Excellencies, Ladies and Gentlemen,

- Over the last two weeks, CTBTO scientists and technical experts have been working around the clock. On 11 March when the devastating magnitude 9.0 earthquake hit Japan, our data contributed to rapid tsunami warning alerts. And our data have been tracking the dispersal of radioactivity from the damaged Fukushima plant across the Pacific and the Atlantic since 12 March.

A COMPREHENSIVE VERIFICATION REGIME WITH WIDE UTILITY

- As you know, the CTBT International Monitoring System is being set up to monitor the Earth for any sign of a nuclear explosion. Over 280 facilities worldwide are currently monitoring underground, the atmosphere, and the oceans, and continuously sniff the air to detect even the smallest nuclear blast. **When North Korea conducted nuclear tests in 2006 and 2009, the system proved its worth, detecting the tests reliably and confidently.** Within an hour of the tests, CTBTO Member States received information about their location, magnitude, depth and time. **When complete with the on-site inspection component, the system will represent the most sophisticated verification regime ever envisaged.**

- But there is more. In the process of detecting the needle in the haystack – the nuclear test - the system registers over 30,000 events a year – the vast majority of them are earthquakes. The **civil and scientific applications** of the CTBT data can be used to gain better understanding of the Earth, of climate change, of volcanic ash clouds, of the movements of whales and much more.
The system has been contributing to tsunami warning since 2006. **Over 50 seismic and hydroacoustic stations are currently contributing data directly to tsunami warning alert centres in the Indian and Pacific Oceans.** The CTBTO data is one of the most reliable and speediest with as much as three minute lead time compared to most other data. On 11 March, the system helped saved lives through its contribution to rapid tsunami warning alerts, the first being sent by the Japanese tsunami warning centre three minutes after the earthquake.

Radioactive isotopes have been detected at CTBTO monitoring stations in Japan, Russia, the Pacific, the United States, Canada, the Atlantic Ocean and Europe since 12 March, . **Through Atmospheric Transport Modelling in cooperation with the World Meteorological Organization, information has also been provided on the global dispersion of radioactive material.** With information made available to the CTBTO by the IAEA since Friday on the release level of radioactive substances at the Fukushima power plant – the so-called source term – CTBTO experts are now also able to provide quantitative measurements as part of the organization’s global dispersion predictions.

These are but a few examples of the comprehensiveness and wider utility of the CTBT verification regime and data. **For the system to be used at its full potential, it needs to be completed and made fully operational.** The necessary resources need to be invested – political, legal, financial, technical, scientific, and human resources.

This takes us to the Treaty. It is important to remember that safeguarding the International Monitoring System is closely linked to safeguarding the Treaty and its entry into force.

**THE IMPORTANCE OF THE CTBT FOR GLOBAL PEACE AND SECURITY**

Just as the system is strong and comprehensive, so is the Treaty.

**The CTBT bans all nuclear test explosions regardless of yield. It is almost universal, with 182 signatures and 153 ratifications.** We are driving to achieve 160 ratifications in the next six months, and this will provide additional momentum towards entry into force (EIF) and universality.
• The Treaty is often already applied as a de-facto international norm, as the UN Security Council did when India and Pakistan tested in 1998 and North Korea tested in 2006 and 2009.

• **The CTBT is essential for peace and security; it is a core element of the non-proliferation regime.** It limits the ability of countries to develop advanced nuclear weapons technology. The issue of nuclear testing is clearly separate from the inalienable right of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes under Article IV of the NPT, as testing is not necessary to pursue a peaceful nuclear programme. If Iran wants to restore confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of its nuclear programme, CTBT ratification would be a logical step. In the case of North Korea, the importance of a legally binding ban on nuclear testing is evident, and should be considered as a logical part of the Six Party talks.

• **The CTBT is also a catalyst for nuclear disarmament.** It curbs the development of new types and new designs of nuclear weapons. This will be essential when moving towards further deeper arms reductions between the United States and Russia, and in a future multilateral disarmament process that involves all the nuclear armed States.

• **The CTBT could also serve as a regional confidence and security building measure.** Ratification of the Treaty by States in the Middle East, in particular the Annex 2 countries Egypt, Iran and Israel, would be a positive catalyst for other security-related issues affecting the region. Similarly, there is a need to engage India and Pakistan on a range of security and arms-related issues. The CTBT would naturally be one of them, providing a cap on the further development of nuclear weapons and thus on the further production of weapons materials to that end. In a wider regional context, much would be gained for confidence- and security-building in Asia if the continent as a whole moved towards ratification.

• **The CTBT is of crucial relevance also in connection with the development of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.** Regardless of what the future of the predicted nuclear renaissance will be after the Fukushima accident, it is a fact that more and more States are mastering the nuclear fuel cycle. The decision between nuclear energy for peaceful or for weapons purposes will become more a political and legal issue rather than one of technology and knowhow. Legal instruments “upstream” of the nuclear fuel cycle are facing increasing difficulties when it comes to the delineation between prohibited and permitted activities (e.g. IAEA Safeguards regime in the case of the Iranian nuclear
A nuclear test provides unquestionable “downstream” proof of the intentions of a State. The CTBT thus provides the last and clearly visible barrier between the two. This legal line needs to be drawn clearly and irrevocably. A CTBT in force would also be an incentive for ending the production of fissile material for weapons use, pending the entry into force of a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty, as well as reducing the stocks of such materials.

