Ladies and Gentlemen,

I welcome the initiative of the UN Information Service in Vienna and the Academic Council on the United Nations System to hold this meeting. It is high time to enhance the interaction between UN-related academics and practitioners, and provide the opportunity to the exchange of views on developments in specific areas of UN policy.

We in the CTBTO firmly believe in the synergy between research and education on the one hand, and the practice of disarmament and non-proliferation on the other. The CTBT, the CTBTO and its three pillared verification system both historically and today are very much the product of the close interaction and association between diplomacy, and science and technology.

After all, the splitting of the atom, the design of atomic weapons and their means of delivery, and the industrial application and implementation of the science behind these WMD is the ultimate scientific and technological endeavour that only a handful of states have mastered.

Almost in parallel to the development of the scientific and industrial mastery of the force of the atom for military purposes, there developed the peace oriented movement opposing the use of this new force as a means of
destruction. This movement, which was already in existence by the mid 1950s, was led mainly by scientists and academics who became concerned with the deadly effects of nuclear testing, particularly above the ground.

It would be accurate to say that the CTBT could only have come into existence through the belief that a test ban could be adequately verified through the verification regime that has science and technology at its very heart. The challenge of designing, building and operating such a system was very much the centre of the debate about an international arrangement banning nuclear test explosions. By the 1990s, the members of the UN Conference on Disarmament were confident that a legally binding instrument could be verified in a credible way, and the Treaty was adopted accordingly.

Recently, there have been several calls to institutionalize this organic relationship. In the UN Secretary-General’s 2002 report on disarmament and non-proliferation education, great importance was placed on the role of international organizations in the development of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation education strategies. The International Commission on Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament (ICNPD) which issued its report in 2010, recommended a major renewed emphasis on formal education and training about nuclear disarmament and related issues, as well as the need for more specialized courses on nuclear related issues—from the scientific and technical to the strategic. In November 2010, the UNSG launched his global Academic Impact initiative. The initiative acknowledges the critical role of higher education in economic and social development and as a foundation for world peace. It aims to align institutions of higher education with the United Nations in actively supporting ten universally accepted principles in the areas of human rights, literacy, sustainability and conflict resolution.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

There is an urgency to invest in the next generation of disarmament and non-proliferation specialists by increasing the awareness and understanding of the international non-proliferation framework. This urgency is a key driver of the Commission’s capacity development initiative, which was launched last October. The capacity development initiative is part of the Commission’s efforts to build and enhance the necessary capacities in States Signatories so that they can participate equally in the implementation of the Treaty and benefit equally from the services of the Treaty’s verification system.

The capacity development strategy is based on the recognition that building and maintaining the necessary capacity to effectively confront the technical, scientific, political, and legal challenges facing the multilateral nonproliferation and disarmament regime is of critical importance now as it will be in the years to come. In addition, political support over the long term
for non-proliferation and disarmament is contingent upon expanding the number of stakeholders with the opportunity to participate on an equal footing in the implementation of multilaterally established regimes. As a core element of the international nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament regime, the CTBT has an important role to play in strengthening verification capacities across the whole range of multilateral arrangements.

As part of the broader capacity development initiative, the Commission organized a weeklong introduction course entitled “Strengthening Verification, Enhancing Security: The Science and Political Significance of the CTBT”, held from 18 to 22 October 2010 in Vienna. The course was designed to strengthen and broaden participation in global monitoring and verification efforts.

In an effort to expand upon the CTBT introduction course, the Preparatory Commission is developing enhanced courses oriented around the capacity development strategy. The courses will follow a modular approach to learning and be complete with an online component, allowing users from all across the world to participate.

In order broaden the scope of the capacity development initiative, we are in the process of building a network of global partnerships, including States, disarmament and non-proliferation organizations and arrangements, universities, research institutes, non-governmental organizations, corporations and individuals with expertise and interest in verification science and technology. Obviously, ACUNS is naturally placed to become a very active and valuable partner in this endeavour.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

Nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation is and shall remain the most defining global issue of our time. The Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty is certainly one of the most effective measures that the international community can take to promote world peace and security. The Treaty is not the answer to all questions. But it is a necessary pillar of a comprehensive nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament regime that is needed to address current and future challenges. The CTBT is a catalyst for nuclear disarmament. It provides a firm legal barrier against nuclear testing. The end of nuclear testing shall curb the development of new types and designs of nuclear weapons. The Treaty is a strong national and regional confidence and security building measure that ensures that the peaceful uses of nuclear energy are indeed peaceful. The Treaty is a potential catalyst for progress in many nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament processes. It is a potential catalyst for deeper cuts in strategic nuclear weapons, for addressing sub-strategic nuclear weapons, the cut off of fissile material production for military purposes. These measures will lead to the total elimination of nuclear weapons.
The CTBT is a strong instrument for non-proliferation. It limits the ability of countries that do not have nuclear weapons to develop these weapons. The Treaty is the last legal and compliance barrier preventing the misuse of nuclear energy for military purposes. Since this last barrier is so visible, it is imperative that the norm becomes universally legally binding.

The CTBT is certainly one of the measures around which international consensus can be built. The non-proliferation regime urgently needs a booster. The Treaty is the only instrument on the horizon which is close enough to universal adherence. Entry into force shall demonstrate that the NPT regime is resilient to pressure. The CTBT has endured a decade of political hardship. So has multilateralism. Nevertheless, we managed to increase the number of ratifying states from 50 to 153. This CTBT family now includes all of Europe, and the vast majority of states in Latin America, Africa, and Asia and the Pacific.

During the same decade, the 182 members of the organization have come within sight of the fulfilment of its mandate. We are approaching the point of readiness for the entry into force of the Treaty. The Commission has built up a one billion dollar verification system. Almost 85% of the International Monitoring System’s global monitoring stations are already sending operational-standard data to the headquarters in Vienna. The volume of the data transmitted from the stations to the data centre in Vienna has tripled during the last five years. A new global communications infrastructure for relaying that data has been installed. Important advances have been made in processing methods and software in all the verification technologies. The CTBT verification regime is transparent, democratic, and participatory in nature. All data and products of the CTBTO are made available to every signatory State, regardless of size, wealth, or technological prowess. The system has been tried and tested. The two DPRK test explosions in 2006 and 2009, while deplorable, have proved the detection reliability of the system. The system has also gained the trust and approval of the scientific community.

The CTBT is often called the “the longest sought, hardest fought prize in the history of arms control”. As a matter of fact, the CTBT has been a promise since 1954 when Nehru proposed the idea for the first time. It took 40 years until the negotiations were finalized and it was open for signature in 1996. Today, it is within political reach. But we need determined action by the international community to go the very last mile. The academic community’s active engagement and support is imperative.

Thank you