Mr Chair,

Brazil associates itself fully with the statement delivered by GRULAC, and would like to add a few remarks in its national capacity.

Mr President,

We note with satisfaction the progress made over the last two decades by the Preparatory Commission in terms of setting up the machinery for the Treaty's implementation. Although most of what is needed for that purpose seems to be in place, there is still no prospect for the CTBT's entry into force in the foreseeable future.

In light of this situation, the 20th anniversary of a Treaty that has not yet been set in motion is, for sure, not a date to be celebrated. But that should not discourage us from stocktaking and making a sober assessment of what we want to achieve with the CTBT.

Today’s event and other activities regarding the 20\textsuperscript{th} anniversary of the CTBT cannot be confined to promoting the Treaty’s entry into force. While redoubling our efforts towards getting the accession by
the remaining eight Annex 2 States, we should also take this special occasion to ask ourselves about the CTBT's significance in the international nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament regime, which was the very reason States joined the Treaty in the first place.

If we want to promote new adherences to the Treaty but also ensure continued political support from those States that have already joined it, some important, concrete steps must be taken in order to ensure that the CTBT remains a credible and meaningful instrument.

In this regard, we cannot condone nuclear doctrines or policies that indicate the determination of nuclear weapons states not only to maintain but also to modernize their arsenals. Such policies are in clear contravention of both the letter and the spirit of the CTBT. Narrow, self-interested interpretations of the Treaty, as a measure only for the cessation of nuclear explosions, have the effect of defeating its objectives of curbing proliferation and promoting nuclear disarmament.

It is disingenuous that some States continue to advocate so-called "step by step" or “progressive” approaches to nuclear disarmament, when the actual steps taken by nuclear-weapon States point to the opposite direction and undermine the CTBT's relevance.

We were encouraged by the fact that the Final Declaration of the Article XIV Conference last September could reaffirm the call on all States to refrain from the development and use of new nuclear weap-
on technologies and any action that would undermine the object and purpose and the implementation of the provisions of the CTBT.

That was made, to a great extent, possible because all States from Latin America and the Caribbean have been championing the cause of the integrity and relevance of CTBT. This was most recently restated in the Special Declaration on the 20th anniversary of the CTBT, issued by the Heads of State of CELAC last January.

Mr Chair,

The conclusion of the CTBT happened only one year after the indefinite extension and strengthening of the review process of the NPT. Those developments took place in the aftermath of the end of the Cold War, on the understanding that accelerated steps would be taken in order to rid the world of nuclear weapons. Unfortunately, 20 years later, such a goal still remains an elusive and distant one.

That notwithstanding, an effective end to all nuclear tests and other experiments associated with the modernisation of nuclear arsenals might rekindle the perception that the CTBT can be a meaningful instrument for nuclear disarmament. At the next anniversaries of the Treaty, we hope we will have reasons to come to this conclusion.

Thank you, Mr Chair.