Mr. Chairman,

Excellencies,

Distinguished Colleagues,

At the outset, I wish to join previous speakers in extending our condolences and sympathies to the families and relatives of the people who were affected by the terrorist attacks in USA, Kazakhstan, Turkey and lately in France.

God bless their souls!

I would like to express our appreciation to H.E. Mr. Lassina Zerbo for his enduring work aimed at the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) and ensuring the effectiveness of CTBTO activities. We are also grateful to the Presidents of the Conference for their dedicated efforts towards facilitating the preparation for this important Ministerial Meeting.

This year marks the 20th Anniversary since the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty was open for signing. The Treaty provides a good mechanism for preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons and strengthening international nuclear safety and stability. At the same time, success of the Treaty still depends on the willingness of all states and world community itself. In this regards we hope that relevant countries will ratify the Treaty soon to make the Treaty come into force.

Mr. Chairman,

We welcome the fact that CTBT has achieved near universal adherence with signatures by 183 States and ratification by 164 States. Despite the aspiration to achieve the early entry into force of the treaty still more should be done to ensure the universality of CTBT and worldwide nuclear security.

We commend the efforts undertaken so far by the Preparatory Commission and the Provisional Technical Secretariat on the implementation of the treaty clauses, in particular on establishment of the International Monitoring System, On-site Inspection elements and International Data Center in Vienna.

In addition to its primary function, the treaty verification system brings scientific and civil benefits, including disaster alert systems, through civil and scientific applications of waveform and radionuclide technologies and use of the data. We are encouraged that CTBT verification regime has demonstrated its utility in providing accurate real-time data relating to major earthquakes, tsunamis and nuclear accidents, as well as other civil scientific applications to all signatory States. Since the data accumulated in the International Data Center could be used for the civil and scientific purposes, it is
important to seek the ways to ensure that those capabilities are broadly benefited by the international community.

We also commend the Provisional Technical Secretariat for providing relevant training courses and workshops, and rendering assistance to the signatory States for advancing their capabilities to ensure the effective implementation of the treaty clauses.

Mr. Chairman,

Speaking of Nuclear terrorism I would like to draw your attention to the threats that emanates from the Republic of Armenia.

Recently there is an increase of revealed facts about the special role played by Armenia in smuggling of nuclear and radioactive materials. Many groups of Armenian citizens dealing with highly enriched nuclear materials were detained on the Armenian-Georgian state border by the Georgian Authorities.

Will call the latest occasion which took place in April 2016, three Armenian citizens were detained with Uranium 238 worth of $200 mil (see enclosure in 2 pages).

Moreover, one should take into account the recent statements by Armenian high ranked officials, such as Seyran Ohanyan, the Minister of Defense and Hrant Bagartyan, former Prime Minister and current member of the Parliament claiming that Armenia possess secret and other types of dirty bombs.

These are the facts, evidences and official statements by the Republic of Armenia!!!!

There are threats of nuclear dirty bombs addressed to Azerbaijan by the Armenian leadership, which must be the concern of relevant International Organizations and world community.

Dear delegates, one can get acquainted with all those statements online by "Washington Times" or “The Jerusalem Post” under the title of “Nuclear concern in Armenia” dated May 7, 2016.

We must stop the raising threats in time just before they become unsolvable problem for all of us.

Thank you for your attentions.
Trafficicking in nuclear and other radioactive materials by Armenia

- **1999, May 22 – Berehovo town, Ukraine:** Two Armenians trying to sell 20 kg of Low-Enriched Uranium (LEU) U-235 ore and a buyer were arrested by Ukrainian law enforcement officials in the town of Berehovo – The Armenians demanded $35,000 per kg for the Uranium. They received heavy radiation doses because they had handled the material with their bare hands and carried it in rubber bags. According to one source, the material was enriched Uranium in white powder form stolen from a radioactive-materials recycling facility in Krasnoyarsk. Other sources said it was LEU metal suitable for making fuel for RBMK reactors.

- **2001, December 19 – Samtskhe-Javakheti region, Georgia:** 300 g of LEU were intercepted in an intelligence operation. The origin of the material was Armenia.

- **2003, June 26 – Armenia-Georgia border (Sadakhlo-Bagratashen checkpoint):** Smuggling case 170 grams of Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) U-235 (~90%). Detected by the Georgian border guards. An Armenian “war hero” named Garik Dadayan was busted when he walked through a nuclear sensor on the Georgia-Armenia border with 170 grams of unsheathed HEU in a tea box in two batches: 70 grams and 100 grams; and in two different forms: UO2 and U3O8. Reportedly, HEU was obtained from the Novosibirsk nuclear fuel fabrication facility, Russia. HEU sample was provided to Russia; remaining HEU was transferred to the USA. Dadayan was handed over to the Armenian government, tried, and sentenced in 2004 just to 2.5 years in prison.

