Address by the Executive Secretary of the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization

Mr. Tibor Tóth

Role of the CTBT in Regional and Global Security
Cross-Regional Workshop
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Mr. Chairman,
Mr. Deputy Undersecretary,
Your Excellencies,
The representatives of the Coordinators of the Article XIV Process,
Ladies and Gentlemen,

We are grateful to the Government of the Republic of Turkey for hosting this event. This is our third meeting in Istanbul dedicated to the Comprehensive-Nuclear-Test Ban Treaty in the last ten years. The warm welcome by Turkey to all participants pays tribute to our host’s unwavering commitment to the Treaty and strong support for its universalization and entry into force. As joint hosts, Turkey and the CTBTO welcome the participation of more than 70 experts from 30 countries, the international community, researchers and think-tanks.

When Turkey hosted the Inter-regional Workshop on the CTBTO International Cooperation and National Implementation/Ratification Procedures in May 2001, the Organization was in its infancy. Then, 69 States had ratified the Treaty and only 11 stations
of the International Monitoring System (IMS) were certified. When we met for the second time in Istanbul in July 2008, the number of ratifications had more than doubled to 141 countries. The Treaty’s verification regime had also matured significantly.

As we meet today, I am gratified that the Treaty has enjoyed ever-growing political support. Today, 182 States have signed the Treaty, and 155 States have ratified it. Guinea was the most recent ratification last September. More ratifications and signatures are forthcoming. This testifies to the commitment by the vast majority of the international community to giving the de facto international norm against testing a full legal standing.

Three years have passed since our last meeting. I am happy to report that the build-up of International Monitoring System has been continuously pursued. Certification of 266 stations out of 337 has already been completed, making the IMS almost 80% ready. We developed an effective IMS sustainment structure, an integrated database, called DOTS. We completely overhauled the PTS computer infrastructure, installed a new state of the art Computer Centre and Operations Centre, and established a new Global Communications Infrastructure, unprecedented in its global reach. We migrated all verification related applications to an open source environment, established a system-wide state of health monitoring tool, refined and improved detection and analysis methods and algorithms for processing of data, and improved the configuration of automatic processing pipelines and strengthened the interactive analyst capability. We initiated the re-engineering of the IDC operating software, introduced infrasound automatic and interactive processing into routine operations, made important advances in data fusion capabilities, decreased the time lines for the production of the various IDC products, delivering them within timelines envisaged at the time of entry into force of the Treaty. We installed nearly 70% of the noble gas systems, introduced noble gas data into routine operations, developed software to process this data and made significant advances in using atmospheric transport modelling to backtrack dispersed radioactive material. We carried out a successful on-site inspection Integrated Field Exercise (IFE) in Kazakhstan, trained the first group of OSI surrogate inspectors, and established an Equipment Storage and Maintenance Facility. We provided automated external access for States Signatories to our data and products, distributed the
‘NDC in a box’ software to States Signatories, and created a new virtual Data Exploitation Centre (vDEC) for use by outside scientists.

These technical achievements were weighed again and again. Weighed by system-wide performance tests, small-scale tests and real-time continuous performance monitoring. Weighed in 2006 and weighed in 2009 by the two announced nuclear tests by the DPRK. Two tests too many. And we were tested by the forces of nature and man-made disaster. Tested by a most tragic earthquake, tsunami and a nuclear accident in Japan.

In March this year, the world witnessed the unfortunate tragic events of the Fukushima accident following the devastating earthquake. In both these instances, the CTBTO provided the most up-to-date and accurate information to all the member-states and signatories of the Treaty putting them on the level playing field and enabling them to make informed decisions.

Collectively we must secure the remaining nine Annex 2 states whose ratification is necessary for the Treaty’s entry into force. The 7th Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the CTBT was convened in New York on 23 September 2011, coinciding with the 15th Anniversary of the signing of the Treaty. The Final Declaration adopted at that conference urged progress on the outstanding ratifications and reaffirmed the CTBT as a core element of the nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime.

The CTBT is a joint international venture of its stakeholders. It is an all inclusive, multilateral, and democratic legally binding framework. It is a prohibition regime of equal obligations. It has a verification regime that relies on its parties, and serves all of them in an equal and transparent manner. The entry into force of the CTBT may pave the way to solving many of the current and future challenges facing the nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament regime.

The CTBT operates at the cutting edge of state-of-the art science and technology that knows no borders. This was demonstrated in June this year when more than 800 scientists from around the globe gathered in Vienna for the 2011 Science and Technology Conference.
where they discussed advances in science and technology relevant to test ban verification and explore scientific applications of the CTBT verification infrastructure. Most importantly, it also encouraged cooperation and knowledge exchange between the CTBTO and the broader scientific community and such cooperation has already sown the seeds for the next Science and Technology Conference that will take place in June 2013.

A sound scientific foundation can contribute to confidence-building and political cooperation. The On Site Inspection regime provides an inspiring opportunity for experts from various countries, including from the Middle East and Asia, to work side by side and learn from each other. In November 2010, 35 international experts took part in the on-site inspection visual observation exercise in Jordan. Kazakhstan, in 2008 hosted the largest Integrated Field Exercise held thus far. These are just few examples of the daily work conducted by the Commission that promote cooperation, understanding and transparency.

The importance of safeguarding both the Treaty and its entry into force, as well as its verification regime, remain of the utmost importance for global and regional peace and security, as well as for safety, human welfare and development. It is essential that we focus on maintaining and developing the necessary capacities and knowledge base to ensure that the next generation is equipped to achieve these objectives. To train and educate the next generation of the CTBT experts and to sustain the expertise on the CTBT verification technologies and implementation practices each technical division – the IMS, the IDC and the OSI – run training programs for station operators, National Data Centres, future on-site inspectors, government officials and so on.

To this end, the CTBTO launched a Capacity Development Initiative, which aims to build capacities in the areas related to the Treaty. A network of partnerships with governments, scientists, scholars, educators, and journalists, particularly younger generations is being established. It was inaugurated with the successful Introductory Course on the Science and Political Significance of the CTBT. This course, held last September, attracted over 230 participants from 79 countries. Now we aim at an even more ambitious two-week long Advanced Science Course that starts on 29 November. More than 300
participants from 95 countries have already registered for the course; in an unmistaken sign of interest and appreciation.

The CTBT, with its non-discriminatory legal obligations and democratic verification system, is an unprecedented platform with which to measure progress towards multilateralism in arms control and international relations. Nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation depend on increased transparency on security issues between States, enhanced cooperation on and democratization of verification activities, and the implementation of security and confidence building measures. The CTBT and its verification regime embody these principles both in letter and in spirit. We have come a long way in the past decade. I have no doubt that with sustained political and action, we cannot but succeed.

Finally, I am pleased to present to you a team of experts and professionals who work at the Commission’s Provisional Technical Secretariat. They stand ready to answer your questions related to the work of the organization.

With this, I would like to wish all participants a productive workshop.

Mr Chairman, I thank you.