Statement by Dr. Annika Thunborg, Spokesperson at the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO)

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Excellencies, Ladies and Gentlemen, dear Colleagues,

• About a month ago, I attended a workshop in Beijing. Nearly 20 journalists from the Chinese media participated, together with reporters and editors from Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, North Korea, the Philippines, Singapore, South Korea, Thailand and Vietnam, as well as international experts on security policy issues. It was the first time that such an extensive workshop for journalists from South East and East Asia on non-proliferation and disarmament issues had been arranged. The workshop was organized by the United Nations together with the Chinese government.

• The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) was singled out for in-depth presentation and discussion as one of four priority issues, together with Weapons of Mass Destruction and Terrorism, Space Security, and Small Arms and Light Weapons.

• Why the CTBT was selected as a priority issue could have many explanations. One that immediately comes to mind is that the CTBT is indeed the next natural step to take on the path to a nuclear-weapon-free world.

• The CTBT is a strong, comprehensive Treaty which bans all nuclear test explosions regardless of yield. It is almost universal, with 182 signatures and 153 ratifications. We are driving to achieve 160 ratifications in the next six months, and this will provide additional momentum towards EIF and universality.

• The Treaty is often already applied as a de-facto international norm, as the UN Security Council did when India and Pakistan tested in 1998 and North Korea tested in 2006 and 2009.

• Also the CTBT verification regime is already operational, with nearly 270 certified monitoring facilities in over 80 countries. It is an unprecedented example of multilateral cooperation on a highly political and technologically challenging issue. When complete with the on-site inspection component, it will represent the most sophisticated verification regime ever envisaged. It has already proven its worth as when it reliably and confidently detected the North Korean tests in 2006 and 2009.

• The CTBT is essential for peace and security; it is a core element of the non-proliferation regime. It limits the ability of countries to develop advanced nuclear weapons technology. The issue of nuclear testing is clearly separate from the inalienable right of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes under Article IV of the NPT, as testing is not
necessary to pursue a peaceful nuclear program. In the case of North Korea, the importance of a legally binding ban on nuclear testing is evident, and should be considered as a logical part of the Six Party talks.

- **The CTBT is also a catalyst for nuclear disarmament.** It curbs the development of new types and new designs of nuclear weapons. This will be essential when moving towards further deeper arms reductions between the United States and Russia, and in a future multilateral disarmament process that involves all the nuclear armed States.

- **The CTBT could also serve as a regional confidence and security building measure.** Ratification of the Treaty by States in the Middle East, in particular the Annex 2 countries Egypt, Iran and Israel, would be a positive catalyst for other security related issues affecting the region. Similarly, there is a need to engage India and Pakistan on a range of security and arms related issues. CTBT would naturally be one of them, providing a cap on the further development of nuclear weapons and thus on the further production of weapons materials to that end. In a wider regional context, much would be gained for confidence- and security building in Asia if the continent as a whole moved towards ratification.

- **The CTBT is of crucial relevance given the prospect of a nuclear energy renaissance.** More and more states are mastering the nuclear fuel cycle. The decision between nuclear energy for peaceful or for weapons purposes will become more a political and legal issue rather than one of technology and knowhow. Legal instruments “upstream” of the nuclear fuel cycle are facing increasing difficulties when it comes to the delineation between prohibited and permitted activities (e.g. IAEA Safeguards regime in the case of the Iranian nuclear program). A nuclear test provides unquestionable “downstream” proof of the intentions of a state. The CTBT thus provides the last and clearly visible barrier between the two. This legal line needs to be drawn clearly and irrevocably. A CTBT in force would also be an incentive for ending the production of fissile material for weapons use, pending the entry into force of a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty, as well as reducing the stocks of such materials.

- **The CTBT sets a new legal and verification standard for nuclear weapons.** It is a non-discriminatory Treaty with the same rights and obligations for all Member States. Its verification regime is equally non-discriminatory and provides equal access for all Member States to the CTBTO data. This was very important in the UN Security Council deliberations in 2006 and 2009 after North Korea had tested. All UNSC members – big and small, NWS and NNWS alike – had the same data and information about the tests.

- **However, despite the overwhelming support for the CTBT, the Treaty’s unusual EIF provisions have prevented the Treaty from entering into force.** **44 specific nuclear holding countries, the so-called Annex 2 States, need to ratify the Treaty for EIF; nine of them still remain:** China, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Iran, Israel, North Korea, Pakistan and the United States. India, Pakistan and North Korea have yet to sign the Treaty and become Members of the CTBTO. Indonesia at the other side of the spectrum has initiated its ratification process.

- **Clearing the final hurdle of achieving the Treaty’s EIF requires leadership** both from the 153 States that have already ratified the Treaty, and from States that have not –
particularly the remaining nine countries that have to ratify the Treaty for it to enter into force.

• Within every challenge lies an element of opportunity, and in this respect, the ASEAN Regional Forum ISM-NPD provides an opportunity for progressing towards EIF of the CTBT. That opportunity is leadership, leadership from the States co-chairing this important forum on nonproliferation and disarmament, as well as the other members of the Forum.

• The ASEAN Member States can play a unique role. They are essential contributors to regional and global peace and security, and have committed themselves to nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament. They have all renounced nuclear weapons as non-nuclear weapon States under the NPT and this carries strong moral authority. They have created the Bangkok Treaty, turning Southeast Asia into a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone.

• The Treaty of the South-East Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone is also a concrete confirmation of the ASEAN’s support to the CTBT. Both treaties include legal obligations to prohibit nuclear tests. In addition to the legal ban, the CTBT provides the verification mechanism that the Bangkok Treaty does not have. Although the CTBT has not yet entered into force, it is already de facto in force given the requirements of the Bangkok Treaty. Together, the CTBT and NWFZ treaties represent concrete and verifiable disarmament actions. The United Nations Secretary-General also stated during the Conference of Member States of NWFZ last year that the entry into force of the CTBT will complement and reinforce the status of the NWFZ.

• The ASEAN States are all Member States of the CTBTO which means that they all have signed the Treaty. Indonesia has initiated its ratification process as mentioned, Thailand has announced its commitment to ratify, and together with additional ratifications by Brunei and Myanmar, this would make all ASEAN countries full members of the CTBT.

• The Annex 2 States, the nuclear weapon States China and the United States, have the opportunity to demonstrate the political will to secure the Treaty’s ratification. Indonesia is currently in the process of pursuing its own ratification, as mentioned. If these three Annex 2 States ratify the CTBT, enormous momentum for the Treaty will be created and a path will emerge with the Treaty’s EIF within sight.

• Multilateral organizations such as the ASEAN Regional Forum are indispensible in this regard. They provide forums designed to foster regional dialogue on various levels in order to build confidence and trust among States. This can in turn lead to the effective implementation of the treaties and arrangements that underpin the nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime.

• A safer and more secure world must be established upon a set of universal principles and legally codified norms. Multilateral organizations can enhance this process by creating the necessary conditions for these security measures to be arranged and implemented.