- **The CTBT sets a new legal and verification standard for nuclear weapons.** It is a non-discriminatory Treaty with the same rights and obligations for all Member States. Its verification regime is equally non-discriminatory and provides equal access for all Member States to CTBTO data. This was very important in the UN Security Council deliberations in 2006 and 2009 after North Korea had tested. All UNSC members – big and small, NWS and NNWS alike – received the same data and information about the tests.

**LEADERSHIP NEEDED**

- However, despite the overwhelming support for the CTBT, the Treaty’s unusual EIF provisions have prevented the Treaty from entering into force. **44 specific nuclear holding countries, the so-called Annex 2 States, need to ratify the Treaty for EIF; nine of them still remain:** China, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Iran, Israel, North Korea, Pakistan and the United States. India, Pakistan and North Korea have yet to sign the Treaty and become Members of the CTBTO. Indonesia at the other side of the spectrum has initiated its ratification process.

- **Clearing the final hurdle of achieving the Treaty’s EIF requires leadership** both from the 153 States that have already ratified the Treaty, and from States that have not – particularly the remaining nine countries that have to ratify the Treaty for it to enter into force.

- The two remaining nuclear weapon States among the Annex 2 States, China and the United States, have the opportunity to demonstrate the political will to secure the Treaty’s ratification. Indonesia is currently in the process of pursuing its own ratification, as mentioned. **If these three Annex 2 States ratify the CTBT, enormous momentum for the Treaty will be created and a path will emerge with the Treaty’s EIF within sight.**

- **Among the 153 countries, representing over 75% of the countries of the world that have already ratified the Treaty, countries that are**
members of Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones (NWFZ) can play a unique role. They are essential contributors to regional and global peace and security, and have committed themselves to nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament. They have all renounced nuclear weapons as non-nuclear weapon States under the NPT and under the NWFZs and this carries strong moral authority.

- **Nuclear Weapons Free Zones** are concrete confirmations of its parties support to the CTBT. Both NWFZs and the CTBT include legal obligations to prohibit nuclear tests. In addition to the legal ban, the CTBT provides the verification mechanism that the NWFZ treaties do not have. Although the CTBT has not yet entered into force, it is already *de facto* in force given the requirements of the NWFZ treaties. **Together, the CTBT and NWFZ treaties represent concrete and verifiable disarmament actions.** The United Nations Secretary-General also stated during the Conference of Member States of NWFZ last year that the entry into force of the CTBT will complement and reinforce the status of the zones.

- **Multilateral organizations such as the OAS are indispensable and can provide essential leadership on the CTBT.** They provide forums designed to foster regional dialogue on various levels in order to build confidence and trust among States, which can in turn lead to the effective implementation of the treaties and arrangements that underpin the nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime.

- In their aspiration for regional and global peace and security, the Member States of the OAS are evidence of a strong dedication to nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament. They are parties to the NPT, while the States from the Latin American and Caribbean region are parties to the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco), which established the first nuclear-weapon-free zone in a populated area. **Thirty-one OAS Member States have ratified the CTBT.** Four countries remain: Cuba and Dominica still need to sign; the United States and Guatemala still need to ratify.

- **The support for the CTBT is repeatedly underscored by OAS Member States with the adoption of a resolution,** which recognizes the valuable contribution of the CTBT to the consolidation and maintenance of international peace and security, therefore urging the signature and ratification of the CTBT.
The CTBTO is thankful for the continued support of OPANAL and UN-LiREC and maintains excellent cooperation with both in promoting the CTBT as part of international peace and security.

CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT FOR THE FUTURE

- I have underlined the importance of safeguarding both the Treaty and its entry into force as well as its verification regime for the sake of global and regional peace and security, and for the sake of safety, human welfare and development.

- To be able to do this, we need to ensure that we have the necessary capacities and knowledge base now and in the future. This means that we need to invest in education – disarmament education as well as education in the monitoring and verification sciences.

- The CTBTO’s capacity development initiative is part of our efforts to build and enhance the necessary capacities in Member States to enable them to participate equally in the implementation of the Treaty and benefit equally from the services of the Treaty’s verification regime.

- The initiative is based on the recognition that building and maintaining the necessary capacity to confront the technical, scientific, political, and legal challenges facing non-proliferation and disarmament effectively is of critical importance now as it will be in the years to come.

- The initiative is aimed at strengthening national capabilities in areas related to the Treaty’s verification technologies by restructuring training activities, further consolidating training courses and workshops, and better integrating their curricula.

- The CTBT represents a benchmark of multilateral cooperation, aimed at enhancing regional and global security. What is needed urgently is leadership and commitment to move the Treaty into force. To this end the OAS and its Member States could be a leading force.

Thank you!