Mr. Co-Presidents,

I would like to congratulate you for assuming the post of the President of the 6th Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. I wish you success in carrying out your duties. I assure you of my delegation’s cooperation and support. I would also like to thank both of you, as well as the Executive Secretary Mr. Tibor Toth and his staff from the Provisional Technical Secretariat for the exemplary preparatory work.

Mr. Co-Presidents,

The period since the 2008 CTBT Ministerial Meeting has been a quite remarkable one with regard to our quest to ensure the early entry into force of the Treaty. The political momentum we witness in the global agenda of nuclear disarmament is providing positive repercussions over the prospects of a CTBT in force.

It is a pleasure to see the US government being represented in this Conference. Consequently, the intention of the US Government, which was made known clearly and at the highest level, to seek the ratification of the Treaty in its Congress, is a positive step which encourages us to secure an early entry into force of the CTBT. The recent renewed commitment of China to this end is also welcome.

Secondly, the adoption of a Work Programme, after more than a decade, in the Conference on Disarmament (CD) feeds our hopes about the possible coupling of the last successful product of the CD, namely the CTBT, with another very important international instrument aiming at cutting off the production of the fissile materials, the FMCT.

Thirdly, we have left behind the Preparatory Committee meeting of the 2010 NPT Review Conference which had a markedly better atmosphere. We would like to interpret this atmosphere as a sign of willingness to achieve a meaningful outcome from the 2010 NPT RevCon.

Last but not least, the commitment undertaken by the two major nuclear weapon States, the US and the Russian Federation, to negotiate a new Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty by the end of this year is a remarkable one.
In light of the developments I have just mentioned, I believe we have profound reason to exert a renewed effort to pave the way for the early entry into force of the Treaty. In this regard, I will reiterate Turkey’s anticipation for those remaining nine Annex-2 states to ratify the Treaty as soon as possible.

Mr. Co-Presidents,

In order to ensure early ratification, we should continue to promote the essential role of the CTBT in curbing the proliferation of nuclear weapons and advancing nuclear disarmament, thereby significantly contributing to the enhancement of international peace and security. Its entry into force would definitely strengthen the international security architecture built upon the foundation of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. We must also continue to strive to have a verification system which is credible and operational. The operational readiness of the verification system is an important incentive. The obvious relevance of the CTBT in the field of nuclear disarmament architecture was cemented with the successful technical work conducted by the Provisional Technical Secretariat during the nuclear tests of the DPRK in 2006 and in 2009. Those deplored events also proved the value of the verification system and its detection capabilities. Hence, it is very important for the States Signatories to continue to work with the Secretariat to maintain the significant progress achieved vis-à-vis the build-up of the verification regime. Finally, we should continue to maintain a full-fledged and efficient organization, free from financial and other constraints.

Mr. Co-Presidents,

Turkey, since the inception of the CTBT, honored her political, financial and technical commitments stemming from the Treaty, in line with its well-known position favouring global, overall disarmament and supporting all efforts in the field of sustaining international security through arms control, non-proliferation and disarmament. In this context, it was also a pleasure for us to host the interregional seminar in Istanbul and to welcome the Executive Secretary Mr. Toth in Ankara last year.

To sum up, let me stress that much have been achieved since 1996 and the technical and political ground we still need to cover may now seem to have shrunk. But prevailing over remaining impediments nevertheless implies us to sustain and solidify our resolution to prevail nuclear weapons proliferation more than ever.

I thank you.