Your Excellencies,
Minister Bruno Stagno Ugarte and Secretary of State Hans Winkler,
Distinguished Delegates,

1. I have the honour to speak on behalf of the European Union. The Candidate Countries Croatia, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia1 and Turkey, the Countries of the Stabilisation and Association Process and potential candidates Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro and Serbia, the EFTA countries Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway, members of the European Economic Area, as well as Moldova and Ukraine, associate themselves with this statement.

2. Allow me to begin by congratulating you, Co-Presidents, on behalf of the EU, on your election to the Presidency of the fifth Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and by wishing you every success in the task with which you have been entrusted. I wish to assure you of the full support of the European Union in your efforts to ensure this Conference is a success.

3. The European Union would like to thank the Secretary General of the United Nations for convening this Conference and for his opening message, as well as the Government of Austria for hosting it. We would also like to express our appreciation for the work carried out by Australia as previous Article XIV coordinator.

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1 Croatia and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia continue to be part of the Stabilisation and Association Process
4. The purpose of this Conference is clearly defined in Article XIV of the CTBT. We are here to examine the extent to which the requirement for Entry into Force has been met and to agree on what measures may be undertaken to facilitate the achievement of that goal.

5. As to the first part of our deliberations, the EU regrets that, despite the significant progress made, the Treaty has not yet entered into force. Eleven years after its opening for signature, ten of the 44 States whose ratification is needed to permit Entry into Force have yet to deposit their instrument of ratification.

6. Since the last Conference in 2005, 15 States have ratified the CTBT, including one Annex 2 State, Vietnam. The European Union commends the Government of Vietnam and the other recent ratifiers for the ratification of this important Treaty, and hopes these sovereign decisions can act as an example to others. The steadily growing number of signatures and ratifications testifies to the desire of the vast majority of the International Community for a permanent end to nuclear test explosions. 177 States have now signed and 140 States have ratified the Treaty. Each new signature and ratification brings us closer to our common objective of universal adherence to the CTBT, and thus to a safer world. All Member States of the European Union and, indeed, all the countries on the European continent have demonstrated their commitment to this goal by ratifying the CTBT.

7. As to what can be done to facilitate Entry into Force, the European Union will continue to work together with all ratifiers to persuade those States that have not yet signed or ratified the Treaty of its essential role in curbing the proliferation of nuclear weapons and advancing nuclear disarmament, thereby significantly contributing to the enhancement of international peace and stability.

8. The European Union conducted an extensive lobbying campaign, of all non-ratifiers, in the ten Annex 2 States and 34 non-Annex 2 States earlier this year. We will continue actively to promote the universalisation of the CTBT through bilateral and regional channels, and encourage others to do the same. In this respect, the EU would like to express its appreciation and continued support for the excellent work of Ambassador Ramaker, Special Representative of the States that have ratified the Treaty, and is grateful for the generous support of the Government of the Netherlands to his functions.
Mr. Co-Presidents,

9. The European Union commends the work of the Provisional Technical Secretariat and of the Executive Secretary Mr. Tibor Tóth for the progress achieved in fulfilling the mandate of the Preparatory Commission. However, this mandate can only be carried out successfully with the full political and financial commitment of all States Signatories. The EU is deeply concerned that the financial stability of the Organisation, and the collective investment by the international community in the CTBT verification regime, is threatened by the failure of some States Signatories to meet their commitments. We therefore urge all States Signatories to meet their financial obligations in full, on time and without conditions.

10. For its part, the European Union pledges to maintain its strong support for the work of the Preparatory Commission for the CTBTO. In addition to fulfilling our financial obligations, we are also contributing to the strengthening of the monitoring and verification system through Joint Actions in support of the CTBT, in the framework of the EU Strategy against the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction.

Mr. Co-Presidents,

11. The proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and their means of delivery threaten the entire international community. Proliferation challenges stem both from States seeking to master nuclear weapons technologies and from the increasing risk that non-State actors could gain access to those weapons.

