, multilateral efforts will need to seriously address Iran’s energy and security concerns and clearly demonstrate that benefits gained by cooperation outweigh those of maintaining its current position. The P5+1 proposals of June 2006 remain on the table for further development. The general view expressed was that the way forward would take the form of a suspension in enrichment activity and probationary period before Iran can enjoy the confidence of the international community and full benefits of NPT membership.

The three presentations and discussion pointed to withdrawal and clarification of Article X as a key area for progress during the 2010 review cycle. A particular focus might center on what responses could or should occur during the three-month notice period stipulated in Article X of the Treaty. It was noted that this is a short period time and that technological advances greatly outpace current response capabilities. The sovereign right of any state to withdraw from the NPT was affirmed, but several participants insisted that the focus should be on dealing with the withdrawal by noncompliant states and preventing states from exploiting the NPT to gain access materials and technology and subsequently withdraw and start weapons programs. Some participants advocated increasing the obstacles and costs of withdrawal. Discussions in 2010 on provisions that would prevent withdrawing countries from continuing to use the material and technology gained while party to the Treaty was one proposal put forward. An alternative view suggested that the goal is not to make withdrawal impossible, but rather to prepare for a prompt and appropriate response should a withdrawal occur, pointing out that forcing a state to stay undermines both their participation and the validity of the Treaty.

Five areas for addressing the withdrawal issue were identified:

- Buttressing legal hurdles through domestic legislation, or participation in additional international arrangements such as NWFZ, CTBT, or a future FMCT.
- Clarifying understanding on interpretations of the elements of Article X, including the role and purpose of the three-month notice and automatic notification of the UNSC.
- Enhancing penalties and rewards.
- Establishing an international mechanism, perhaps by extending IAEA safeguards, to investigate weaponization.
- Restructuring global fuel cycle activities to make the move from ‘latent’ capability to ‘actual’ nuclear weapon status. This could be accomplished through more intrusive safeguards and real-time surveillance, multilateralization of enrichment and reprocessing, or transitioning to new fuel cycles such as thorium.

**Session VII: Prospects for the 2008 NPT PrepCom - Substantive, Procedural and Other Challenges**

The final session of the two-day meeting was designed to allow the 2008 PrepCom Chairman, Ambassador Volodymyr Yelchenko, an opportunity to brief the workshop on his consultations and preparations for the 2008 session. He highlighted his intention to resolve procedural matters before the session begins. In this regard, he informed the participants that an indicative timetable for the session has been accepted by the regional groups, and that the chairmanship for 2009 will be held by
Zimbabwe. Outstanding procedural issues included the venue of the 2009 PrepCom\(^2\) and 2010 Review Conference, and the fact that the UN Secretariat had not yet received sufficient funds to hold the 2008 PrepCom session.

The timetable is similar to that of 2007, covering the usual three issue clusters and the following specific issues. These are:
- Nuclear disarmament;
- Implementation of the 1995 Middle East Resolution; and
- Other provisions of the Treaty including Article X.

The Chairman identified three areas where he expects heated debate:
- Slow pace of progress in the implementation of Article VI, and the undertakings contained in the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference and 1995 Principles and Objectives;
- Limited progress on implementation of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East; and
- Correlation between strict observance of nonproliferation obligations and full scope exercise of the inalienable right to peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

The Chairman expressed his intention to continue disciplined time-management in order to allow more time for interactive debate and enable the elaboration of recommendations for the 2009 PrepCom. He also expressed the desire for consensus on his summary report reflecting the positions of the various NPT groupings of states.

The responses from the participants illustrated the delicate balance of the Chairman’s role, in which he is expected to display both impartiality and leadership. A few participants cautioned the Chairman against a biased approach, while others commended him for putting his ideas forward. All participants who spoke expressed support for the Chairman’s goal of a session focused on substance rather than procedure which could serve as a building block for the 2009 PrepCom session and the 2010 Review Conference. While the Chairman was commended for his ambitious goal of achieving consensus on a summary report, differing views were expressed regarding the desirability of such an approach. Some suggested that such a summary could show areas of agreement or convergence that could be drawn upon in 2009 and 2010. Others cautioned that negotiating the text of the document could subject an otherwise simple procedural matter to a protracted debate and noted the need for an alternative way to carry the substance of the discussions forward. Several participants advised the Chairman against reliance or overemphasis on regional groups, which might cause polarization, and instead stressed the need for cross-regional, issue-based groupings.

Participants welcomed the notion of brief five to six minute opening statements in order to maximize the time available for interactive debate. Such limits were utilized at the 2007 PrepCom session as a matter of necessity, but proved to have distinct advantages in obtaining concise articulations of national positions on a wide variety of issues.

A subject mentioned several times over the course of the workshop—the role of civil society—was raised again. Several participants expressed their desire to see greater access afforded to NGOs and media during the session as was the case during the 2007 PrepCom session. The importance of mobilizing public opinion and increase pressure from civil society was discussed, with several participants expressing dismay at the low level of participation in recent years. Two explanations for this were offered, the first being that the NPT is, what one participant called “a passion killer.” The complex issues of a technological or theoretical nature can be hard to grasp and, as memories of the Cold War fade, increasingly abstract notions about nuclear weapons vie for the public’s attention amid numerous pressing issues of global importance, including many that are more immediately tangible such as climate change, development and human rights. A second explanation offered was that of a negative feedback loop in which no action by government causes less interest among NGOs to invest their scarce funds and resources. This, in turn, results in even less progress by governments, fueling

\(^2\) In light of renovations at the United Nations Headquarters in New York, there are no guarantees that meeting rooms would be available in New York. Alternatively, the 2009 PrepCom session could be held at the Palais des Nations in Geneva
the decline in civil society participation. The need to reach out and activate civil society and the media was emphasized.
Workshop on the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty

Preparing for 2010: Striking a Balance between Nuclear Disarmament & Nuclear Nonproliferation

L’Impérial Palace Hotel, Annecy, France

7 and 8 March 2008

AGENDA

Friday, March 7, 2008

09:00 Registration

09:15 Opening: William Potter

09:30 Session I: Taking stock after 2007: Is the glass half full or half empty?

