MC.DEL/35/11 6 December 2011

ENGLISH only



TBTO preparatory commission for the comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty organization

## Message from the Executive Secretary of the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization Mr Tibor Tóth

## OSCE Ministerial Council Meeting, Vilnius, Lithuania 6-7 December 2011

I am pleased for the opportunity to convey my message to the Eighteenth Ministerial Council Meeting of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), and to express my gratitude for the ongoing strong support for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) and the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO).

The role of OSCE participating States and its Partners for Cooperation continues to remain central to strengthening regional and global peace and security. As reflected in the 2010 Astana Commemorative Declaration, emerging transnational threats such as terrorism, organized crime, illegal migration, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, require robust and coordinated mechanisms and means to eradicate these threats. In this context, enhanced cooperation among OSCE States, Partner States and international organizations reinforces cooperative security structures that promote international peace and security through adherence to treaties and conventions that comprise the international nonproliferation regime.

The CTBT offers a unique and unparalled mechanism for cooperation among political and economically diverse nations. As a regional and international framework for cooperation, it serves as an equalizer among all states with the common objective to ensure a universal and verifiable ban on nuclear test leading to the eventual elimination of nuclear weapons, widely considered to be the most serious threat to existence of humankind. Moreover, the CTBT serves as a regional confidence and security building measure. As one of the three key elements of all Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones (NWFZ) – no nuclear weapons; no fissile material for nuclear weapons; and no nuclear weapons

tests - it complements the observance of regional pacts designed to ensure regional Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones.

The past three years have witnessed growing political support for the CTBT and the continuous build-up of its International Monitoring System. More than 80% complete, this System offers all CTBT members access to transparent and transboundary data. It is significant that OSCE participating States host nearly half of the more than 370 monitoring facilities that make up the System. OSCE States carry the bulk of the financial burden to develop and support this verification investment. The return on investment is clear. The technical achievements of the verification regime have been tried and tested by wide performance tests and real-time continuous performance monitoring. They were tried and tested by the two nuclear tests by the DPRK in 2006 and 2009. They were also weighed by the forces of nature and man-made disasters.

In March this year, the world witnessed the unfortunate tragic developments of the Fukushima accident following the devastating earthquake in Japan. These tragic events triggered all systems of the verification systems in place, and as such served as an unintended stress test for the system a whole. It also highlighted that just as nuclear testing is of global concern, the accidental release of radionuclides and noble gasses is a transboundary issue that require a global response. In this regard, the Commission was able to provide credible and accurate data and data products to all State signatories, and to more than 1200 registered data users, including the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the World Health Organization (WHO).

The value of the OSCE and its Partners for Cooperation in strengthening the Treaty and its verification regime is unquestionable. The OSCE remains an important forum to raise awareness on the CTBT, the activities of the Commission, and to seek support in further promoting universalization and entry into force of the Treaty. The Treaty's membership is steadily increasing towards becoming one of the most universally adhered to international agreements. This testifies to the commitment by the vast majority of the international community to giving the Treaty full legal standing beyond its de facto international norm. To date, 182 States have signed the Treaty, while 155 States have ratified it.

I welcome the Indonesian parliament's ratification of the CTBT on 6 December 2011, to be followed by the deposit of the instrument of ratification with the United Nations Secretary General in New York shortly thereafter. Indonesia's ratification is required for the CTBT to enter into force as one of the Annex 2 States.

Jointly, we must strive to secure the remaining ratifications of the Annex 2 States to the Treaty which have not yet ratified, thus delaying entry into force, while at the same time promoting universal adherence. In this regard, the OSCE is setting a clear example. All 56 OSCE participating States and Partners for Cooperation are signatories to the CTBT and ratification is nearly all encompassing in the OSCE region. The 7th Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the CTBT was convened in New York on 23 September 2011, coinciding with the 15th Anniversary of the signing of the Treaty.

The Final Declaration adopted at that conference urges progress on the outstanding ratifications and reaffirms the CTBT as a core element of the nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime. With OSCE support, we can build on the momentum created by these ratifications to soon reach the threshold of 160 ratifying States.

There is need for increased and sustainable support for the Treaty and its verification system. Ongoing OSCE support for and participation in the Commission's training programmes for station operators, National Data Centers, future on-site inspectors, government officials, etc., is of critical importance. The contribution by OSCE and Partner States by providing voluntary contributions for the participation of experts from developing countries in the activities of the Commission is also highly valued.

Moreover, it is essential to train and educate the next generation of the CTBT experts and to sustain the expertise on the CTBT verification technologies. For this reason, the Commission launched its Capacity Development Initiative last year, which aims to develop and enhance capacities in the areas related to the Treaty by establishing a network of partnerships with governments, scientists, scholars, educators, and journalists, particularly younger generations. It was inaugurated with a highly successful Introductory Course on the Science and Political Significance of the CTBT held in September this year. Over 230 participants from 79 countries participated in the course, many following the course on-line and in real time. A more ambitious two-week long Advanced Science Course (28 November to 9 December 2011), which boasts more than 400 registered participants from 100 nationalities, is now underway.

The CTBT is underpinned by state-of-the art science and technology that knows no borders. In June this year, more than 800 scientists from around the globe gathered in Vienna for the 2011 Science and Technology Conference where they discussed advances in science and technology relevant to test ban verification and explore scientific applications of the CTBT verification infrastructure. This cooperation and knowledge exchange between the Commission and the broader scientific community has already sown the seeds for the next Science, Technology and Innovation Conference that will take place in June 2013.

I look forward to further enhanced interaction between the Preparatory Commission and the OSCE with a view to working hand-in-hand in achieving a safer and more secure world free from nuclear weapons. To this end, cooperation between the OSCE and the Preparatory Commission provides opportunities for confidence building and promotes the role of international organizations in cooperative security. It is through mutual confidence, enhanced cooperation, and meaningful dialogue that the international community can turn the vision of a nuclear weapons free world into reality.