

**Intervention by the Executive Secretary  
of the Preparatory Commission for the  
Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization**

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**“CTBT Role in Addressing Security Challenges in the Middle East”**

**Middle East Scientific Institute of Security**

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HE Alsharif Nasser bin Nasser,  
Excellences,  
Ladies and Gentlemen,

- I am pleased to be here at the Middle East Scientific Institute of Security. I thank Alsharif Nasser for his invitation, and for arranging such a distinguished participation. The partnership with academia and research centers is of vital importance for the CTBTO. By expanding the scope of the debate about the CTBT and its contribution to security, non-proliferation and disarmament, we maintain the Treaty’s momentum and promote its entry into force.
- As you know, MESIS has been our long standing partner in the Eastern Mediterranean Infrasound Campaign. Thanks to the collaboration of MESIS, the CTBTO successfully deployed four infrasound arrays spread out throughout Jordan and one near field sensor close to the Israeli border. We were able to make unique recordings of the infrasound waves generated by the calibration experiments carried out in Negev desert in January 2011 as the waves propagated across Jordan. The recordings have been instrumental for advancing the infrasound technology and the understanding of the atmospheric propagation of infrasound waves.
- I believe it is precisely this kind of interaction between science and policy, so clearly illustrated in the work of MESIS, that is strategically vital for advancing discussion on regional security issues. The same synergy is embedded in the CTBT: the legal barrier against nuclear weapons testing established by the Treaty is essentially complemented by a robust verification system.

**EFFECTIVENESS AND RELIABILITY OF THE VERIFICATION REGIME**

- Assuring that the CTBT verification system is reliable and trustworthy is of core importance for its entry into force. In other words, continuing to demonstrate the effective

and efficient detection capabilities of the verification system serves as the bedrock foundation of the added value that the Treaty provides for ratifying states and those considering its ratification.

- Working with States to promote understanding and increase awareness of the Treaty and its verification regime is an essential part of our efforts to secure the Treaty's entry into force and universalization.
- The CTBT's strength is derived from the successful establishment of the verification regime to monitor compliance with the prohibition of explosive nuclear tests. I can say with confidence that we have achieved great success in the build-up of the Treaty's verification regime in the last decade.
- The International Monitoring System has a truly global reach. It is made up of 337 monitoring facilities and is almost 90% complete. The test ban is verified by seismic, hydroacoustic, infrasound and radionuclide monitoring.
- The IMS is supported by the International Data Centre (IDC) which continuously processes and analyses the data registered at monitoring stations. The CTBT verification system gathers data around the globe and around the clock. Around the globe around the clock, the data are shared with 1,300 institutions in 130 countries, in an equal and transparent manner.
- We provide the confidence that no nuclear test can go undetected. When North Korea announced its nuclear tests, the CTBT verification regime proved its worth, detecting the tests reliably and confidently.
- The Integrated Field Exercise 2014 is a major component in the build-up of a trustworthy verification regime. By assessing the readiness of the OSI component and testing OSI methods and procedures in practice, IFE14 will strengthen confidence around the entire verification regime and assure that the OSI capability will be available following the Treaty's entry into force.
- OSI's serve as a deterrent. Potential violators can never be confident that a nuclear test can go undetected. From this point of view, an on-site inspection can be carried out upon request by a State Party to establish whether or not a nuclear explosion has taken place, as the last verification measure.
- The Treaty prescribes how an inspection is triggered; how it is prepared and conducted; what techniques and procedures can be applied; which information an inspection report should contain; and what possible steps could follow the report's examination by the organization's main executive organ, the Executive Council.
- The Treaty also establishes tight schedules for the launch and duration of an on-site inspection to ensure that the evidence is collected in the appropriate timeframe. For instance, an inspection team has to arrive at the point of entry of an Inspected State Party within six days of an inspection request. For an international organization without a standing inspectorate it is an unprecedented logistical and technical challenge. Imagine all the complexities involved in assembling a qualified, informed and well-equipped team on

such a short notice. Consider further that the inspection team cannot exceed 40 people at any given time, meaning that future inspectors will have to be qualified in a range of activities and techniques to make up an effective and capable team. Now add that an inspection can last up to 130 days.

- These are the reasons why fully trained personnel and tested procedures are of core importance for the successful accomplishment of an inspection. We endeavor to carefully prepare professionals and involve national experts in training exercises to assure the efficiency and effectiveness of the OSI regime by the time when the CTBT enters into force.
- The conduct of the 2014 Integrated Field Exercise (IFE14) in Jordan from 3 November to 9 December 2014 will demonstrate the progress the CTBTO made since the previous field test in 2008. IFE14 will test crucial aspects of all inspection phases in an integrated manner and assess progress with the development of OSI procedures and techniques.
- IFE14 will help to gain enhanced political support for further development of the OSI regime and the promotion of the CTBT. By developing and testing the OSI regime, the CTBTO can further demonstrate that the Treaty is verifiable, thus facilitating the decision to join the CTBT to those countries who are yet to do so, particularly the remaining Annex 2 countries.
- Jordan was selected as the Host Country for IFE14 by CTBTO Member States in a competitive process. It was the right decision as confirmed by Jordan's excellent cooperation. The leading role of Jordan in facilitating IFE14 reflects Jordan's commitment to international peace and security, and to strengthening the nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament regime.

### **CTBT role in the Middle East**

- The CTBT can serve as a regional confidence and security building measure. Ratification of the Treaty by States in the Middle East, in particular the Annex 2 countries Egypt, Iran and Israel, would be a positive catalyst for other security-related issues affecting the region. Jordan's efforts to ensure the success of the IFE14 will contribute to the process towards the establishment of a zone free of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East.
- The CTBT can play an important role as a confidence-building and transparency measure in the Middle East. The IFE14, which will involve over 100 participants from across the region and the world, is a major contribution in this regard. Such activities are of particular value given the developments in the region: be it chemical weapons in Syria or the Iranian nuclear programme.
- I would like to emphasize that the development of nuclear energy programmes for peaceful purposes as enshrined under Article IV of the NPT is totally incompatible with nuclear testing. In fact, nuclear testing undermines confidence in a state's intentions. The reverse is equally true. By signing and ratifying the CTBT, states increase confidence in their peaceful nuclear programmes. The CTBT thus provides the last and clearly visible barrier between the two, contributing to the build-up of confidence in the region. An

increased support for the CTBT in the Middle East could pave the way for a zone free of weapons of mass destruction in the region, advancing the ultimate goals of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation.

- I thank you for your attention and I look forward to our discussion.