Mr. Chairman,

On behalf of the Government of Canada, I wish to extend my thanks to you and to all of the ratifiers and signatories of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty present here today for demonstrating a continued commitment to this vitally important Treaty. I also wish to take this opportunity to congratulate Djibouti, the Cook Islands, Madagascar and Vanuatu for their recent ratifications, which brings to 125 the number of States that have agreed that the security of their citizens and of this planet is enhanced by banning, for all time, the testing of nuclear weapons.

I lament, however, that this Treaty remains an unfinished piece of disarmament and non-proliferation business on the agenda of the international community nine years after it was opened for signature. In the coming days, we, the ratifiers and signatories of this Treaty, must focus our attention, first and foremost, on ways to promote ratification of the Treaty amongst the remaining eleven States listed in Annex 2 and, second, on ways to universalise the Treaty amongst the remaining non-Annex 2 States.

The CTBT is a Treaty that works by constraining the ability of States to develop nuclear weapons ab initio while also constraining the ability of States with existing nuclear stockpiles to make qualitative improvements to their weapons. The Treaty applies equally to all States and the activities that the Treaty prohibits can be effectively verified by the International Monitoring System’s worldwide network of detection stations. Without question, the nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament aspects of the CTBT provide security benefits to all States in all regions of the world and constitute a crucial step in alleviating the threat of nuclear war that has persisted for sixty years.

Many of you were also here in this very building five months ago for the Review Conference of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Delegations were confronted with procedural wrangling and inflexible positions and, regrettably, no progress was made on building upon the landmark Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference. The results of the 2005 Review Conference were disappointing for Canada, but the lack of progress has served to motivate my government to promote progress actively in other venues that strive to further the cause of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. This Entry into Force Conference is one of those venues.

Many are surprised that a Treaty which provides so many security benefits to so many States has not entered into force after the better part of a decade. Experts in countries all over the world have wrestled with this problem and have proposed a number of innovative and creative solutions. In the previous three Entry-into-Force Conferences, ratifiers and signatories have proposed measures to facilitate ratification of the Treaty, such as urging officials of ratifying States to raise CTBT ratification at meetings with counterparts in non-ratifying States; providing legal and technical
assistance to States that want to implement national legislation; exploring civilian application of IMS monitoring technology; and undertaking regional outreach activities. One especially innovative measure agreed at the 2003 Entry-into-Force Conference was the creation of the office of the Special Representative to promote entry into force of the Treaty. I commend Dutch Ambassador Jaap Ramaker for his hard work as the first Special Representative. As one of the countries that volunteer to assist him in his work, Canada appreciates his efforts in working to advance entry into force of the Treaty.

So far, the Treaty has been signed by 176 States and ratified by 125, including 33 of 44 ratifications by Annex 2 States. Progress in gaining more ratifications has been steady, but entry into force remains elusive. This year, the Final Declaration includes yet more practical and innovative ideas for advancing entry into force. One proposal, suggested by Canada and built upon by other ratifiers, is to encourage States in the same region to ratify the Treaty in a coordinated manner. Canada has noted in its deliberations with many non-ratifiers that regional security dynamics are a strong impediment to ratification for some. Our modest proposal would thus address one of the most common objections to ratification by such States in light of these harsh realities: "why should I ratify when others in the region refuse to do so?".

By agreeing to ratify together at the same time, both Annex 2 and non-Annex 2 States in a given region can help build security and confidence in regions that suffer all too often from insecurity and uncertainty. Building confidence is often a leap of faith: by ratifying the CTBT simultaneously, States can make a significant leap jointly for the benefit of the entire world. After all, it is clear that testing nuclear weapons would be an unparalleled risk to regional stability and security.

It is indeed an honour to attend this important conference, but I look forward to the day when such Conferences are no longer necessary. I am confident that we all, as well as active members of civil society, will continue to demonstrate the resolve to support the CTBT and stand by the principles that form the backbone of the nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament regime. I call on ratifiers, in particular, to work to convince States that have not yet ratified the Treaty that the CTBT represents a monumental step in shackling the nuclear genie and building a safe and secure world for everyone everywhere.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.