Address by the Executive Secretary
of the Preparatory Commission for the
Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization
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Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the
Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty
(Vienna, 17-18 September 2007)

1. It is a great honor for me to address the fifth Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. I would like to thank the Secretary-General of the United Nations for convening this Conference and for his strong words of support for the Treaty. I would also like to thank the High Commissioner for Disarmament Affairs as well as the host country, Austria, for the excellent cooperation in organizing this conference.

2. I am grateful that States Ratifiers and Signatories alike have gathered here in Vienna to again express and underscore their support for the Treaty and its early Entry into Force and to work on concrete ways and means how this goal can be achieved.

3. Article XIV conferences are future oriented. Without stocktaking though, it is hard to chart future action. As in 2005, the basic challenges remain. We are awaiting entry into force with ten Annex 2 ratifications still outstanding and with important build-up tasks lying ahead of us.

4. Has anything changed at all compared to where we were in 2005? A “Preparatory Commission” is, by definition, the childhood of any organization. This child of ours has had no time to toddle. From day one it had to walk. It had to walk straight and steady because of the ambitious and unprecedented tasks for any treaty arrangement in terms of the ratifications required for Entry into Force and the size and the complexity of the verification regime. During the last two years, this child had to pick up further speed since, in addition to installation and certification, new tasks of sustainment, maintenance and operation had to be handled.

5. As for the universalization, while Entry into Force is still pending, twenty more states have signed or ratified the Treaty, bringing it significantly closer to the level of ratifications of other WMD prohibition norms.
6. In the area of build-up of the verification regime, the easiest way to quantify progress in the last two years is through certification numbers. We have moved from 135 to 211 certified facilities - a 60% increase in 2 years. Essential improvements have been made in International Data Center processing methods and software in all four technologies. The achievements were particularly significant for data analysis of radionuclide particulates and noble gas as well as for atmospheric transport modeling. Critical computer and network infrastructure was moved to a new computer centre. Storage capacity in IDC was expanded from 8 to 20 terabytes.

7. The nuclear weapon test of 9 October 2006, claimed by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), posed a challenge to the Treaty and the Commission on several fronts. Firstly, it constituted the most serious trial to the norm against nuclear testing for many years. The practically unanimous condemnation demonstrated how much the international community cares about the nuclear test ban.

8. Secondly, it was an imposed performance test for our organization and its nascent verification regime. The event tested our technical capabilities and procedures and the value that our global verification system can bring to the international community in a situation of such gravity. The monitoring system did prove that it ceased being a mere mathematical sum of the stations put in place one by one, less than 180 by that time. The monitoring system proved its future potential. It lived up to its name by functioning as a system, in a holistic and synergistic way. The Preparatory Commission was able to prove the value of the significant investment that has been made in the past decade. The event in the DPRK thus constituted a validation of the CTBT verification system. This bodes well for the verifiability of the CTBT once the system is complete and the Treaty is in force.

9. As regrettable and disquieting as this event was, it also served to refocus the attention of the international community on the relevance of the CTBT as a key disarmament and non-proliferation instrument. It also underscored the urgency of bringing the Treaty into force and completing the build-up of the CTBT verification system.

10. Since that imposed coming of age, in less than a year since October 2006 the Preparatory Commission has not remained idle. An additional nearly 20% increase in certified stations has been achieved. The number of noble gas stations increased by 70%. With 10 of the 11 envisaged stations now certified, we have virtually completed the network of hydroacoustic stations. A new Operations Centre was installed within the PTS with state of the art technology monitoring every step of the movement of data. New software to analyze data from the infrasound network has been developed. The new Global Communication Infrastructure was approved for installation, with the first monitoring station already linked to it.

11. While the CTBT-community can rightly feel proud of the progress made in building the verification system, there are significant challenges still ahead of us. Having crossed in the last two years the 50% certification barrier also means that the glass in those technologies is still half empty. Many of the remaining stations to be installed and certified are also the most difficult ones, posing considerable technical, financial
and political challenges. The glass is even less than half full on the noble gas stations, so critical in the light of the DPRK event. We have to learn by the time of the Entry into Force how to keep that dynamically growing monitoring system up and running, while meeting the highest standards of data availability and timeliness. Further improvements in processing methods and software in different technologies are required. Station operations must be kept cost-efficient. The migration to the next Global Communications Infrastructure will have to be undertaken. The first ever integrated on-site inspection field exercise is to be conducted. The support divisions have to cope with increasing and multifold demands in a challenging financial environment. And, let us not forget that the tasks ahead of us must be implemented in a much shorter timeframe than the 10 years that were required to put behind us the first half of the build-up job.

12. The build-up of the verification regime would not be possible without the political and financial commitment of States Signatories and Ratifiers, but also without the expertise, talent and dedication of the experts working as delegates and staff members in the Provisional Technical Secretariat and in the National Data Centers.

13. The way the system generates data and products is multilateralism at its best. It is creating a new standard for verification arrangements. 89 countries from North and South, East and West are hosting the facilities of the monitoring system that no country could build and deploy alone. As one of the most extensive global joint ventures, hundreds of station operators and national data centre staff support the system around the world around the clock. They represent a nearly invisible, but highly efficient and crucial extended arm of the monitoring system.

14. Countries independent of their size or contribution are entitled to all the benefits of a system which is close to 300 million USD of direct investment by now. In an all-inclusive manner data and products are shared near real time. The motto for this ultimate transparency in verification is: What We See Is What You Get.

15. The CTBT enables States, regardless of their size or wealth, to fully participate in the verification work and benefit from the wealth of data provided by the monitoring system. This includes a variety of potential and important civil and scientific applications. Most notable in this context is our contribution to tsunami warning organizations. As the provider of the fastest data - seismic and hydroacoustic – our system enhances the ability of tsunami warning centers to issue timely and reliable tsunami alerts.

16. It is heartening to see the robust increase of interest in the future common benefits of the system, especially by less developed countries. Since 2005 there has been a 20% increase in users in national institutions, the overall number reaching 840. Data products supplied to National Data Centers doubled, while the data itself has tripled just in the last two years.

17. The economic development and energy imperatives are dictating the resurgence of nuclear energy. On certain continents and in certain regions of the world the annual growth rate in the next quarter of a century in nuclear energy production and nuclear
capacity is projected to be between 6 to 12%. More and more states will embark upon the road of mastering different segments of the nuclear fuel cycle for their energy needs. The decision between nuclear energy for peaceful or for weapons purposes will be more and more a political and or legal rather than a technological issue. Legal barriers intended to prevent the misuse of nuclear energy “upstream” of the fuel cycle are facing increasing difficulties when it comes to this delineation between permitted and prohibited activities. The nuclear test provides the final and irreversible “downstream” proof as to the intentions of a state. The CTBT provides, thus, this last and clearly visible barrier between the peaceful legitimate use and the misuse of nuclear energy. This legal line needs to be drawn firmly and irrevocably.

18. However, ultimately our investment in the verification regime and our dedication will show its true potential only when the CTBT enters into force. It is for those states listed in Annex 2 whose ratification is still necessary for entry into force to consider the value of the CTBT for their national and for international security. It is for all of us, who are convinced of the crucial importance of this goal, to continue to support the Treaty and the Preparatory Commission both politically and financially. We need to continue our work of completing this unique system and to ensure that its capabilities live up to the highest expectations. We, in the Provisional Technical Secretariat will continue to do our utmost to contribute to this important endeavor.