Moderator: Caroline Millar

Speakers:

i. The 2007 PrepCom chairman’s summary – the basis for a successful review? (Yukiya Amano)

ii. A Non-Aligned perspective (Sameh Shoukry)

iii. A Weapon State perspective (John Duncan)

11:00 Coffee break

11:30 Session II: Nuclear Disarmament: Getting the politics right

Moderator: Jean du Preez

Speakers:

i. A new disarmament era? What initiatives are being undertaken, and what would be the impact of political leadership changes on the future of disarmament? (Knut Langeland)

ii. Disarmament: Keeping on track and avoiding derailment in a new political climate. (Patricia Lewis)

13:00 Lunch (Cosponsored by France and the United Kingdom)

14:30 Session III: Systematic and progressive disarmament: Qua vadis?

Moderator: Johannes Landman
Speakers:

i. Prospects for entry into force of the CTBT and negotiations of an FMCT (Jean-Francois Dobelle)

ii. Reducing non-strategic nuclear weapons: the 1991/92 PNIs and the INF as templates for regional initiatives and removing forwardly-deployed weapons in Europe and Russia (Kari Kahiluoto)

iii. Reducing the salience, numbers and operational status of strategic nuclear systems: Scope for multinational initiatives. (Don MacKay)

16:00 Coffee break

16:30 Session IV: Nuclear Nonproliferation and Disarmament: A Zonal Approach

Moderator: Thomas Markram

Speakers:

i. Implementing existing NWFZs: Challenges and solutions (Wesaka Puja)

ii. Israel and a Middle East Nuclear Weapons Free zone: Prospects and impediments (Rebecca Johnson)

iii. The future of NWFZs: Maintaining their relevance and expanding their scope (Sergio Duarte)

18:30 Pre-dinner reception (Sponsored by Slovenia)

19:30 Dinner (Cosponsored by the Republic of Korea and Japan)

Dinner Speaker: Mr. Robert Einhorn, senior adviser in the International Security Program of the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)

Saturday, March 8, 2008

09:00 Session V: Peaceful uses of nuclear energy and the nuclear fuel cycle: Protecting the “Achilles Heel”

Moderator: Lawrence Scheinman

Speakers:

i. Dual uses and the nuclear fuel cycle: Is multilateralisation the answer? (Rüdiger Lüdeking)

ii. Strengthening safeguards and nuclear disarmament: Is there a connection? (Tariq Rauf)

iii. Minimizing global HEU and separated plutonium stocks: methods and prospects (Hee-Seog Kwon)

10:30 Coffee break

11:00 Session VI: Plugging proliferation holes.

Moderator: Dong-hee Chang

Speakers:
i. Progress towards disarming North Korea: Is the candle in the window still burning? (Chris Ford)

ii. Dealing with Iran: Getting it right (Anatoly Antonov)

iii. Preventing further break-outs: Can the backdoor be shut permanently? (John Simpson)

12:30 Lunch (Cosponsored by Australia and Slovenia)

14:00 Session VII: Prospects for the 2008 NPT PrepCom: substantive, procedural and other challenges

Moderator: William Potter

Speaker: Volodymyr Yelchenko

15:00 Coffee break

15:30 Session VIII: Recap: Striking a balance between disarmament and nonproliferation undertakings

Moderator: Jean du Preez

• Feedback from session moderators

16:30 Closing remarks: William Potter

17:00 Departure

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List of Participants

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Permanent Representative of Japan to the International Organizations in Vienna

Ambassador Anatoly Antonov - Speaker
Director, Department for Security Affairs and Disarmament, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Russian Federation

Ambassador Bernhard Brasack
Permanent Representative of Germany to the Conference on Disarmament, Geneva

Mr. Tim Caughley
Deputy Secretary-General to the Conference on Disarmament, Geneva

Ambassador Dong-hee Chang - Moderator
Head of Delegation of the Republic of Korea to the Conference on Disarmament, Geneva

Ambassador Hans Dahlgren
Permanent Representative of Sweden to the United Nations Office and other International Organizations, Geneva

Ambassador Jean-François Dobelle - Speaker
Permanent Representative of France to the Conference on Disarmament, Geneva

Ambassador Sergio Duarte - Speaker
UN High Representative for Disarmament Affairs

Ambassador John Duncan - Speaker
Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom to the Conference on Disarmament, Geneva

Mr. Jean du Preez - Moderator
James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies, Monterey, CA

Mr. Robert J. Einhorn - Speaker
Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, DC

Mr. Obaida ElDandarawy
Permanent Mission of Egypt to the United Nations, Geneva

Ambassador Lucia Fiori
Permanent Representative of Italy to the Conference on Disarmament, Geneva

Dr. Christopher Ford - Speaker
Special Representative for Nonproliferation
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Dr. Rebecca Johnson - Speaker  
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Office of the Personal Representative on Nonproliferation, Council of the EU High Representative

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