## STATEMENT BY HIS EXCELLENCY MR. KIM TRAAVIK STATE SECRETARY HEAD OF THE NORWEGIAN DELEGATION TO THE CONFERENCE ON FACILITATING THE ENTRY INTO FORCE OF THE COMPREHENSIVE NUCLEAR-TEST-BAN TREATY

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Mr. President,

Existing multilateral instruments on disarmament and non-proliferation are vital to meet the new threats to our security. Universal adherence to these instruments is crucial if we are to succeed. Multilateralism must remain a core principle. We must continue to ensure that these instruments function well.

Improving the multilateral instruments in the field of non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament, and ensuring strict compliance with the various regimes is an integral part of our fight against international terrorism.

The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) is an indispensable step towards non-proliferation and disarmament.

We deeply deplore the fact that seven years after it was opened for signature, the CTBT has still not entered into force. We call upon the 25 states that have not signed the Treaty, and those that have not ratified it, to do so without delay and unconditionally.

We welcome the recent ratification of the Treaty by Algeria and Cyprus. These are important steps towards universalisation of the Treaty, which is our ultimate goal. Universal adherence to the CTBT and its early entry into force continue to be a priority for Norway.

We hope that this conference will create further momentum that will result in more States signing or ratifying the Treaty. This applies particularly to those 12 states whose ratification is required in order for the Treaty to enter into force.

The CTBT is an essential complement to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and a building block for further efforts towards nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, since testing is one of the principle engines of nuclear proliferation. The CTBT also acts as a barrier to the qualitative development of nuclear weapons, and thus it promotes and enhances the process of nuclear disarmament. Hence, verification of compliance with the Treaty is crucial.

It is of the greatest importance that the integrity of the norms set by the CTBT is respected. We are worried that the development of new weapons may result in the resumption of tests. Likewise it is vital to retain the current nuclear threshold.

Pending the treaty's entry into force, self-imposed moratoria on nuclear testing are a useful measure. Such moratoria cannot, however, replace the legally binding commitment represented by the signing and ratification of the CTBT.

Mr. President,

The NPT is facing serious challenges. We deeply deplore the announcement by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to withdraw from the Treaty. We call once again

upon the Democratic Peoples' Republic of Korea to reverse its course of action, to comply with its obligations under the NPT and to co-operate fully with the IAEA.

We welcome the initiative that led to the recent six-country meeting in Beijing. Although the meeting was not as productive as we would have hoped, this process should and must continue. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea has a special responsibility in this regard. The Korean peninsula needs a new start leading towards stability, reconciliation and a lasting settlement on all aspects of nuclear issues. A solution must be found through dialogue.

Norway fully supports the IAEA in its efforts to conduct a comprehensive examination of Iran's nuclear programme. We call on Iran to co-operate fully with the IAEA in all its nuclear activities and immediately and unconditionally to sign, ratify and implement an Additional Protocol to its Safeguards Agreement. Transparency regarding Iran's nuclear programme and co-operation with the IAEA are necessary if confidence is to be restored.

## Mr. President,

The verification system is at the core of the CTBT. Financial and political support for the Preparatory Commission of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization must continue unabated. We must maintain the momentum in building the verification regime, which will build confidence that States will keep to their commitments once the Treaty enters into force.

We must ensure the necessary funding for a continued build-up of the International Monitoring System (IMS) in order for the verification regime to meet the requirements set out in the Treaty. Norway has contributed actively to the CTBT and the development of its verification regime. We will continue to do so.

## Mr. President,

This conference is important for our common goals: an early entry into force of the Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty and universal adherence. This is essential to international peace and security.

Thank you, Mr. President.