

**Statement by
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**Second Conference of State Parties and Signatories of Treaties that
Establish Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zones
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On behalf of the Executive Secretary of the Preparatory Commission of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty Organisation, I wish to express my deep appreciation for the opportunity to address this important and timely conference.

The year 2010 represents one of the most important thresholds in the history of arms control, non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament. As we look ahead to the opening of the 2010 Nuclear Non-proliferation (NPT) Review Conference, we gather in the wake of a series of important events, such as the entry into force of both the Central Asian and African Nuclear Weapon Free Zones, the 10th anniversary of Mongolia's legally established nuclear weapon free status, and the 2009 Conference on Facilitating the Entry-Into-Force of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) - which enjoyed unprecedented high-level attendance and produced a strongly worded consensus Final Declaration. These milestones serve as key reminders of the important relationship between NWFZs, the CTBT and the NPT. Complementarities between these instruments run like a steel thread through the nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament regime.

Nuclear Weapon Free Zones (NWFZs) and the CTBT are bound in spirit and letter, and share a common history. The grave human and environmental consequences of nuclear testing have been a key driving force behind the international community's quest to establish NWFZs. Testing in the South Pacific led to a proposal by New Zealand to establish a NWFZ, clearing the way for the Treaty of Rarotonga. Similarly, nuclear weapons testing in Kazakhstan and Algeria culminated in the Central Asian Treaty and the Treaty of Pelindaba.

Entry into force of the Pelindaba Treaty carries both symbolic and political importance. The symbolism attached to the Zulu word "Pelindaba", which roughly translates into "the matter or discussion is settled", not only signals the end of the struggle to make Africa free of nuclear weapons, but the establishment of the African NWFZ makes the whole of the Southern Hemisphere

nuclear weapons free. The entry into force of the Pelindaba Treaty also made the entire Southern Hemisphere nuclear test-free. Large parts of the Northern Hemisphere, including countries that have been victims of nuclear testing, are also covered, thereby expanding nuclear weapons free areas of the world to the borders of states with nuclear weapons. The desire by most countries and their citizens is clear: no nuclear weapons and no more nuclear testing!

NWFZs and the CTBT complement each other in that they both contain legal obligations to prohibit nuclear tests. In fact it can be argued that while the CTBT is not yet in force globally, it is already effectively in force in all the States covered by existing NWFZ. The CTBT and its implementing organisation bolster NWFZ by providing states covered by these zones with a powerful verification mechanism.

However, providing a legal basis for the CTBT verification mechanism relies upon securing new ratifications. States covered by existing NWFZs should have no conceivable political obstacles to ratifying the CTBT. They have already made a legally binding commitment not to test nuclear weapons or to allow nuclear testing on their territories. Nevertheless, of the 115 States under these zones, a full 30 have not yet ratified the CTBT. The signing and ratification of the CTBT by these 30 states will make a significant impact on both the universalisation of the CTBT and its entry into force. Since these States are already de facto bound by the obligations of the CTBT, I encourage them to ratify the CTBT without delay. Such action will further strengthen the bond between NWFZ and the CTBT and underline their combined role as a powerful force for international peace and security. It will also further strengthen their non-proliferation and disarmament obligations under the NPT.

As we look into the future, the CTBT represents an opportunity to build confidence and promote regional stability. By ratifying the CTBT, countries demonstrate that they are prepared to draw a line in the sand and state unequivocally that the Treaty is fundamental to their own national security interests. Such action can also pave the way for new NWFZs. For example, if all countries in the Middle East ratify the CTBT, it would be a key step in creating the right conditions for a Middle East NWFZ. CTBT ratification carries no political cost while the positive spillover effects can increase mutual trust and significantly enhance stability throughout this region.

More broadly, CTBT ratification offers an invaluable opportunity for States to unambiguously demonstrate the peaceful intentions of their nuclear programs. Likewise, States possessing nuclear weapons can show the international community that they are willing to accept a qualitative constraint on their ability to develop nuclear weapons.

Since the CTBT opened for signature in 1996, myriad political challenges have threatened the Treaty's well-being. However, throughout these politically turbulent times, the international community has responded by strengthening its collective commitment to the CTBT. This commitment also applies to the multilateral security architecture embodied in both the Treaty's non-discriminatory legal obligations and its democratic verification mechanism. But, fulfilling this

commitment is of paramount importance if the international community is to succeed in realizing the objectives of a nuclear free world.

The Treaty now enjoys near universal support, boasting 182 signatory States and 151 ratifying States. Taken together with the wide swath of countries under NWFZ, these treaties represent a significant portion of the globe committed to a nuclear free world. These States have demonstrated their recognition that adherence to these Treaties buttresses the foundation of the non-proliferation regime and strengthens international peace and security. Still, nine Annex 2 States – China, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Egypt, India, Indonesia, the Islamic Republic of Iran, Israel, Pakistan and United States - need to ratify the CTBT for it to enter into force. Moreover, the signature and ratification of all States that have not yet done so will provide important momentum towards entry into force as an expression of global confidence in the wider nonproliferation and disarmament regime. I am pleased to convey a message from Executive Secretary Tibor Toth welcoming a significant development in this regard: “I warmly welcome the statement made today by Foreign Minister Marty Natalagewa to the Indonesian Parliament that Indonesia will soon ratify the CTBT. This announcement is of crucial importance in moving the treaty closer to entry into force, and underscores the leadership role of Indonesia in regional and global non-proliferation and disarmament efforts.”

With the 2010 NPT Review Conference upon us, we must identify key measures that the international community can find consensus around and that can help produce a positive outcome. I believe that in this respect, the CTBT and NWFZ treaties are clear choices. Steps towards universalisation and entry into force of the CTBT represent an important catalyst that will strengthen existing NWFZ and provide States with the confidence to pursue additional NWFZ. Such progress will fortify the resolve of NPT State parties as they address the multitude of challenges facing the nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament regime. Of course headway on the CTBT and the establishment of new NWFZ alone will not solve the many concerns generated by nuclear weapons. But, entry into force of the CTBT and full implementation of existing NWFZ and their protocols will place clear-cut and irrefutable obligations upon States. These commitments serve as tangible steps to realize the goals of the NPT. They strengthen the nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime, inching us closer towards a nuclear free world.
