Statement by
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as observer at the International Disarmament and Non-proliferation Conference
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Allow me to express my appreciation for the opportunity to address this International Conference on Disarmament and Non-proliferation as a representative from an observer organization. [1]

In 2009, the aspirations towards a world free of nuclear weapons, shared by the entire international community, received a much needed boost. The recent agreement between the United States and the Russian Federation to renew the 1991 Treaty on Strategic Arms Reductions further contributes to a more conducive environment for nuclear disarmament.

This conference, held a mere two weeks before the start of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Review Conference in New York, is a timely opportunity to intensify international support for the elimination of nuclear weapons, while preventing the further proliferation of these most horrifying weapons and of the means to develop them. Responsible nations must take concrete actions in 2010 if we are to make substantial progress towards this objective.

The grave human and environmental consequences of nuclear testing have been a key driving force behind the international community’s quest to rid the world of nuclear weapons. In this regard I wish to pay tribute to Indian Prime Minister Nehru the first statesman to call for a “stand still” agreement on nuclear testing in 1954.

The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, banning all nuclear-weapon tests, is one of the most critical mechanisms to halt the nuclear arms race. It represents one of the most important steps towards a weapons free world. Nuclear testing is required for the development of new and more sophisticated nuclear weapons by established nuclear weapons possessors. It is also essential for the development of nuclear weapons programmes on the part of would be possessors. Closing the door on the destabilizing and dangerous practice of nuclear testing requires transforming the de-facto international norm against nuclear testing into an enforceable legally binding instrument. Furthermore, in order to move towards multilateral disarmament involving all the nuclear armed States, it is imperative that the CTBT enter into force.

Unlike the NPT, the CTBT does not differentiate between haves and have-nots. It imposes a legally binding verification mechanism upon both NNWS and NWS, an unprecedented evolution within the nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament regime. Just as all NPT parties – under Article VI - undertook to pursue effective measures on nuclear disarmament all states are equally responsible for the entry into force of the CTBT. While the ratification of those nuclear weapons states that have not yet done so is crucial, the ratification by the non-nuclear weapons states listed in Annex II to the Treaty are just as important. Moreover, the signature and ratification of all states that have not yet done so will provide important
momentum towards entry into force as an expression of global confidence in the wider non-proliferation and disarmament regime.

The question remaining for those States, particularly the remaining Annex II States, is whether they are prepared to draw a line in the sand and state unequivocally that the CTBT is fundamental to their own national security interest. Especially for those States with nuclear programs, ratification of the CTBT represents an unambiguous declaration that they have no intention to keep the door open for testing in the future.

The CTBT also plays a significant role in strengthening regional security. There is a strong complimentary force between NWFZs and the CTBT. While the CTBT has not yet achieved legal international standing, it is already effectively in force in all of the States covered by existing NWFZs. As such, the CTBT provides a powerful verification mechanism to NWFZs. Moreover, ratification of the CTBT by countries that are not yet covered by NWFZs, such as those the Middle East, can serve as powerful confidence and security building measures aimed at creating the right conditions for the establishment of such a zone.

Since the CTBT opened for signature in 1996, a myriad of political challenges have threatened the Treaty’s well-being. However, throughout these politically turbulent times, the international community has responded by strengthening its collective commitment to the CTBT. This commitment also applies to the multilateral security architecture embodied in both the Treaty’s non-discriminatory legal obligations and its democratic verification mechanism.

The Treaty now enjoys near universal support, boasting 182 signatory states and 151 ratifying states. The States that have ratified the CTBT have demonstrated their recognition that ratification of the Treaty buttresses the foundation of the non-proliferation regime and strengthens international peace and security. Still, nine Annex II States – China Democratic People’s Republic of Korea Egypt India Indonesia Islamic Republic of Iran Israel Pakistan and United States - need to ratify the Treaty for it to enter into force.

The unprecedented high-level attendance at the Conference on Facilitating the Entry-Into-Force of the CTBT held on the margins of the high-level segment of the UN General Assembly in September last year underscored the importance ascribed to the Treaty Signatory and ratifying states produced a strongly worded consensus Final Declaration calling on hold-out States to sign and ratify the Treaty for it to enter into force. The international community again showed the political determination to make substantive progress on this and other non-proliferation and disarmament objectives.

In this regard the renewed commitment by the United States to secure its own ratification while working to promote the ratification of the other remaining Annex II states is to be warmly welcomed. Equally the recently released US Nuclear Posture Review strongly endorsed US ratification. Evidence exist that this renewed commitment already enspired other Annex II states to expidite their own ratification processes. The international community must seize upon this momentum and step up its efforts to bring the test ban into full legal standing.

It is important to recall that when the Treaty opened for signature, the International Monitoring System (IMS) was still in the conceptual phase. In fact, certain technologies employed to verify compliance needed to be developed specifically for the purposes of monitoring for nuclear tests. We have a very different picture today, one that illustrates the significant strides made in the development of the CTBT verification regime. Out of the 321
monitoring stations in the IMS, 268 stations have already been installed and certified. Several more IMS stations are in the process of being certified and many more are under construction.

The capabilities of the CTBT verification regime have been demonstrated by the accurate and timely detection of two nuclear tests conducted by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea in October 2006 and May 2009. The technical capabilities of the IMS have been well documented, and when combined with on-site inspections, the final arm of the verification regime, no country can be confident of being able to evade detection.

Moreover the CTBT verification regime is democratic, participatory, and an unprecedented equalizer. Altogether 90 countries are hosting stations of the International Monitoring System, thus contributing to the Treaty’s verification capabilities. The data and products of the CTBTO are made available in near real time to every signatory State, regardless of size, wealth, or technological prowess. This allows all signatory States to form their own opinions and pass their own judgments and enhances our credibility. On the basis of this open and democratic nature of the regime, the CTBTO is engaged in a wide range of training and capacity building activities to allow all Member States to take full advantage of the benefits of the Treaty, including the manifold potential civil and scientific applications of the monitoring data.

Nonetheless, the full and active participation of all member states in the work of the Commission is of vital importance for continued success in the development of the verification regime. Validating the parameters of the IMS and testing the communications infrastructure requires that the International Data Centre receive continuous data flows from all stations that have the capability of doing so. All states must take the responsibility to ensure the fulfilment of the CTBTO mandate to establish the global verification regime so that it is fully operational once the Treaty enters into force.

With the 2010 NPT Review Conference nearly upon us, we must identify key measures that the international community can find consensus around and that can help produce a positive outcome at the conference. I believe that in this respect, the CTBT is a clear choice. Progress towards entry into force is an important catalyst that will fortify the resolve of the international community as it addresses the multitude of challenges facing the non-proliferation disarmament regime. Of course the CTBT in itself will not solve the many concerns generated by nuclear weapons. But the Treaty’s entry into force is a necessary step on the path towards a strengthened non-proliferation and disarmament regime capable of addressing these issues in the future.

[1] “The Preparatory Commission attended the recently held Teheran Conference on Disarmament and Non-proliferation as an observer organization. Given the non-negotiating format of this conference it is understood that the outcome of conference does not reflect the collective view of the participants and observers.”