- **2003, December 29 – Megri checkpoint on the Armenian-Iranian border, Armenia:** Armenian customs officials discovered a radiation source in a scrap metal shipment bound for Iran. It was reported that scrap metal was outbound from the Armenian Metsamor Nuclear Power Plant (NPP). Radioactive object discovered at the Armenian-Iranian border was an empty casing from a radioactive source, which previously contained strontium-90 (The presence of the casing for a radioactive source without the radioactive source itself would appear to imply that the source now rests at an unknown location without the protective barriers necessary to avoid injury to the public). Spectral analysis showed that the object has a high radioactivity level.

- **2004, March 13 – Armenia-Georgia border (Sadakhlo-Bagratashen checkpoint):** Armenian citizen with radioactive material detained. The report did not identify the radioactive material.

- **2007, October 24 – Georgia-Turkey border (Sarpi checkpoint):** Georgian police officers and operatives from the Special Operations Center of the Main Directorate of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Georgia for the Autonomous Republic of Adjara arrested 4 Armenian citizen for attempting to smuggle 2.04g of Lawrencium-103 in a specifically designed gold container.

- **2009 August 26-28 – Armenia-Georgia border (Sadakhlo-Bagratashen checkpoint):** The vehicle belonged to a resident of Noratus village of Gegharkunik region, Armenia, carrying three Armenian citizens entered Georgia from Armenia at the Sadakhlo border crossing. The car set off a gamma alarm on the radiation detection portal monitor. The driver provided a cursory explanation for the alarm, and the patrol police did not detain the group. On August 27, the same car returned to Armenia through the Sadakhlo crossing, and again set off a gamma alarm. At this point, the patrol police stopped and searched the vehicle. Georgian officials determined that the
car was contaminated with Cesium-137. However, because the search did not produce any radioactive material, the occupants were released and returned to Armenia.

- **2010 March – Tbilisi, Georgia:** Two Armenian, Businessman Smbat Tonoyan and Physicist of the Yerevan Institute of Physics Hrant Ohanyan were arrested by Georgian authorities in the hotel room, with 18 grams of 89% HEU brought from Armenia into Georgian territory. Two had concealed the material in a lead lined Marlboro cigarette package before boarding a train from Yerevan to Tbilisi. During the trial in Tbilisi, it was revealed that Tonoyan had demanded $8 million from a prospective buyer for 120 grams of the enriched uranium, but later dropped the asking price to $1.5 million. 18 grams would be shown to the buyer as a sample of the product in their possession. Smbat Tonoyan’s son Samuel Tonoyan, was a member of the Special Investigative Service of the Republic of Armenia. Interestingly, the seized HEU was provided to the smugglers by the same Armenian national, Garik Dadayan who was arrested in possession of the first sample of HEU intercepted in Georgia in 2003. Having served a relatively light prison sentence of 2.5 years, he resurfaced again in 2010 as a supplier of the same material.

- **2010, September 16 – Tbilisi Airport, Georgia:** Three persons were arrested at Tbilisi airport for attempting to sell a small quantity of mixed powder containing about 0.0004 kg of Plutonium (Pu) and 0.00008 kg of LEU. The individuals said they had brought the Uranium and Pu from the Russian Federation and Ukraine to sell it. One member of the group was from Armenia.

- **2014 August – Armenia-Georgia border (Sadakhlo-Bagratashen checkpoint):** Georgian authorities arrested two Armenians trying to smuggle Cesium 137 into Georgia.

- **2016 January – Armenia-Georgia border (Sadakhlo-Bagratashen checkpoint):** Georgian authorities arrested three Armenians, also for trying to sneak Cesium 137 across the border.

- **2016 mid-April – Georgia’s State Security Service detained three citizens of Armenia and three citizens of Georgia with trying to sell $200 million worth of Uranium-238 that was found in the home of one of the Georgians. The prefabricated transportation containers full of uranium were found in one of the detainee's apartment, he further said without disclosing the precise amount of the radioactive material. It is also known that the group of 3 Armenian citizens, previously worked in Metsamor NPP. One of the detainees was identified as a former associate of the Armenian secret service. This group planned to sell Uranium-238 to the Middle East region.

Repeated seizures at the Armenia–Georgia border and the unusually high number of Armenian nationals implicated in nuclear trafficking cases provide sufficient evidence to confirm the existence of the Armenian route. Some of these cases involved seizures of of weapons-usable nuclear material. Radioactive sources could be also used for malicious purposes, for example in a radiological dispersal device or "dirty bomb." Uncontrolled radioactive sources also have the potential to harm human health or the environment. Unlawfully discarded or disposed of radioactive sources, when melted at scrap metal recycle plants, may lead to severe environmental and economic related consequences.

Sources: Annual statistics reports of the IAEA Incident and Trafficking Database (IDTB), Database on Nuclear Smuggling, Theft, and Orphan Radiation Sources (DSTO), reports by NTI, SIPRI, and other open media sources.