12. These pressing challenges call for a united response. Our conviction, as expressed in the European Union’s Strategy against the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, is that a multilateral approach provides the best means to counter those threats, from which no region or State is immune. Underlying this approach is our commitment to preserve and strengthen the existing international instruments designed to combat and deter such threats and to develop new ones where appropriate. No single instrument is sufficient in itself; we must make the best use of all tools at our disposal if we are to successfully address the increasing and changing threats we all face.
By aiming to hamper the development and qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons, the CTBT is one of the essential pillars in the nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation framework. Its Entry into Force would significantly strengthen the international security architecture built upon the foundation of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

The preparations for the next NPT review cycle began here in Vienna last spring. We hope to avoid the repetition of the disappointing exercise of 2005, where no substantive Final Document was agreed. At the first Preparatory Committee for the 2010 Review Conference, the EU and many other States underlined the need for the early Entry into Force of the CTBT. The EU believes that progress towards Entry into Force of the CTBT would contribute significantly to reinforcing nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament.

Mr. Co-Presidents,

The adoption of the CTBT, despite the fact that it has not yet entered into force, established a global norm against nuclear test explosions. This norm was seriously challenged by the announcement of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea in October 2006 that it had conducted a nuclear test. This regrettable event, which the EU strongly condemned, once again highlighted the urgent need for a legally binding universal prohibition on nuclear test explosions as well as for a robust verification regime to monitor compliance with it. Notwithstanding this, the EU notes the positive steps taken by the DPRK to achieve the complete and verifiable denuclearisation of the Korean peninsula in the framework of the Six Party Talks.

Further delay of Entry into Force increases the risk that other countries might break this norm. The European Union, therefore, continues to attach the utmost importance to the earliest possible Entry into Force of the CTBT and reiterates its call on all States, and in particular those ten States whose ratification is required for Entry into Force, to sign and ratify the Treaty at the earliest possible date.

The European Union welcomes the voluntary moratorium on nuclear test explosions observed by several States that have not yet ratified the Treaty. Pending Entry into Force, the EU continues to urge all States to abide by such a moratorium and to refrain from any action contrary to the obligations and purpose of the Treaty.
18. The value of the CTBT as an effective nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament instrument is anchored in a credible and operational verification regime. The verification instruments embedded in the Treaty were designed to ensure that no nuclear explosion can be carried out undetected. Indeed, the value of the verification system and its detection capabilities were demonstrated on the occasion of the North Korea event. The response of the system provided confidence that it will able to successfully fulfil its purpose after Entry into Force while also underlining the importance of its completion as soon as possible. A fully functioning verification regime will provide the international community with an independent, reliable and cost-effective means to monitor compliance with a test ban. In this sense, we believe that the early completion and operational readiness of the verification regime will also form an important incentive for Entry into Force.

19. The EU strongly supports and actively contributes to the development of the verification regime and welcomes the significant progress made in this regard. We look forward to continued steady progress in the establishment and sustainment of the International Monitoring System, so that global and equitable coverage is achieved as soon as possible. We call on all States that host monitoring stations to fully co-operate in installing them and in providing real-time data, so as to ensure operational readiness of the IMS at Entry into Force. The development of a robust On-site Inspection regime is another essential element in verifying compliance with the Treaty; the Integrated Field Exercise in September 2008 will be an essential step towards that objective.

20. The verification regime has also intrinsic value as an instrument for international cooperation and confidence building. Notwithstanding the primary purpose of the verification system, the EU supports the continuing development of the civil and scientific benefits of the CTBT verification technologies. The data collected by the monitoring stations has the potential to help avert the catastrophic consequences of certain natural disasters, which is a valuable additional benefit of the system. In this context, we welcome the decision reached by the Preparatory Commission in November 2006 regarding the provision of IMS data to tsunami warning organisations and we look forward to its implementation. The EU believes that a continued interaction with the scientific community will result in wider benefits for the International Community and, at the same time, will ensure that monitoring technologies remain state-of-the-art.
Mr. Co-Presidents, Distinguished Delegates,

21. Against the backdrop of past experiences and current challenges to international peace and stability, the EU remains convinced that a universal nuclear test ban will enhance the security of all States. We call on all present here to work towards advancing the cause of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament by promoting Entry into Force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. The EU hopes that this Conference will send an unmistakable message of our joint determination to realise a world in which no nuclear weapons testing is permitted, for the sake of present and future generations.

Thank you.